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ABSTRACT 
This thesis advocates for the inclusion of liberal education in discussions of college and 
university missions and mandates in North America. It is conceived with the purpose of 
influencing policy thinking and generating the theory and ideas required for sound education 
policy decision making. Research into liberal education is a special and atypical kind of inquiry 
and requires innovative theoretical approaches. Liberal education is foremost a philosophical 
problem and requires philosophical approaches; the method used is, therefore, conceptual in 
nature and drawn from analytical philosophy.  
My research approaches liberal education conceptually in three ways: historically, 
philosophically, and politically. Historically, all explanations of liberal education remain partial, 
debatable, and fragmentary. Philosophically, liberal education brings into focus fundamental 
questions and problems with a universal significance. Liberal education is perhaps best 
characterized as an ongoing argument, discussion, and debate. Politically, liberal education is 
relevant to many of the challenges facing North American society. Liberal education is civic in 
nature, aimed at producing responsible citizens able to contribute to democracy and the 
continuation of democratic institutions. 
The contribution to knowledge made by this research is the development of liberal education 
towards idealism and universality. Universality provides the meta-principle needed to ground the 
inclusion of liberal education in the missions and mandates of North American colleges and 
universities. The synthesis of the three conceptual approaches (i.e., historical, philosophical, and 
political) produces a new justification for liberal education, one based in objectivity and 
rationality as universal values.  My argument is that the values of objectivity and rationality are 
the best explanation of the universalist understanding of liberal education and its processes and 
goals. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the modern world, education is a given; in the Western world, even post-secondary education 
is considered a fundamentally important basis for a democratic way of life. But the world, and 
education, continues to change, never more rapidly than in our own times. In this new world, the 
time-honored notion of a liberal education seems to fit less and less comfortably.  
Liberal education has a long history that can be traced back to ancient times and to the founding 
of the university as an institution. Liberal education is (or, at least, has been) part of the soul of 
the university, the product of a vast intellectual tradition. In this dissertation, I argue that liberal 
education is eminently justified in a modern world, and I advocate for the return of liberal 
education to a position of central importance in post-secondary education. My goal is to 
explicate a rich theory of liberal education that can influence policy thinking and sound decision 
making in higher education and support the inclusion of liberal education in the missions and 
mandates of North American colleges and universities.  
In Chapter One, I address some key issues. To begin, I examine various definitions and 
conceptions of liberal education and begin to generate theory that is consistent with both its 
history and its place in a modern world; a theory that can take us forward through the 21st 
century. Secondly, I provide a rationale for addressing the issue of liberal education at all, 
attempting to justify its significance in a modern world and, in particular, referencing what some 
critics go so far as to call a crisis in postsecondary education in North America. Thirdly, I 
explain what I mean by theory, what purposes theory serves, and how my theory of liberal 
education will develop. Finally in Chapter One, I explicate my methodology. 
1.2 LIBERAL EDUCATION: INITIAL DEFINITIONS 
The word liberal derives from the Latin librare, to free. A liberal education, then, might be an 
education “for a free mind, a mind curious to roam where it will, intent on study for its own 
sake” (Gould, 2003, pp. 12-13). Others have also attempted to define and describe liberal 
education: 
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A liberal education fosters the ability to distinguish between what is true and what is false 
. . . . I call this a liberating education, liberating students from their provincial origins, no 
matter what their station in life. (Scott, 2014, p. 25) 
Liberal education in the university refers to activities that are designed to cultivate 
intellectual creativity, autonomy, and resilience; critical thinking; a combination of 
intellectual breadth and specialized knowledge; the comprehension and tolerance of 
diverse ideas and experiences; informed participation in community life; and effective 
communication skills. (Axelrod, 2002, p. 34-5) 
A philosophy of education that empowers individuals, liberates the mind from ignorance, 
and cultivates social responsibility. Characterized by challenging encounters with 
important issues, and more a way of studying than specific content, liberal education can 
occur at all types of colleges and universities. (Schneider, 2013, p. 4) 
“Liberal education” also needs to be distinguished explicitly from other terms with which it is 
commonly and unreflectively conflated, such as “liberal arts,” “general education,” and “the 
humanities.” Glyer and Weeks (1998), Table 1 below, demonstrate an attempt to differentiate 
liberal education from other closely associated concepts. 
Table 1 CONCEPTUAL DIFFERENTIATIONS1 
Liberal 
Arts 
Although the notion of academic disciplines is a recent development, seven 
fields of study have historically been identified as liberal arts: logic, grammar, 
rhetoric, mathematics, geometry, music, and astronomy. Any number of other 
subjects have been dubbed modern spin-offs of those seven fields, but there is 
no consensus about other fields claiming such status. 
                                                          
1 Glyer, Diana & Weeks, David. L. (1998) Liberal Education: Initiating the Conversation, in 
Glyer, Diana & Weeks, David. L. (eds.), The Liberal Arts in Higher Education: Challenging 
Assumptions, Exploring Possibilities. Lanham, New York, & Oxford: University Press of 
America, Inc. (pp. ix-xvi). 
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Liberal 
Education 
An education grounded in the liberal arts which extends to an investigation into 
the central human questions: Who am I? Why am I here? What is my 
responsibility to God, to other individuals, to the community? What is true? 
What is good? What is beautiful? It is also helpful to explain what liberal 
education is not. The following three views may be part of liberal education but 
should not be mistaken for liberal education itself: (1) the development of 
transferrable intellectual capacities (e.g., critical thinking, higher order 
reasoning, and intellectual virtue) and the sharpening of basic skills (e.g., 
reading, writing, speaking, and listening); (2) a survey of the "cultural heritage 
of Western civilization" to establish cultural literacy, inculcate Western values, 
and cultivate aesthetic taste; and (3) general education. 
Trivium Those disciplines generally referred to as the literary arts, the verbal arts, the 
humane letters, the arts of eloquence - grammar, logic, and rhetoric. These 
protean arts were always understood more broadly then contemporary 
formulations; the trivium generally included but was never restricted to 
linguistics, critical thinking, and persuasive communication, the arts of 
composing, delivering, and analyzing written and oral communication, or even 
reading, writing, and thinking. It was no accident that one studies the arts of 
eloquence by reading classical literature, often histories, not only in one's native 
language, but in a foreign language (usually Latin and Greek) because the 
classics were the consummate guide to moral philosophy (ethics and politics). 
Therefore, a contemporary formulation of the trivium probably includes the 
study of language, literature, foreign language, communication, logic, history, 
ethics, and politics . 
Quadrivium Those disciplines often referred to as the mathematical arts, the arts of wisdom 
and understanding - arithmetic, geometry, music, and astronomy. These arts 
revolve around the study of things, of quantities, and of abstractions, symbolic 
representations of things such as numbers. One scholar describes the quadrivium 
as consisting "of the mathematical or 'learnable' arts, so called because they 
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concern intelligible objects, which are traditionally ordered according to 
increasing corporeality, from dimensionless arithmetic through plane and solid 
geometry, to astronomy (the application of mathematics to moving bodies) and 
music (the study of bodies executing harmonious motions, that is, physics)." 
Geography was often a part of the study of geometry. A contemporary 
formulation of the quadrivium probably includes mathematics, the natural 
sciences (i.e., physics, astronomy, geology, biology, and chemistry) and, 
perhaps, geography. 
Liberalism Those modern social and political movements ranging from democratic 
socialists to libertarians which are identified with the ideals of liberty, equality, 
progress, and individual rights. Although both classical and contemporary 
liberals advance particular and influential understandings of liberal education, 
liberalism and liberal education are not essentially related. Political liberals are 
not the end product of liberal education. 
General 
Education 
An utterly amorphous notion that is used to describe either (a) an educational 
experience that prepares all students for life in general, a common denominator 
approach; or (b) a basic level of study  in most major fields of inquiry, that is to 
say, a required "taste" of many different fields, or (c) a comprehensive term used 
to describe the combination of academic and co-curricular experiences that 
constitute a student's complete college experience. 
 
LIBERAL ARTS:  The origins of the liberal arts are in Ancient Greece and Rome. Plato's 
Academus, established in 387 BC, is the contested origin of the historical and philosophical 
impetus. While Plato emphasized purely theoretical truth, his contemporary, Isocrates, advocated 
for a civic kind of liberal education based in rhetoric and the preparation of an enlightened 
leadership. The “liberal arts” took concrete shape in the Hellenic era as a kind of study suitable 
to “a free man.” In the Middle Ages, the liberal arts were reconfigured by the rise of Christianity 
and synthesized in the emerging universitatis. They took on the connotation of “liberatory” - that 
is, freeing. From the outset, the scope of the liberal arts was malleable, embodying different 
 5 
 
contents and different methods depending on context, and the liberal arts have a massive range of 
different hierarchical organizations and different interpretations of each individual art (Kimball, 
1986).  
During the reconfiguration of knowledge by the rise of the medieval European universities in the 
13th century, the core of the liberal education became known as the “seven liberal arts” and 
became a program aimed at developing the intellectual and moral substance of society’s future 
leaders. The liberal arts at the universitatis represented preparatory studies necessary for entry 
into the higher level studies of law, medicine, and theology (Graffon et al, 2010). 
Today, the “liberal arts” commonly refers to unspecialized studies during the undergraduate 
years at colleges and universities, and usually to certain cultural branches of learning - 
languages, history, religion, and the arts and humanities as over and against science and 
technology education (Allen, 2007). The liberal arts represent a broad and general education 
combined with an in-depth critical appreciation of an academic discipline, comprising a 
curriculum that aims at developing general knowledge and general cognitive capacities 
combined with sufficient depth to form a critical awareness. The liberal arts are the modern 
developed version of the trivium (i.e., grammar, logic, and rhetoric) and the quadrivium (i.e., 
music, geometry, arithmetic, and astronomy) of the medieval universitatis, The medieval arts 
represent an attempt to systematize the philosophical precepts of liberal education into a course 
of liberal studies (Axelrod, 2002). Rothblatt (1993) thematized from historical fragments the 
attributes of a liberal education as 
a. liberation from the self or parts of the self, mentally or emotionally, or from society or the 
prejudices and limitations of society; 
b. breadth of outlook, a capacity to see connections and hence an ability to make 
fundamental decisions and judgments;  
c. independence of mind, born of a breadth of outlook and freedom from prejudice and pre-
conception; and, 
d. an understanding of human nature, the motives and springs of action in human conduct, 
and by extension, institutions and basic human structures (p. 28). 
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HUMANITIES: During the Italian Renaissance (14th-17th centuries) the term studia humanitatis 
(literally “studies of humanity”) meant a program of humane, secular, and classical studies 
defined as distinct from theology by content and method, and by the 19th century the humanities 
began to be defined specifically as distinct from the natural sciences. In our times, the humanities 
often mean a kind of “values education,” as distinct from both the natural and the social sciences. 
The humanities have also sometimes been called “the spiritual sciences” and “the human 
sciences,” defined as dealing with everything outside the domain of the natural sciences.  
LIBERAL STUDIES AND GENERAL EDUCATION:  The term “liberal studies” commonly 
refers to courses based in the liberal arts and humanities that complement a program of business, 
science, technology, or professional studies (Allen, 2007). Today, “liberal studies” refers to a 
program often called “general education” which is broadly based in the arts and sciences, and 
often comprised of studies in literature, languages, philosophy, history, mathematics, and 
science.  
LIBERAL EDUCATION:  The liberal arts, humanities, liberal studies, and general education are 
all aspects of liberal education to the extent that they aim at developing a certain frame or bent of 
mind characterized by universality, but these programs do not mark out its entire scope. A 
liberally educated person is often regarded as someone with a critical capacity to reflect on 
values, opinions, and judgements and connect them to the whole of knowledge. A liberal 
education involves initiation into the historically transmitted tradition of the liberal arts. It is not 
merely the transmission of content, but initiation into a state of mind developed over centuries of 
change - initiation into historical and philosophical modes of thinking.  
The British philosopher of education R.S. Peters (1965) (see Chapter Three, p. 48-54) 
emphasized the inter-subjective nature of education generally as involving a special kind of love 
and a feeling of togetherness and mutual respect. Applying this notion to the concept of a liberal 
education implies initiation into a group of free people who enjoy liberty and the capacity to 
conjure and revise an image of the good for themselves. The notion of a liberal education is in 
this sense the initiation into a worthwhile life. As my theory of liberal education shall also 
develop, the idea has an intrinsically civic, as well as cognitive, dimension - an emphasis on 
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citizenship alongside a commitment to intellectual and moral ideals. The aim is a liberally 
educated and responsible citizen committed to universal freedom and tolerance. 
Reaching a clear and perspicuous account of liberal education is a complex task. While virtually 
all education owes at least a passing acknowledgement to notions of liberal education, few 
institutions define it with clarity and precision. A liberal education is an education that seeks to 
develop ways of thinking and knowing - a certain frame of mind and habit of thought - rather 
than any particular content or specific knowledge. It does not point to any single kind of study 
but rather to the intrinsic purposes of all study. It is concerned with the development of qualities 
of mind and intellectual virtues rooted in reflection on timeless questions that are universal in 
scope, questions that educate both the mind and the heart, that illuminates the ambiguity of 
human life both at the moments of its highest dignity as well as in the depths of its most 
desperate despair, and that serve needs and interests intrinsic to humanity as a species.  
1.3 RATIONALE FOR THEORY OF LIBERAL EDUCATION 
Allan Bloom's controversial best-selling 1987 critique of the modern university, The Closing of 
the American Mind, is an extensive lament about how and why higher education is failing today's 
young people and leaving them intellectually and culturally impoverished (Bloom, 1987). 
Whether one finds The Closing of the American Mind to be long, erudite, and polemical (Reno, 
2007) or deep and profound (Kimball, 1987), Bloom's analysis continues to be a key reference in 
any discussion of liberal education. Bloom's concern in defending Great Books and the classics 
is to preserve some of the spirit behind the medieval studia humanitas in the contemporary 
American academic humanities. 
In more moderate terms, John McMurty (1991) identified concerns about education similar to 
many of those about which Bloom had lamented. McMurty's critique is of an international 
movement towards justifying educational excellence in terms of the capacity to "compete 
effectively in the international marketplace" (p. 209). The concerns are similar to Hyslop-
Margison's (2000) analysis, in which the discourse and values of capitalist ideology and market-
centric thinking are exerting a tremendous influence on all education, including the college and 
university missions and mandates of North America and around the world. 
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The concerns Bloom raised about education in the United States of America 25 years ago are still 
current and prevalent. University of Chicago philosopher and legal scholar Martha Nussbaum's 
(2010) recent book Not for Profit alerts us to the "silent crisis" (p. 1-11) of the American arts and 
humanities, "We are in the midst of a crisis of massive proportions and grave global 
significance" (p. 1). The erosion of liberal education represents the grinding down of the values 
upon which a free and democratic society thrives. The capacity for critical inquiry and 
questioning looks irrelevant, trivial, and dispensable to an outlook that focuses purely on 
maximizing profits and producing knowledge with marketable results. Liberal education, with its 
commitment to democratic and civic participation, is declining in the face of a profit, efficiency, 
and utility driven system. When education begins to be assessed purely in terms of market 
responsiveness and economic growth, both democracy and human decency are put at risk 
(Allemang, 2010). 
Concern over liberal education is widespread in Canada and the United States of America. The 
humanities, long regarded as the core of liberal education, are declining in the face of 
government policy intended to reorient higher education towards labor force demands. 
Reorienting universities in this way makes them little more than appendages of government, 
industry, and economic policy, and erodes their purpose to serve democracy and democratic 
society (Anisef et al., 1999). In Values in Conflict, Paul Axelrod (2002) explains how political 
and economic pressures are influencing liberal education in the North American context and are 
redefining the university according to the imperatives of the marketplace. North American 
colleges and universities are increasingly pressured to provide skills and knowledge tied directly 
to employment and labour market success. Amidst all the noise and clatter, liberal education is 
ignored and subsequently in decline, with the future of North American colleges and universities 
at stake. Essentially, redefining the university according to the utilitarian criteria of efficiency 
drawn from the world of business management, along with the restructuring plans of industry, 
commerce, and government, has displaced the values traditionally associated with liberal 
education. 
Universities, as the critics referenced above argue, have over the past two decades been more and 
more openly turned into an arm of the new global economy as part of an unprecedented 
mobilization of social life to meet the demands of those who control the economy. Education at 
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university and other levels is seen in an increasingly reductive way as equipping people for work. 
Most funded research is in areas which are designated as national priorities for business, 
industry, commerce, and government. The academy has been pushed into a closely networked 
relationship with business and government and talk of the autonomy of the university is now 
largely nostalgia (Fairclough, 2003, p. 216). 
The commitment to liberal education in Canada and the United States is clearly in decline. 
Although Axelrod (2002) suggests that liberal education today is not necessarily in crisis, current 
policy trends rarely, if ever, discuss its importance. Recent government policies privilege 
science, technology, and business at the expense of the academic humanities. The space for 
liberal education is shrinking next to the expansion of professional, technical, and applied 
programs. Universities are being directed to make their operations and programs instrumental to 
areas of provincial and federal economic importance. 
The concern is widespread, and many have expressed anxiety over the future of liberal education 
(Hyslop-Margison, 2000; Kubsch, 2002; Norris, 2009; Shaker, 2001). Some, including Martha 
Nussbaum, and earlier, Allan Bloom, consider the decline of liberal education to be a profound 
educational crisis with wide ranging consequences, economically, socially, culturally, civically 
and politically. Universities increasingly regard liberal education as a waste of valuable time and 
resources (Allemang, 2010). Research funding and the marketplace favor useful science and 
technical training over all other knowledge and understanding. The turn away from liberal 
education, particularly in its university and college context, represents a turn away from the 
intellectual and civic values that support a just and democratic regime. 
Weakening the liberal arts is going to have serious long-term consequences for Canadian culture 
and the possibilities for young people to realize their civic role and potential in a democratic 
society (Whyte, 2015). Reductions in funding for the academic humanities, such as the 
withdrawal of $6 billion from health, education, and welfare in Canada from 1994 to 1996 
(Axelrod, 2002, p. 93), and the engineering of funding metrics targeted to programs that meet 
labour market and industrial demand erode the intellectual, moral, and cultural ideals of both 
liberal education and the university. Compounding the forces causing a decline in the academic 
humanities is commercialization that values research with profitable, marketable results, fueled 
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by collaboration between university, government, and industry. One could argue that, abuses 
aside, commercially oriented academic work, by definition, subverts a basic precept of liberal 
education, in that research contracts between academics and external sponsors inevitably 
encumber, in some way, autonomous intellectual inquiry (Axelrod, 2002, p. 108). 
Changes in Canadian education arising from the policy demands of global organizations such as 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the policy 
imperatives the emanate from government, industry, and business, intended to develop 
workforce and technical capacities, erode the values and purposes of liberal education (Hyslop-
Margison, 2000). Economic shifts and anxiety at labor market gains are causing more and more 
students to reject the idea of liberal education (Chapnick, 2015). Rising tuition rates and 
exploding student debt counter-act the civic and democratic purposes of both liberal education 
and the college and university system. Rising tuition and massive debt means that civically, 
Canada will fail to develop the most talented and deserving members of lower socio-economic 
brackets and those with academic and intellectual ability who come from lower and working 
class backgrounds. The retreat from liberal education represents a decline in our civic capacity to 
fuel a just and democratic society (Whyte, 2005).  
One of the core values of liberal education is to provide the intellectual culture capable of 
producing informed and engaged citizens (Anisef et al., 1999). Liberal education, like science 
education, values the processes of critical inquiry and deliberation, discovery, exploration, and 
the curiosity that drives a vibrant intellectual and civic culture and that generates the intellectual 
flexibility required by companies and businesses to adapt to market trends. Indeed, I argue that 
the skills and values of a liberal education, for a variety of reasons, are more relevant than ever.  
Ansif, Axelrod, and Lin (1999), in Universities, Liberal Education, and the Labour Market, 
affirm the market viability of liberal education. The reorientation of higher education to assumed 
market needs is based on the fallacious premise that universities are well equipped to anticipate 
the long-term, employment-generating sectors of the economy. That government and business 
economic projections have been notoriously faulty raises additional questions about the 
rationality of this premise (Anisef et al., 1999, p. 12). 
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It is difficult, if not impossible, to predict how the university system will evolve in the coming 
decades, but with a diminished focus on the values of intellectual cultivation and the world of 
ideas, universities will almost certainly be defined mainly with reference to corporate principles 
harnessed to marketable results. What is often overlooked in the many demands and policies is 
that liberal education serves the university as a whole; it can contribute to professional and 
vocational education and virtually all jobs training and employment because it is already 
assumed in most job and skills training (Axelrod, 2002). 
1.4 FOCUS, QUESTIONS, AND CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
Research Focus:  Liberal education represents a deep and recurring problem for policy makers 
and higher educational institutions in Canada and around the world (Godwin, 2015). In this 
thesis, I will generate a theory of liberal education academically, through historical, 
philosophical, and political analysis. The intention of the research is to generate the ideas and 
theories required to fuel policy thinking, making, and development. 
Key Questions: In this dissertation, I will address some key questions - What is liberal 
education? What are its origins? What are its purposes? What ends does it serve? 
This research will ultimately propose two points: 
 that liberal education is eminently justifiable in the modern world, and 
 that education policy can be developed to support the inclusion of liberal education in the 
missions and mandates of North American colleges and universities. 
Chapter One develops the method of the academic, analytical and conceptual approach  
according to historical, philosophical, and political analysis, aimed at producing the ideas and 
theories required to fuel the policy making processes.  
Chapter Two develops a historical analysis and narrative. Any historical analysis of liberal 
education remains partial, fragmentary, and incomplete. Liberal education has had a vast range 
of historical influences on the development of education in Canada, the United States of 
America, and around the world. 
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Chapter Three addresses philosophical issues that arise out of the problem of liberal education. I 
simply argue that liberal education is underwritten by a commitment to universality, or to valuea 
with a universal significance. A conception of "universal" is central in liberal education as it is in 
science education. Working out an argument in support of values and ideas with a universal 
significance can help to establish liberal education. 
Chapter Four situates liberal education politically. Since the Roman era and the thought of 
Marcus Tullius Cicero (see Chapter Two), one of the motivating ideals of liberal education has 
been the education of a citizenry capable of participating in democratic society. Liberal 
education has a special relationship with democracy and it is woven into the fate of democracy 
and free and democratic societies around the world. 
Chapter Five argues, out of the synthesis of the three conceptual, academic approaches (i.e., 
historical, philosophical, and political), that liberal education is intrinsically idealist, committed 
to values with a universal significance,. and animated by a conception of universality. Even 
science education needs to be framed in terms of the idealist pursuit of, and inquiry into, values 
with a universal and timeless character. A conception of universality is indispensable in 
understanding the purposes and aims of liberal education. 
1.5 THEORY OF LIBERAL EDUCATION 
The purpose of this dissertation is to develop a rich theory of liberal education to justify the 
inclusion of liberal education in the missions and mandates of colleges and universities in North 
America and around the world. My Paperback Oxford Canadian English Dictionary 2nd 
ed.(2006) defines "theory" as: 
1. a supposition or system of ideas explaining something, esp. one based on general 
principles independent of the particular things to be explained (opp. HYPOTHESIS 2) 
(atomic theory; theory of evolution) 2. a speculative (esp. fanciful) view (one of my pet 
theories) 3. (the sphere of) abstract knowledge or speculative thought (this is all very well 
in theory; has been studying theory) 4. the principles on which a subject of study is based 
(music theory) 5. Math. a collection of propositions to illustrate the principles of a subject 
(probability theory). (p. 1072-3). 
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A theory is a form of understanding and a way of looking at the world; theories explain things 
and form the basis of our practices. Theories are made up of ideas and arguments and provide a 
framework for explanation to make sense of thoughts and understanding through structuring 
facts and their inter-relationships. Sets of ideas that make up theories and provide the basis of 
explanations for different events and actions. Theories are the explanations and the accounts of 
the reasons for why we do things and the basis of our practices. 
Developing a theory of liberal education means developing a system of ideas to explain what it is 
and generating a set of principles on which the practice of liberal education can be based. The 
theory of liberal education I develop in this dissertation is the product of generating theory 
according to three descriptive, conceptual, academic approaches: historical, philosophical, and 
political. The historical, philosophical, and political analysis is academic, and committed to 
idealism. I will develop a theory of liberal education that will show that liberal education is 
specifically a special kind of education grounded in values that are timeless and universal in 
scope. Without a commitment to values with a universal character then liberal education has no 
basis. 
1.6 METHODOLOGY 
In order to develop theory around the notion of liberal education, a methodology that seeks rigor 
and conceptual clarity is required. Analytical philosophy, through conceptual analysis and 
discourse analysis, is relevant to this task. 
Philosophical Inquiry  
Philosophical inquiry mirrors processes in which most people are already engaged: making 
meaning out of experience and trying to understand the world. Doing philosophical analysis 
means rationally bringing out aspects of the nature of the world through questioning and 
examining the facts and evidence and proceeding methodically. Marriam B. Sharon and Edwin 
L. Simpson (2000) identify four categories of philosophical questions: questions about the nature 
of knowledge (epistemology); questions about what is real (metaphysics); questions about values 
(axiology); and questions about rules for procedures and reasoning (logic) (p. 85). In terms of 
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liberal education, one might ask: What is liberal education? Why is it important? What ought the 
goals of liberal education to be? How does liberal education proceed? 
In their influential essay, "Philosophical Inquiry: Conceptual Analysis," Jerrold R. Coombs and 
Le Roi B. Daniels (1997) note that within curriculum studies - and, I would argue, most areas 
within the field of education - many important questions can be adequately addressed only 
through analytical and conceptual inquiry.  
Analytical philosophy aims at understanding and improving the sets of concepts or conceptual 
structures in terms of which we interpret experience, express purposes, frame problems, and 
conduct inquiries. It is an important part of education research because the conceptual structures 
we possess determine the kinds of educational policies we can entertain and the kinds of 
empirical and normative research questions we regard as significant. 
Coombs and Daniels (1997) identify three kinds of conceptual inquiry:   
Concept Interpretation aims “to provide adequate concrete interpretations of concepts.” 
(p. 27)  
Concept Development means “developing and defending a conception or conceptual 
structure.” (p. 28)  
Conceptual Structure Assessment aims to “determine the adequacy of conceptual 
structures.” (p. 28)  
In this dissertation, I will undertake concept interpretation and concept development, as Coombs 
and Daniels define these terms, around the notion of liberal education. I will attempt to develop a 
“concrete interpretation” of liberal education, and to develop and defend “a conceptual structure” 
for liberal education that can serve as a basis for education policy development.    
Conceptual Analysis as Method  
Analytical philosophical inquiry cannot be identified with any specifiable methodology. Rather it 
comprises a diverse set of analytical questions, techniques, and procedures. What distinguishes it 
from other kinds of inquiry is its purpose or point (Coombs & Daniels, 1997, p. 27). 
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The purpose of applying analytical philosophy to an object in educational policy is not for the 
sake of prediction, control, and input-output ratios, but to add richness to the body of theory, 
ideas, and concepts that inform policy thinking. Philosophical analysis is an attempt to get at the 
reality of a particular policy-related object (e.g., liberal education, teaching and learning, 
knowledge and understanding, etc), and to deal with it in great depth, complexity, and detail. 
Given current issues concerning the nature of post-secondary education, it is more important than 
ever to provide clarity concerning our thinking and reasoning. Applying philosophical analysis to 
the objects of educational policy will add to the theoretical infrastructure of the discipline.  
Analytical and philosophical inquiry emphasizes rigor and conceptual clarity in the terms and 
words through which ideas and theories are expressed. Conceptual analysis as a branch of 
philosophical inquiry seeks to “clarify a concept or the meaning of a statement or the definition 
of a word” (Marriam & Simpson, 2000, p. 88) - or, in the words of Coombs and Daniels (1997), 
Concept Interpretation (CI) aims “to provide adequate concrete interpretations of concepts” (p. 
27). The goal of conceptual analysis is to clarify a concept as it is used in everyday language. 
Whenever we try to answer a question or frame a problem we are interpreting a concept.  
All the problems for which solutions are pursued are formulated in ordinary language. The 
definition of a concept ought to clearly capture what is meant in terms of ordinary language use. 
The mode through which a clear understanding of a term is created is the central component of 
conceptual analysis: “Conceptual analysis attempts to provide an explicit and perspicuous 
account of the meaning of a concept by clearly detailing its relationships to other concepts and its 
role in our social practices – including our judgments about the world” (Coombs & Daniels, 
1997, p. 29). The process of conceptual analysis involves analysing linguistic and social 
structures and how these structures represent reality; it is a process of breaking concepts into 
propositions and logical structures (Audi, 1999). 
Conceptual analysis can be used to analyse the linguistic structures present in relevant literature. 
The data consists in the linguistic and conceptual structures that underlie relevant data, that 
include books, journal articles, reports, essays, periodicals, research studies, theses and 
dissertations, research papers, bibliographies, dictionaries, online databases, indexes, and 
encyclopaedias. Summarizing, integrating, and synthesizing data from different sources provides 
 16 
 
the basis for the construction of a conceptual framework and for further research and inquiry into 
the area of interest. Guiding philosophical questions and rules provide the basis for 
interpretations (Marriam & Simpson, 2000). 
There are no clear, definitive rules for how to proceed with the analytical techniques of 
conceptual analysis. Coombs and Daniels (1997) have provided eight “loose guidelines” as a 
framework: 
a. Not all concepts have the same degree of complexity. Extensive analysis is not always 
required. Where possible, keep interpretation simplistic. 
b. Discover the range of ways in which the concept is used in sentences, and formulate these 
uses into sentence contexts. When the terms mean different things in different contexts, 
this may cause conflicting conclusions and some contexts may be totally irrelevant to the 
inquiry. 
c. Consider unconventional uses of a term such as in slogans, recommendations, the making 
of commitments, metaphors, or allegories. The term can be treated outside the domain of 
describing an object, state of affairs, or relation. 
d. Compare and contrast ways in which the term is used appropriately with ways in which 
the term is used inappropriately. The point is to understand what makes the use of the 
term appropriate or inappropriate. It is also helpful to relate the use of the term with other 
closely affiliated terms. The purpose is to generate rules to follow in the use of the 
concept. 
e. Avoid considering the use of the term in narrowly specialist or technical uses. The goal is 
to clearly understand the concept the way competent language users mean it in an 
everyday sense untainted by specialist and technical uses. 
f. Avoid supposing that our conclusions identify clear underlying linguistic and social 
structures.  
Conceptual Development (CD) is a process of developing and modifying existing conceptual 
structures. Developing a concept is a way of making a vague idea more precise. Clarifying ideas 
using conceptual development aids in the process of categorizing related phenomena. Coombs 
and Daniels (1997) provide five loose guidelines for the process of conceptual development: 
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a. Clearly identify the problem that is to be solved, and the use for which the framework is 
intended. It is helpful to state clearly the problems and issues being addressed and the 
goal being aimed at. 
b. Preserve the core meaning of what persons who use the term normally mean. It is critical 
to discover the meaning that people who use the term are evoking. This kind of analysis 
is use-based clarification, which can (if inquiring into technical or specialist language 
use) create conflicting meanings.  
c. Break down technical terms (e.g., liberal education) and analyze the concepts separately. 
This provides the ground for articulating the core meaning of the term by identifying the 
purpose of the use and of combining the meanings.  
d. Assess the strengths and weaknesses of existing conceptual frameworks (e.g., Hirst’s 
(1974) work on “liberal education,” see Chapter Three, p. 54-60). 
e. Provide reasons for how the new conception is better than other frameworks. The new 
framework must be justified as more fruitful than other models. (pp. 33-5) 
Discourse Analysis as Method 
Analytical inquiry and conceptual analysis can also employ discourse analysis. The term 
“discourse” was largely popularized by Foucault, who used the word to include how language 
“embod[ies] meaning and social relationships, [and] constitute[s] both subjectivity and power 
relations” (Ball, 1996, p. 2). Texts have a causal influence on society and on beliefs, attitudes, 
and social relations. Representations of concepts and frameworks in texts influence the way the 
world is perceived, structured, and changed. A discourse thus includes both linguistic structures 
and the process of interpretation. Using discourse analysis means that texts are examined not just 
as words or sentences but as elements of a social, cultural, and historical process. A discourse is 
more than a text or a conversation; it refers to “the whole process of social interaction of which a 
text is just a part” (Fairclough, 2001, p. 20).  
The discourse of the liberal arts has been transmitted through history in a fragmentary way, but 
consists in different conceptual and linguistic structures in different times and different epochs. 
Discourse analysis allows researchers to see how in different epochs the discourse of the liberal 
arts has been different and how the types and orders of discourse overlap and diverge. Discourse 
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analysis will show that key concepts and categories (i.e., universality) bind the notion of the 
liberal arts together through history and how the idea of the liberal arts we have today is the 
culmination of a historical tradition. 
Critical discourse analysis is typically associated with issues of domination and submission 
embedded in such fields as colonial history and globalization. It can provide a means for 
discovering the frameworks that underlie ideas and texts associated with these fields, how they 
are constructed, and how they overlap and diverge (Fairclough, 2003). The political history of 
liberal education and political influences on post-secondary education make critical discourse 
analysis an important tool in any attempt to generate theory around liberal education. 
Critical discourse analysis also functions as a kind of language critique. As a method, it begins 
with a social problem (e.g., the decline of liberal education) rather than a research question, and 
moves to an analysis of practices, relations, structures, and inter-discursive elements that frame 
the problem. The purpose is to discover the causes of the problem in terms of the way certain 
activities are structured. The next stage of critical discourse analysis is to imagine possibilities 
for change and to reflect critically on the analysis in order to imagine new possibilities. Critical 
discourse analysis is best used in concert with other techniques and resources of analytical 
analysis (e.g., conceptual analysis) (Fairclough, 2003). 
1.7 LIBERAL EDUCATION AND POLICY 
Education Policy 
Education policy is a sub-discipline of policy studies that is particularly concerned with issues 
associated with education - and particularly with the analysis of such phenomena as school 
budgets, salaries for teachers, human resources, management, contracts, legal issues, tenure, 
testing, and so on (Nagel, 1983). In a field dominated by cost-effectiveness analysis and the use 
of interviews, surveys, case studies, and different kinds of experimental and pseudo-experimental 
research designs, the utility of philosophy is not often recognized. Philosophical analysis is well 
outside the mainstream thinking. Within the world of mainstream policy studies, however, 
philosophical analysis can serve as an important formative theoretical tool (Haas & Springer, 
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1998, p. 93) - meaning that it can be used, as Coombs and Daniels also suggested (1997, quoted 
above), to improve and refine already existing ideas.   
Rich theory adds depth to the policy making process and facilitates informed decision making in 
the later stages of policy making. There are at least four distinct strengths that analytical 
philosophy can add to educational policy: it can reduce ambiguity and provide clarity and 
precision in the use of terms and communication of theories, improve the understanding of 
decision makers, bring out new perspectives and new understandings, and improve the quality of 
discussion and debate in the research area.. 
Liberal Education as an Object of Educational Policy Analysis 
Liberal education has a long and complex history and has been influential in the genesis of 
educational institutions in North America and in educational planning and decision making 
around the world. Some educators - John Henry Newman, for example - considered liberal 
education to be among the highest goals of the university and one of the purposes of its existence 
as an institution. Yet it remains an idea mired in ambiguity in spite of the efforts of many who 
sought to provide it with a special place of importance and force in educational deliberation. 
Educational policy requires a deep theoretical grasp of the issues with which it is concerned - the 
processes of teaching and learning, for example, or, in the present case, the notion of liberal 
education. The task of analytical inquiry into liberal education consists in explicating the ideas 
upon which liberal education is based. Rich theory will help to fuel the policy making process; 
indeed, rich theory is a requirement for good policy. A theory of liberal education grounded in 
analytical philosophy and discourse analysis will contribute to the theoretical infrastructure that 
guides educational development in North America. 
Justifying the Philosophical Analysis of Liberal Education2 
1. Who is the information for? 
                                                          
2 For an extended discussion of how these questions fit into a situation-based justification for 
policy research, see Hass, Peter J. & Springer, Fred (1998) Applied Policy Research. New York 
& London: Garland Publishing, Inc. 
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A project on liberal education is intended to provide a robust theoretical understanding. A rich 
understanding is helpful for policy making at virtually all levels and stages of the deliberation 
and decision making process. As an idea, liberal education has a long history and has been 
deeply influential in the development of North American education, in particular as it pertains to 
the historical founding and intellectual and moral purposes of the university as an institution. The 
knowledge produced by a philosophical analysis of liberal education is intended for use by 
anyone involved in education policy planning. 
2. What kind of information is needed?  
A wide array of sources and many considerations add to the depth and complexity of the 
analysis. A considerable breadth and depth of information improves the theoretical infrastructure 
of the policy object. Books and journals contain the data and an intellectual synthesis combined 
with clear, rigorous argument is the goal.  
3. What is the purpose of the research? 
Education today is facing profound challenges. There is a real need to generate ideas and theories 
that can lead us into the uncertain future. The purpose of this research is to inquire into the ideas 
and values that influenced the development of our educational institutions and to advocate for 
including liberal education in the long term evolution of North American colleges and 
universities.  
4. What resources are required to conduct the research? 
Perhaps the great strength of philosophical analysis is that it is resource-minimal. It only requires 
the analyst have access to a wide and diverse enough body of literature to apply interpretation 
and draw out theories and ideas. The data consists in books, reports, essays, research projects, 
and so on. The resource minimal nature of philosophy is an interesting issue. As the mother 
discipline it thrives on debate, discussion, controversy, and argument. In a philosophical 
paradigm ideas themselves are considered the data and good thinking the method or procedure. 
5. What is liberal education? 
A theory of liberal education seeks to develop a frame of mind rather than any particular content. 
It does not point to any single kind of study but rather the universal purposes of all study. Liberal 
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education implies the development of qualities of mind and intellectual virtues rooted in 
reflection on timeless questions that are universal in scope, questions that educate both the mind 
and the heart. It is a special kind of education that serves needs and interests intrinsic to 
humanity as a species. The whole purpose of my work is to defend the idealist and universalist 
idea of liberal education as one based in irresolvable and intractable problems of human nature. 
Defining liberal education and providing it with a rich theoretical infrastructure will mean, in 
part, clearly differentiating it from other closely related terms. 
Literature Selection 
Some of the most important meditations on liberal education include John Henry Newman's 
(1851) The Idea of a University, Robert Maynard Hutchins's (1936) The Higher Learning in 
America, the 1945 Harvard Report General Education in a Free Society, Alan Bloom's (1987) 
The Closing of the American Mind, and Bruce Kimball's (1906) Orators and Philosophers. All 
of these sources are cited and included in the study. Several further sources around the problem 
of liberal education which are not as central were also reviewed and are cited. Ultimately, the 
selection of literature reflects the aim of dealing with sources which have as a central issue 
specifically philosophical justifications for liberal education and that give reasons for why liberal 
education is important. Sources that did not meet this criteria were omitted or do not have a 
central place in the argument. 
1.8 CONCLUSION 
Chapter One situates the problem of liberal education in its contemporary political and economic 
context, clarifies the issue by distinguishing liberal education from other closely related terms, 
and develops the rationale and method for approaching the problem of liberal education. The 
purpose is to justify why inquiry into liberal education is a vital problem in the development of 
university and college missions and mandates in North America and around the world. The 
research will generate a theory of liberal grounded in idealism, in the intractable problems and 
ambiguities of human nature and in values and inquiry with a universal significance. The 
purpose is ultimately to generate the theory required to advocate for the place of liberal 
education in the college and university missions and mandates in North America and around the 
world. 
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CHAPTER TWO: HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 
Education, in its absolute determination, is the liberation and work towards a higher 
liberation; it is the absolute transition to the infinitely subjective substantiality of ethical 
life, which is no longer immediate and natural, but spiritual and at the same time raised to 
the shape of universality. (Hegel, G.W.F., Elements of the Philosophy of Right, III., 187, 
p. 225) 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Different frameworks of liberal education are commensurable in many respects but 
distinguishable by fundamental ontological and epistemological variances. Different over-
arching themes can be discerned in different historical moments. These moments and themes, 
these different ontological and epistemological variances, help to demonstrate how and why the 
ambiguities, contradictions, and conflicts that currently characterize liberal education have been 
ongoing since its inception. Examining different historical frames of liberal education can help to 
provide a basis for examining the complex problems liberal education faces today and, in 
particular, the challenges facing liberal education with reference to its place in the modern 
university. It is worth noting that the legacy of liberal education up until the work of R.S. Peters 
and Paul H. Hirst (which will be discussed in Chapter Three, p. 48-60) was committed to 
metaphysical realism. Even today, metaphysical realism informs the methods and assumptions of 
scientific inquiry. The historical analysis provides the intellectual basis and theoretical 
infrastructure for the universalist and idealist justification for liberal education generated 
throughout the project. 
The history of liberal education spans over 2500 years of development and accretion. Virtually 
every epoch of Western civilization from ancient Greece and Rome to present day North 
America includes some reference or footnote to liberal education. The theoretical background 
inquired into is the history of creative tensions that has produced disagreements between 
philosophers, educators, politicians, and statesmen for millennia. The whole edifice of what we 
call science, the university, professional education, all the arguments of post-modernism and 
multiculturalism, are part of the universalist idea of liberal education. 
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Bruce A. Kimball's (1986) astonishing book Philosophers and Orators traces the development of 
the idea of liberal education from its roots in Greek antiquity, through the evolution and decline 
of ancient Rome, its reconfiguration under the rise of Christianity, its influence in the humanism 
of the Italian Renaissance and its place in the Enlightenment, and finally its sojourn across the 
Atlantic to America during the colonial era. Kimball (1986) divides the legacy of liberal 
education into two ideals: the one Socratic (or the philosophers), the other Ciceronian (or the 
orators). The philosophical ideal emphasizes the never-ending quest for truth while the oratorical 
ideal highlights the production of responsible citizens committed to rhetorical and oratorical skill 
and the virtues required by society's future leaders. One ideal is theoretical and contemplative 
while the other is civic and political. The lines that divide these ideals, however, are complex and 
the distinction between the two is often blurry and confused. An interesting aspect of Kimball's 
(1986) analysis is two implicit themes, one relativist and the other idealist. On the relativist 
account, liberal education is treated as changing from age to age and from context to context, 
while on the idealist account the idea of liberal education represents values and theory that are 
fundamental, timeless, and lasting. 
Kimball's (1986) differentiation of liberal education into the philosophical and oratorical ideals is 
an intellectual construct intended only to provide a theoretical framework to enable inquiry into 
the dialectic of liberal education in various historical contexts. Every kind of liberal education 
can be explained with references to its tendency to gravitate to either the philosophical or 
rhetorical ideals. Underlying the many fragmentary notions of liberal education is a commitment 
to preparation for civic, intellectual, and moral life, driven by the realist premise that the human 
personality consists in many conflicting tendencies that need to be brought into harmonious 
alignment and holistic balance in according with an external reality (Rothblatt, 1993). 
2.2 THE GREEK FRAMEWORK 
Liberal education originated in the ancient influences of Platonic and Pythagorean thought in the 
idea that education should enable a person to ascend from appearances to truth (Rothblatt, 1993). 
Distinct ontological features of this classical view are its commitments to truth, to the notion that 
knowledge is an end in itself, and to the significance of the question of how we ought to live our 
lives. Indeed, the classical Greek liberal education had as its starting point the notion of 
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wholeness and the whole person (Rothblatt, 1993) and that liberal education meant asking 
questions about the universal significance of human life, human nature, and the individual person 
in his or her relationship to the world and to all others. It was based on the ideas that it is the 
nature of the mind to pursue knowledge, that the pursuit of knowledge is the pursuit of the good 
and of the good life, and that it is through the quest for self-knowledge that the liberally educated 
person becomes a universal citizen of humanity and a citizen of the world: 
Implicit in the whole history of liberal education is the goal of increased self-knowledge: 
that students come to see themselves, their strengths and weaknesses, accurately and to 
appraise their relationship to the rest of the world accurately. (Winter et al., 1981, p. 49)  
Socrates and the questions he posed to the ancient Athenians has a special significance for the 
universalist and idealist conception of liberal education I develop throughout this dissertation. 
Socrates went about confronting the men of public affairs, the poets, the merchants, and the 
artisans, exhorting them first to look after their souls and their own nature and only afterwards to 
pursue fame and wealth. Socrates is the model of the liberal educator through his critical and 
dialectical activity of shared communication and discovery. 
Socrates serves as the first exemplar of the classical framework’s philosophical and political 
commitments. Plato’s allegory of the cave is the description of the upward progress of the mind 
through education, from shadows to substance, from second hand impressions and opinions to 
full understanding. The progress of the mind from the moral and intellectual condition of the 
average man to the higher state of philosophic reflection was believed to be achieved through 
training in arithmetic, logic, rhetoric, dialectic, and other studies (Plato, 2003).  
The ancient ideals of a liberal education have been retrieved and re-conceptualised in a 
fragmentary way in different eras and epochs and in different national and cultural contexts. The 
ancient ideals of the harmony of the soul with the cosmos and the pursuit of knowledge as the 
good of the mind have, arguably, been eclipsed in modern society by an emphasis on technical, 
professional, and vocational education and the governance of universities by management 
criteria drawn from the world of business rather than by the legacy of Western philosophy. This 
conflict, however, is not new. Its roots are discernible in the conflict between Plato and Isocrates, 
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where the contrast between a liberal and intellectual, and a practical, useful, or vocational 
education had its first expression.  
2.3 THE MEDIEVAL PERIOD (500 - 1500 CE) 
The accretion of the tradition of theory and ideas that originate in the classical Greeks and 
Romans came to be differentiated by the fifth and sixth centuries CE into the trivium (i.e., the 
verbal arts of logic, grammar, and rhetoric) and the quadrivium (i.e., the numerical arts of 
mathematics, geometry, music, and astronomy) (Kimball, 1986). The liberal arts as the trivium 
and quadrivium of the medieval universitatis are the intellectual accretions of a tradition 
manifested in a substantive curriculum of studies in an organizational structure that maintained a 
theoretical commitment to an intellectual and moral ascent.  
The allegory of the cave in Plato's Republic VII3, where the assent of the mind from illusion to 
pure philosophy is described, is the motivating image behind the organization of the medieval 
trivium and quadrivium. The classical realist justification behind the differentiation of the 
medieval liberal arts is the training of the intellect according to the nature of the mind, character 
development, and development of the "whole person" (Rothblatt, 1993). The intellectual training 
begins with basic literacy and numeracy because these are necessary for all branches of learning. 
It then moves to the more difficult inquiry into phenomena with a universal human significance. 
The medieval universitatis was committed to metaphysical realism, to the notion that the mind 
develops in unity with external reality, and to the general principle that all knowledge forms a 
unified whole and is bound together by harmony (Rothblatt, 1993). All the development of 
liberal education is associated with "freeing," with liberating the individual from the intellectual 
and moral snares of social and civic life so the person can develop according to their own innate 
potential.  
The Latin phrase artes liberales means, literally, "the arts of freedom" (Flannery & Newstad, 
1998, p. 9). Kimball (1986) develops the notion of the artes liberales as the accretion of trends 
                                                          
3 Lee, Desmond, (ed.). (2007) Plato: The Republic 2nd ed. London, England: Penguin Books, (p. 
240-248, Republic VII. 514a-521b). 
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rooted in the writings of Plato (427-346 BCE) and Aristotle (384-322 BCE), the developments of 
Hellenism, and the writings of figures such as Cicero (107-44 BCE) and Quintilian (35-100 CE). 
It was the Romans who systematized the ancient ideas into the seven liberal arts found in the 
medieval universitatis. Underlying the various medieval versions of the liberal arts is the 
influence of the original Platonic education that emphasized harmony (i.e., the study of inter-
relationships) and dialectic (i.e., pure theory or abstraction) (Winter et al., 1981, p. 2). The artes 
liberales ideal is implicitly committed to discovering a universal basis for the experience of life. 
It is interesting to note that the ideas driving the differentiation of the liberal arts and the ideals of 
personal development and growth are often assumed in the justification for professional 
programs in modern times. Even the differentiation of modern day academic fields and faculties, 
such as sociology, psychology, and anthropology, are mostly developments of the tradition of the 
liberal arts and represent subspecies of traditions we inherit from the Greeks as extensions of the 
thought of Plato and Aristotle (Hanson & Heath, 1998). 
2.4 RENAISSANCE HUMANISM AND THE ENLIGHTENMENT 
By the thirteenth century several institutions called universities were in operation4: "In 1300, 
there existed in Western Europe between fifteen and twenty functioning universities; and over 
the following two centuries scores more were planned, founded, or actually opened for lectures" 
(Kimball, 1986, p. 75). These institutions were committed to a pattern of education based on the 
liberal arts with an underlying commitment to metaphysical realism and with requirements, 
grading, and academic ranks (Kimball, 1986). The entire edifice of what was called education 
was entirely transformed by the rise of these institutions. Even the liberal arts themselves became 
deeply intellectually problematic because they came to be taught according to different 
                                                          
4 "including Salamanca, Lisbon, Valladolid, and Coimbra in the Iberian Peninsula; Bologna, 
Padua, Naples, Vicenza, Arezzo, and Siena in Italy; Paris, Orleans, Angers, Toulouse, and 
Montpellier in France; and Oxford and Cambridge in England (None yet existed in Germany and 
central Europe)." (Kimball, 1986, p. 63) 
 27 
 
hierarchies of value and importance and because radically different interpretations of each of the 
individual arts (such as grammar and rhetoric) came to exist. 
The 14th and 15th centuries saw the rise of renaissance humanism, mostly in Italy5. Leaving 
aside debates about the meaning of the terms, the humanism of the renaissance was partially a 
revival of the philosophical liberal educational ideal grounded in a retrieval of the classical 
literature of antiquity (Kimbal, 1986). The humanism of the renaissance represented an 
educational ideal grounded in the retrieval of classical letters. Debatably, it was the beginning of 
the historical turn known as the Enlightenment (1620 - 1780 CE) and the subsequent turn to 
science, liberalism, and modernity. Humanism was committed to both the civic ideal of the 
production of good citizens and to the intellectual and moral ideal of the development of the 
human character and personality. Interestingly enough, humanism did not arise from within the 
university and the influence it had on the 15th century medieval universitatis is debated and 
contested (Kimball, 1986).  
The 16th and 17th century Enlightenment was driven by the idea that society should be guided 
by philosophy and science. Out of the Enlightenment arose a new liberal education ideal, what 
Kimball (1986) calls the "liberal-free" ideal. The Enlightenment dissolved the traditional 
theological justification of the university and produced the New Philosophy, the philosophy of 
modern philosophy, the philosophy of Rene Descartes (1596-1650 CE), of rationalism, 
empiricism, and scientific, experimental method. The times were characterized by figures such 
as Copernicus (CE 1473-1543), Kepler (CE 1571-1630), Galileo (CE 1564-1642), and Sir Isaac 
Newton (CE 1642-1727). They were predicated on a rejection of the classical tradition insofar as 
the New Philosophy, with its commitment to experimental science, rejected the scholasticism of 
the medieval universities (Kimball, 1986). The modern world was profoundly changed by the 
rise of science and scientific method. 
                                                          
5 Hirst (1973), in his essay on "Liberal Education and the Nature of Knowledge," considers the 
revival of Greek and Roman literature of the Italian Renaissance to be a misconception of liberal 
education. 
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What Kimball (1986) calls the liberal-free ideal was characterized specifically by reconfiguring 
the idea of liberal education according to individual freedom and liberty. The liberal-free ideal of 
liberal education is characterised by its emphasis on seven criteria: freedom and liberty; 
rationality; critical skepticism; tolerance; egalitarianism; individualism and the obligations of 
citizenship; and the concern for individual personal growth (Kimball, 1986, p. 119-123). Kimball 
(1986) intends the liberal-free ideal to explain the modifications to the idea of liberal education 
that occurred through the 17th and 18th centuries. In Philosophers and Orators he writes “As 
liberalism challenged the 'conservative' influences in society, so did the liberal-free ideal 
confront the artes liberales ideal in education" (p. 61). There is a great deal of ambiguity here in 
how the idea of liberal education is transmuted from the medieval artes liberales to the 
Enlightenment liberal-free ideal.  
Robert W. Connor (2013) recently noted in Inside Higher Ed that the roots of liberal education in 
the humanism of the Italian Renaissance, with its deep commitment to the retrieval of classical 
Greek and Roman wisdom - often through translating, critiquing, commenting on, discussing, 
disseminating, and teaching certain key texts - is the spirit underlying the Great Books approach 
to liberal education advocated by modern figures such as Alan Bloom (1987) in The Closing of 
the American Mind. The Great Books programs of the American academic humanities are a 
modern attempt to synthesize the ideals of the medieval studia humanitatis with modern 
educational thinking. According to Connor (2013), the justification for Great Books in America 
and the synthesis of classical authors is the same as in the Italian Renaissance humanitatis at 
Bologna, Florence, and Padua, where the study and synthesis of poetry and mathematics based 
on  metaphysical realism undergirded the educational scheme. Degree programs at institutions 
such as Oxford, Cambridge, and Harvard are motivated by this vision in a limited sense, even 
today. 
2.5 UNIVERSALITY AND IDEALISM 
The theological view of a liberal education is provided by John Henry Newman’s (1873) 
"Discourse V: Knowledge its Own End" in The Idea of a University. Newman advances the view 
of an education founded on the belief that all knowledge is inter-related, inter-dependent, and 
bound together by harmony - an idea in many ways similar to the Platonic “Idea of the Good” 
 29 
 
(Plato, 2003). Newman (1873) views a liberal education as the cultivation of the intellect as such, 
the training of the mind, and the elevation of the intellect into moral, philosophical, and  
historical states of conscious awareness. 
Newman argues that knowledge is valuable in itself and is its own end, “There is a knowledge 
which is desirable, though nothing come of it, as being of itself a treasure, and a sufficient 
remuneration of years of labor” (Discourse V, pt. 6) - but also that it has a purpose which he 
believed to be to free the mind from confusions and error and to elevate it with intellectual 
growth. Liberal education and the liberal arts are in this sense exercises of the mind and of the 
innate human faculties that are within us. The exercise of these faculties for their own sake is 
intended to lead to a kind of transcendence, where the absolute limit of the soul with the cosmos 
is encountered (Newman, 1873).  
A liberal education subsumes both cognitive and affective domains. Newman believed that 
intellectual development itself would result in the cultivation of particular character traits or 
dispositions such as calmness and moderation; that liberal education, through intellectual 
engagement with timeless questions about the nature of being human, would educate both the 
mind and the heart.  
Newman argued that the university is the special home of liberal education, which is aimed at 
what he called "liberal" and "universal" knowledge. By "liberal" he meant "philosophical," and 
he thought that studying in the special home of intellect and integrity he called the "university" 
would lead to moral and character development. In his framework for religious knowledge he 
tried to synthesize formal processes of reasoning with aspects of experience that fall outside pure 
rationality. Newman's framework represents an early attempt to synthesize intellectual ideals 
with the aim of cultivating the cognitive and moral requirements of citizenship in full 
acknowledgement of the universality of human experience that transcends the dichotomy 
between thought and feeling and that resists attempts at easy systemization and formalization. 
Newman's universalist view is founded on the belief that all knowledge is inter-related, inter-
dependant, and bound together by harmony, and he stands in as a figure who advocated for a 
version of the universalist and idealist justification. The view in The Idea of a University (1873) 
is a kind of the philosophical species of liberal education and something like a Platonic form 
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where reality represents the reflection of an intellectual and moral ideal. The purpose of 
Newman's scheme is to produce a solid intellectual foundation that can last throughout life: 
Hence it is that his education is called 'Liberal.' A habit of mind is formed which lasts 
throughout life, of which the attributes are freedom, equitableness, calmness, moderation, 
and wisdom; or in what a former Discourse I have ventured to call a philosophical habit. 
(Newman, 1873/1962, p. 77) 
Newman's (1873) framework in The Idea of a University is unique, special and reflective of the 
attempt to establish liberal education, with its special language of universality and transcendence, 
as the purpose of the university. Newman's claims are important (the problem of establishing an 
objective, science-based justification for the claim that liberal education produces intellectual 
and character traits is analyzed in Chapter Three, p. 77-81), as he regarded liberal education as 
involved in the production of virtues like equitableness, calmness, and moderation.  
As an example of the historical claims made by defenders of liberal education, and in particular a 
defender of a universalist position, the thesis Newman advanced is that intellectual development 
occurs through a focus on timeless questions - the same questions that pervade both philosophy 
and science - that transcend the dichotomy between cognitive and affective, through a kind of 
education intended to fulfill both the mind and the heart. Liberal education in the universalist 
sense is a product of the philosophical ideal and associated strongly with the tendency to equate 
"liberal" education with purely intellectual development: 
It is common to speak of 'liberal knowledge,' of the 'liberal arts and studies,' of a 'liberal 
education,' as the especial characteristic or property of a university and of a gentlemen; 
what is really meant by the word? Now first, in its grammatical sense it is opposed to 
servile; and by 'servile work' is understood, as our catechisms inform us, bodily labour, 
mechanical employment, and the like, in which the mind has little or no part. (Newman, 
1873/1962, p. 80-1) 
The idea of universality underlying the justification in The Idea of a University (1873) is an 
important point of reflection as it differentiates liberal education away from manual, vocational, 
and technical education and develops the idea toward the universalist and idealist pursuit of 
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knowledge for its own sake and purely theoretical reflection detached from practical or utilitarian 
aims. 
A further defender of the idealist conception, Wilhelm von Humboldt’s "Theorie der Bildung des 
Menschen" (or "Theory of Bildung", 1793/4) represents a notion of education as “[the] unlimited 
development and flourishing of the potentials and capacities of the single human person” 
(Stojanov, 2012). Bildung encompasses all that might be involved in the development of 
individual potential and in the freeing of the individual from the cultural and intellectual snares 
of society.  
The word “education” is too narrow to embody what Humboldt  means by Bildung, because he 
refers to the whole of life and all the exercise of human powers that are innate in us in their 
totality. The purpose of Bildung is essentially inner improvement and elevation and the 
expansion of the innate faculties of human knowledge (i.e., memory, reason, and imagination). 
The concept of universal and innate intellectual powers is central to the cultivation of a free and 
autonomous mind. The striving after goals set autonomously is the expression of a vital power 
and part of the process of developing an individually differentiated character. All activity and 
gathering of experience is an attempt at self-understanding and at gaining self-knowledge 
(Humboldt, 1793/4). 
Humboldt’s (1793/4) concept of Bildung is deeply influenced by the idealist philosophy of 
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804 CE). The study of classics and idealist philosophy is intended to 
liberate the individual and to cultivate freedom, liberty, agency, and autonomy, and to combine 
experience with knowledge in a process that forms identity and an ideal of humanity towards 
which an individual can direct his or her activity (Luth, 2000). Through the study of idealist 
philosophy, and by striving after autonomously set goals, a person strives to “transform mere 
scholarship into scholarly Bildung, merely restless behaviour into judicious activity” (Humboldt, 
1793/4, pp. 60). 
The conception of liberal education advanced by Humboldt in the 18th century European 
university is the product of the idealist notion of Bildung, which is rendered here in English as 
"aesthetic or spiritual self-development" (Luth, 2000). The idealist conception maintained the 
notion that there is a harmony between the individual with the world and the community 
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(Rothblatt, 1993, p. 41). The idealist theory of knowledge underlying Humboldt's notion of 
Bildung involves an anthropocentric view of life and experience that puts the individual at the 
center of the world (Luth, 2000). The contribution made to liberal education includes the idealist 
retrieval of the ideas and culture of classical antiquity and also through the framing of the pursuit 
of science in idealist terms. The central value of the Theory of Bildung (1793/4) is the 
development of all the powers of humanity in terms of the individual life and also in terms of the 
whole range and scope of human culture and community:  
It is the ultimate task of our existence to achieve as much substance as possible for the 
concept of humanity in our person, both during the span of our life and beyond it, 
through the traces we leave by means of our vital activity. This can be fulfilled only by 
the linking of the self to the world to achieve the most general, most animated, and most 
unrestrained interplay. This alone is the yardstick by which each branch of knowledge 
can be judged. (Humboldt, 1793/4, p. 58-9) 
Humboldt's promotion of science in terms of idealist philosophy provides justification for the 
universalist position because he regards liberal education to be aimed essentially at inner 
improvement and expanding the innate faculties of human knowledge - memory, reason, and 
imagination - that are treated as universal in scope. The concept of innate a priori mental and 
moral powers that are universal in scope is an essential part of the claim to universality and the 
cultivation of a free and independent character and mind. The study of classics in terms of 
idealist philosophy is intended to cultivate individual freedom, liberty, agency, and autonomy, 
and to combine experience and knowledge in a process that forms identity and an ideal of 
humanity towards which the individual directs his activity (Luth, 2000). 
Universality implies the whole of human life and the exercise of innate intellectual powers in 
their totality. Universality aims at the cultivation of an individually differentiated character 
through aiming at goals autonomously, and all of this activity represents a basic attempt at 
acquiring self-understanding and self-knowledge. The pursuit of science in the context of idealist 
philosophy is intended to improve the world within us and to cultivate and improve the inner-
being of humanity generally.  
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The idealist influence centers on certain distinctions between inner and outer, of unity and 
wholeness, and the cultivation of diverse intellectual and moral powers which are themselves all 
sides of a single, universal power, combined with liberation, freedom, and liberty. Through the 
externalization of internal powers in discussion and debate and the objectification of subjective 
ideas and theories through communication - by exercising innate or "plastic" creative powers - 
human potential is cultivated, expressed, and realized. Science has a central place in this scheme 
and is to be pursued in the context of idealist philosophy in a recognition that an individual 
participates in a wider humanity and a global community characterized by freedom, liberty, and 
diversity. The essential point of science is not the acquisition of knowledge or facts but the 
exercise of innate, creative, plastic powers. Bildung is science combined with inner elevation and 
improvement, the improvement of the self through experience of the world, and the 
transformation of restless activity into real judicious production (Luth, 2000). However, the 
idealist notion advocated for by Wilhelm von Humboldt seems to not have had much influence 
in North America which instead became philosophically committed to utilitarianism, 
pragmatism, and progressivism (Wegener, 1978). 
2.6 THE AMERICAN CONTEXT 
Some version of the liberal-free ideal makes its sojourn across the Atlantic and into the 
American colleges of the 18th century. During the colonial era (1693-1776 CE), the school 
curriculum included Greek and Latin and the retrieval and study of classical authors such as 
Cicero, Virgil, and Isocrates: 
In reports of the Harvard laws from 1642, 1655, 1686, and 1702, it is consistently 
specified that a boy desiring admission must demonstrate the ability to speak and write 
Latin prose and poetry, comprehension of Greek and its grammar, and familiarity with 
standard classical authors, especially Cicero and Vergil in Latin and Isocrates and the 
New Testament in Greek - 'Then may hee bee admitted into the Colledge, nor shall any 
claime admission before such qualifications.' (Kimball, 1986, p. 103) 
The Oxford and Cambridge models influenced the founding of institutions such as Harvard in the 
United States of America. Oxford and Cambridge were committed to a Great Books curriculum, 
in which training in ancient languages and mathematics was considered to train the mind, and 
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liberal education was considered to be liberal when it sought to develop broad analytical 
capacities required for civic, social, and political leadership. The liberal education espoused at 
late 17th and early 18th century Harvard represents a guiding intellectual principle followed by 
many colleges and universities in North America until the middle of the twentieth century, when 
liberal education became linked more strongly with pragmatism, progressivism, and 
utilitarianism. The liberal education of the American colonial institutions was drastically 
different, however, from the artes liberales of the medieval European universtiatis (Kimball, 
1986). 
Out of the Enlightenment arose an increasing emphasis on science, and this influenced the 
American context. The early American version of liberal education in the 20th century 
represented a bouquet of science, pragmatism, and utilitarianism, united with a classical heritage 
and with an ideal of Christian gentility (Kimball, 1986, p. 120). The Greco-Roman and Judeo-
Christian cultures were mingled with American purposes and ends in the early colonial 
American educational institutions. The kind of liberal education involved in the founding of 
Harvard in America, for example, represents the reproduction of institutions such as Cambridge 
and Oxford on the other side of the Atlantic.  
The Morrill Federal Land Grant Act of 1862 established colleges in America firmly committed 
to utilitarian criteria for the practical necessity of providing the skills and ideas needed to 
maintain a middle class (Sheridan, 1998, p. 27). The American demand for a utilitarian, 
pragmatic, and scientifically-based education exerted influence on the development of its 
colleges and university system. By the 20th century attacks are commonly made on liberal 
education in its classical, perennialist, universalist, and idealist kind by American educators such 
as John Dewey (1859-1952), who advocated for a pragmatic form of democratic education with 
no reference to idealism or the language of universality. 
The decline of the idealist justification of liberal education can be explained with reference to the 
utilitarianism, progressivism, and pragmatism behind The Morill Land Grant Acts of 1862 and 
1890 which made practical, technical, and vocational education and training an indispensable 
part of the idea of liberal education in North America. By 1939, a liberal education came to be 
defined in North America in mainly negative ways, specifically with reference to it not being a 
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professional education or a technical education (Sheridan, 1998). However, a huge mass of 
ambiguity surrounds the transformation of liberal education in the colonial institutions of 20th 
century America.  
In the early part of 20th century liberal arts colleges existed and were in operation but their 
missions and mandates conveyed a massive web of contradictions, confusion, and ambiguity 
(Kimball, 1986). Early American colleges and universities were influenced by a wide array of 
competing ideas and values; they were heirs of the Enlightenment and its utilitarian outlook, and 
American colleges and universities became exceedingly committed to progress and 
progressivism (Rothblatt, 1993, p. 47). The utility of liberal education has been a problem for 
much of the historical transmission of the idea. From the dichotomy between liberal and useful 
education many ambiguities and perplexities arise with distinctions and differences that can 
ultimately be misleading.  
Even with the move away from notions of universality and idealism to pragmatism and 
utilitarianism the American universities of the late 19th and early 20th centuries were 
nevertheless partially influenced by the idealism of the European research university, embodied 
in a commitment to a program of specialized scholarship, speculation, and individual freedom. 
The commitment to idealism and intellectual freedom was at least partially influential in 
America: "Lehrfreiheit (freedom to teach what one wishes) and Lernfreiheit (freedom to study 
what one wishes) - impressed the Americans" (Kimball, 1986, p. 162). The North American 
colleges of this time were part high school, part university, partly devoted to some vague idea of 
general education and partly to specialization, and often served primarily as teacher training 
institutes. The American middle-class into the 20th century was deeply committed to a utilitarian 
culture of professionalism. Pragmatism was the driving philosophical system shaping the 
American higher educational experiment.  
Throughout this period: 
Descriptions of liberal education affirmed diversity but called for unity; offered breadth 
but eschewed superficiality; extolled freedom but called for discipline; proclaimed 
democratic equality while demanding standards; honored individuality beside social 
responsibility; hailed intellectual along with spiritual, emotional, and physical 
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development; promised 'a foundation on which to base . . . occupational activities' but not 
vocational education; and recognized that no idea of liberal education is final but 
expected their students to find a firm philosophy of life. (Kimball, 1986, p. 196) 
In the second half of the 20th century the pragmatism and progressivism of post-World War II 
America was loosely tied to a notion of liberal education as liberating and liberational (or as 
liberal-free, in Kimball's (1986) analysis), and the importance of freedom and individual liberty. 
The 20th century witnessed, rooted in the legacy of the Enlightenment, a deepening commitment 
to science, the meaning of which (i.e., the term "science") has been significantly debated, and by 
an ongoing search for a "science education." Paradoxically, the talk of science education for 
most of  the 20th century and its commitment to critical inquiry into natural phenomena and 
mathematical laws through experimental method gravitates to the Platonic rather than the civic 
liberal educational ideal. However, the conflict here is complex, because the rise of science - 
with its commitment to specialization -  runs directly counter to, and has arguably contributed to 
the decline of, the academic humanities, classical letters, and Great Books. The pragmatism of 
the post-World War II American university was guided by the demand for science based 
education: "The faith on which the new universities was grounded was not really a faith in 
education: it was a faith in the ability of controlled, scientific inquiry to change the conditions of 
human life and work" (Wegener, 1978, p. 41). 
By 1936, Robert M. Hutchins, President of the University of Chicago from 1929 to 1945 had 
written The Higher Learning in America, commenting on the American version of liberal 
education of his time. Critiquing American pragmatism and progressivism, he writee, "Our 
erroneous notion of progress has thrown the classics and the liberal arts out of the curriculum, 
overemphasized the empirical sciences, and made education the servant of any contemporary 
movements in society, no matter how superficial" (p. 65). Hutchins (1936) further comments that 
for most of the life of the institutions we call universities the curriculum and processes of the 
place had, for most of history (i.e., up to the Enlightenment), been committed to theology. 
Theology had, since the medieval universitatis, been regarded as the science of sciences, and was 
seen as a necessary precursor for the study of all the other sciences. During the Enlightenment, 
with its turn to scientific empiricism and experimental method, theology was cast down from its 
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place of importance, and in our time theology exists mainly as a sub-discipline in some 
philosophy departments.  
Hutchins (1936) saw that, with the expulsion of theology from the university - and with it the 
traditional justification for liberal education as in John Henry Newman - a vacuum was created, 
and no ruling idea or faculty remained to organize all the disparate departments of the university 
into a single, unified, harmonious whole. There is no agreement among faculty about any 
universal discipline or universal knowledge that underlies and unites all the various branches of 
science and departments in the North American college and university. This has led to a 
confused mish-mash of fields often guided by little more than the trendiest and most fashionable 
ideas of the moment. Hutchins (1936) then argues for the study of metaphysics to assume the 
place once held by theology: "Metaphysics, the study of first principles, pervades the whole" (p. 
108)6.  
In 1945, Harvard University released a report, General Education in a Free Society, which is 
commonly called the Redbook. This report, which was ultimately rejected by many,7 was 
criticized for its conceptual conflation of liberal and general education. The kind of general 
education espoused by the Redbook represents a blurring of liberal education with general 
education. The Redbook connected general education with mental traits and powers of mind - 
thinking effectively, communicating thought, making relevant judgments, and discriminating 
among values (Winter, 1981, p. 10) - but provided little justification for how these powers and 
traits of mind are induced. 
                                                          
6 Hutchins (1936) makes an important argument, but I deviate at least so far as to advocate for 
liberal education, rather than metaphysics, to be the guiding ideal that binds the university as an 
institution into a continuous whole. Metaphysics is part of liberal education, but not its entire 
scope.  
7 Hirst, P. H. (1973) "Liberal Education and the Nature of Knowledge," in Peters, R.S. (ed) The 
Philosophy of Education. Oxford: Oxford University Press, (p. 87-111). 
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Charles Wegener's (1978) Liberal Education and the Modern University is a history of liberal 
education in the university since the beginning of the 20th century. The book demonstrates how 
deep and consistent the problem of retrieving and continually redefining liberal education has 
been in the life of North American colleges and universities. Historical analysis of liberal 
education ends up consisting mainly in objectifying ambiguity and disagreements for reflection, 
discussion, and for critical inquiry. Constructing a historical architecture of the idea remains 
contingent and partial, but it exerts a gravitational influence on the practices and processes of 
teaching and learning wherever the idea of liberal education is invoked. The colleges and 
universities of North America today are hardly a "system" at all but a vast galaxy of institutions 
that spans the whole continent (Wegener, 1978).  
The entire educational landscape of North America underwent massive transformations 
throughout the 20th  century. The press for scientific and technical research and specialization is 
characteristic of the spirit of the development of the North American colleges and universities in 
recent times. However, the conceptual tie to liberal education happens at the pre-reflective level 
of university work (e.g., research, teaching, and service). The practical operations of the North 
American college and university are often shot through with vague and obscure references to 
liberal education. For most students and faculty the connections between liberal education and 
the university are simply assumed. Liberal education is pre-supposed in the way researchers, 
including scientists, go about their work (Wegener, 1978).   
In recent times there have been as many characterizations of liberal education as there are people 
who invoke the phrase. David G. Winter, David C. McClelland, and Abigail J. Stewart (1981), in 
A New Case for the Liberal Arts, generalize concerning modern day developments: 
The new liberal education programs had two common features: (a) They emphasized 
broad abstractions and basic principles (usually across several disciplines) rather than 
specialized advanced work in a particular discipline. (2) they were consciously intended 
not to prepare students for vocations, or even for graduate school. (Winter et al., 1981, p. 
4) 
The vast and complex web-like historical context in which liberal education develops to 
contemporary times is important. However, any historical interpretation of liberal education 
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remains only partial and perpetually incomplete. The problems arise from disputes concerning 
defining the whole problem of human nature and how, if there is a universal human nature, it is 
to be educated and fulfilled.  
2.7 CONTEMPORARY ARGUMENTS 
After the 1960's and 1970's in America liberal education came under increased scrutiny. 
Pragmatists rejected liberal education as irrelevant and trivial. The aims of pragmatic and 
democratic American educators were civic, concerned with producing responsible citizens with 
the skills and culture required for labor market success and for the maintenance of a middle 
class. The kind of pragmatic American education advocated for in the period of the 1960's and 
1970's, harnessed to instrumental political and economic goals, has led to, among other things, 
rampant materialism, consumerism, and the development of technological and technical 
capacities associated with oppression, exploitation, violence, and terror (Wegener, 1978). The 
educational upheavals of the 1960's and 1970's did much to obscure liberal education and 
attempts to define it and formulate a clear and distinct conception. The more that the idea of 
liberal education is inquired into, it seems, the more confused, confounding, and contradictory 
the issues become. The whole epoch at this time created a general crisis about both the university 
and, in particular, the value of a liberal education. 
In North America today the issues surrounding liberal education are confused. In the turn to 
pragmatism and progressivism in the 1960s and 1970s North American context, for example, 
liberal education is still commonly invoked by its relationship to the artes liberales or the liberal-
free ideals, but the appeal is assumed and tacit. The liberalism of present day America and liberal 
education are not sacrosanct (Rothblatt, 1993), and liberal individualism has little to do with the 
transmission of either of Kimball's (1986) philosophical or oratorical ideals. Liberal 
individualism is in a sense the negation of liberal education owing to the fact that liberal 
education, in terms of idealism and universality, has always sought some notion of universal 
harmony between the self and the world and between the individual and the community. 
An example of a recent manifestation of liberal education is Mortimer Adler’s notion of “the 
Paideia framework.” Adler (2014) regarded education as primarily a practical activity aimed at 
particular kinds of ends and goals. It is generally aimed at the improvement or betterment of 
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persons and of society generally and is treated as an inherently moral enterprise. The means and 
ends of education are a special kind of good involved with improvement. It is a practical 
enterprise concerned with particular kinds of goals and the ways they are achieved. Adler (2014) 
saw education in its most general sense as ”a process which aims at the improvement or 
betterment of [persons], in themselves and in relation to society” (p.1). Adler’s (1984) The 
Paideia Program sought to synthesize work and citizenship with the realization of fundamental 
human potential. The Paideia project was intended to be enacted through the development of 
different kinds of knowledge, skills, and understandings, with a basis in fundamental human 
traits that are widely generalizable or universalizable (but he mostly emphasised, in the 
philosophical vein, training in theoretical mathematics). 
Adler’s (1984) The Paideia Program aims at: 
A course of study that is general, not specialized; liberal, not vocational; humanistic, not 
technical. Only in this way can it fulfill the meaning of the words ‘paideia’ and 
‘humanitas,’ which signifies the general learning that should be in the possession of 
every human being. (Adler, 1984, p. 6) 
While society is built on a division of labor that serves a wide array of functions there is the 
natural fact that individuals are different and have different talents and needs. Some argue that 
education is the improvement of persons based on their own unique skills and talents. On the 
other hand, Adler's (2014) more universalist orientation argues education is intended to improve 
people based on a common humanity in terms of things everyone must do. Adler’s (2014) key 
point is that people seem to have special talents and functions and capacities and functions 
common to all. Liberal education is specifically aimed at certain fundamental aspects of human 
experience such as the meaning of life and work in the most general sense. 
Adler (2014) distinguishes between attributes which all people share and excellences specific to 
particulair individuals. Some people seem to have special talents and abilities. However, what 
Adler calls “liberal education” is not aimed at specific talents. It is liberal to the extent it is aimed 
at those excellences and powers which are part of humanity in a general and universal sense. 
Specialized education is often closely related to technical or vocational training. The tendency 
here is to conflate specialized education with labor and occupation and to conflate general 
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education with liberal education. The problem arises because general education is often seen as 
directed towards “the liberal training of man as man” (sic, Adler, 2014, p. 2). That education is 
aimed at the cultivation of generalizable and universalizable human capacities marks out the 
scope of Adler’s notion of liberal education. 
Adler (2014) distinguishes between intrinsic and extrinsic educational aims. He divides them 
according to whether or not the aims are cultivating general human capacities or powers or 
specific, occupation related capacities. Extrinsic aims are those aimed at the perfection of 
specific skills that might possibly involve intrinsic human excellences. Extrinsic aims may also 
be determined by political forces, and to the extent that these forces determine the scope of what 
is acceptable, they are ideologies. Many activities have both these features: the exercise of hand 
and brain is both human generally and a factor in vocation or occupation. 
Adler’s (2014) universalist notion of liberal education is not confined to a mere arts education, 
nor is it narrowly confined to intellectual education or the cultivation of the mind. Liberal 
education resists attempts at systematization due to the inherent logical nature of the enterprise 
itself. Adler regarded “liberal education” as involving three broad aspects of a person’s being: 
the physical (body), the moral (character), and the intellectual (intellect). Adler pointed out that, 
ultimately, liberal education is intended to produce subjects that apprehend the principles behind 
the skills and knowledge encountered. It requires certain basic masteries (e.g., literacy and 
numeracy), but beyond this involves apprehension of universal principles of knowledge. A 
complete education is both technical and liberal in the sense that it aims at universal principles 
across sciences, disciplines, and faculties. 
While Adler represents a recent development of the idea of liberal education towards a 
philosophical trend, Meira Levinson (1999) in The Demands of Liberal Education pushes the 
idea towards the civic side and founds the modern notion of liberal education within the 
framework of liberalism itself (see Appendix B) as an education that protects individual liberty 
and that is grounded in the civic value of autonomy. Liberalism in modern society is often 
founded on market oriented reform and centered on pluralism and diversity. Levinson’s (1999) 
criticism is that liberal education in modern society has been increasingly defined along 
economic rather than social or democratic grounds. She reframes the principles of liberalism in 
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terms of the influence it has had on educational theory, practice, and policy. For her, the aims of 
education are not intrinsic to the concept (contrary to the claims made by the educational 
philosopher R.S. Peters, see Chapter Three), but are defined by the external political influences 
that shape it (the civic importance of liberal education for our times, specifically with reference 
to democratic education, is further discussed in Chapter Four). 
Levinson (1999) defines autonomy as the capacity to form a conception of the good and to re-
think goals with the genuine possibility of revising them. It is autonomy that justifies the 
substantive freedoms of political liberalism. It is a substantive political value that allows citizens 
to enact a search for the good. “Autonomy, I conclude, is a necessary component of 
contemporary liberal theory” (Levinson, 1999, p. 21). For Levinson, a liberal education is 
primarily an education of beliefs and of initiation into a set of intellectual and moral habits 
grounded in a wider dimension of cognition (e.g., Paul H. Hirst's forms of knowledge, discussed 
in Chapter Three, and/or the trivium and quadrivium, etc.), than mere technical or professional 
education. It is the training of the intellect and of the character towards civic ideals rather than 
towards practical know-how and skills.  
Autonomy is a kind of self-rule or self-legislation (Levinson, 1999), and is a necessary condition 
of freedom. Autonomy implies the ability to evaluate and revise desires through the continual re-
examination of reasons for acting. A kind of autonomy that recognizes plurality allows for the 
revision of values from a variety of standpoints. Levinson (1999) argues that liberal education, 
having no end inherent in the concept itself and detached from its classical premises, requires a 
political commitment, in North America, to the ideal of personal autonomy: 
The ideal of personal autonomy is a substantive notion of higher order preference 
formation within a context of cultural coherence, plural constitutive personal values and 
beliefs, openness to others evaluations of oneself, and a sufficiently developed moral, 
spiritual, or aesthetic, intellectual, and emotional personality. (p. 35)  
Adler and Levinson represent recent influences on the justification for liberal education, but the 
tension between them is merely an example of the historical configurations of Kimball's (1986) 
two ideals, of the philosophers and the orators, in a modern and contemporary form. Adler's 
justification is commensurate with the universalist and idealist justification, whereas Levinson's 
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framework rejects the notion of universality as superfluous and connects liberal education to the 
extrinsic civic demands of the liberal state. The tensions here, once again, serve to demonstrate 
that liberal education is perhaps best exemplified by a focus on seemingly irresolvable and 
contradictory problems. 
2.8  FROM HISTORICAL TO PHILOSOPHICAL AND POLITICAL 
The argument developed in the historical and historiographical analysis claims that liberal 
education is a special and atypical kind of education that is specifically based in a concept of 
universality which is defined in terms of the universal significance of rationality and objectivity 
for all education. The whole animating spirit of the humanities (i.e., the humanitatis, or the 
spiritual sciences) is the universality implied in the intrinsic structures of human experience and 
consciousness of which the medieval liberal arts are an early incarnation. Questions and inquiries 
that are universal in scope is the source of the idea of liberal education, at least in the West 
(Flannery & Newsted, 1998, p. 5).  
The history of liberal education is prone to ambiguity and conceptual confusion, a kind of 
theoretical dissonance, because it involves inquiry into the phenomena of human consciousness 
at the universal and pre-reflective level. Myth is written into the fabric of ideas that make up any 
notion of liberal education and give it substance (Rothblatt, 1983). The aim of such an education, 
then, is to produce students and teachers capable of inquiring into the universal significance of 
thoughts and actions and that are able to discern the just from the unjust, virtue from vice, 
wisdom from folly, according to universalizable standards and rational criteria. 
While liberal education is logically and historically grounded in, and a product of, at least some 
representative notion of the liberal arts, liberal education still represents something that 
transcends both the plurality of interpretations of each of the individual arts and of the framing of 
the seven arts known as the trivium and quadrivium within the context of the holistic conceptual 
unity of all branches of knowledge. The substantive scope of liberal education is problematic for 
just this reason. Under the shape of universality, the organization of liberal education is towards 
certain powers of intellect and mind, but how a liberal education actually produces intellectual 
and moral powers is still unclear (this question is raised again in Chapter Three). The whole 
organization of the academic humanities is implied in this problem. The liberal arts, however 
 44 
 
they are construed and arranged, are specifically those arts that emerge out of the universal 
nature of human consciousness as such, and that are aimed at uplifting the human spirit, 
enlivening the soul, and educating the mind and the heart. A democracy requires citizens 
educated in a such a way if it is to function healthily (more comments are made on the 
relationship between liberal and democratic education in Chapter Four).  
The argument developed from the history of liberal education is that it renews, in a universalist 
and idealist sense, the values that sustain all cultures regardless of context. Historically, liberal 
education is not concerned with any particular culture but the general and universal significance 
of all culture. It is that special education that arises out of the intrinsic criteria of historical 
inquiry itself - out of the intrinsic necessary conditions of human nature, reality, consciousness, 
and awareness. The universal bond of each individual person with all others, the transcendence 
of the human condition, the universal community of human nature and the bonds of citizenship, 
civic responsibility, and friendship that these bonds imply; our responsibility to ourselves, to 
each other, to the community, and to the life of the planet and to the species, is all implied in the 
universalist conception of liberal education. 
Most recent attacks on liberal education emanate from movements in philosophy in the 
American academic humanities, from post-modernism and relativism (see Chapter Three) treated 
primarily as a philosophical problem. Post-modernism arose in the wake of the 1960s and 1970s 
and drove the North American college and university away from any notion of liberal education. 
The ultimate impact of post-modernism and relativism on the aims and purposes of liberal 
education is still unclear. In the decades since the 1960s, post-modernism has been central in 
contemporary debates concerning truth and reality in science and philosophy. Perhaps as a result 
of this conceptual chaos, liberal education by the 1980s had come to be defined "however one 
pleased" (Wegener, 1978). 
From its inception, liberal education was beset with variance concerning aims, conflicting and 
contradictory goals, and different manners of framing substantive content. Underlying the 
different frameworks of liberal education is something like what Thomas Kuhn (1970) means by 
paradigms in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. However it is construed, liberal education 
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remains the attempt to produce a special kind of education suited to the shared, general, universal 
nature of humanity (if there even is such a thing) (Rothblatt, 1993). 
The historical development of liberal education is marked by a commitment to metaphysical 
realism, or to the idea that there is a reality outside perception that is universal in scope (attempts 
to divorce liberal education from metaphysical realism by R.S. Peters and Paul H. Hirst are 
discussed in Chapter Three). Implicit in the fragmentary historical transmission and association 
with metaphysical realism is the commitment to universality. Realism, including the realism of 
the physical and mathematical sciences, assumes a universal basis for experience outside the 
contingencies of the moment and of any particular situation or context. Universality is written 
into the fabric of liberal education and represents one of its foundational ideas. 
Presumably, the first conflicts between the philosophical and oratorical ideals, between Plato and 
Isocrates, and the contrast between an intellectual or civic education, is implicitly a debate about 
the universal nature of human life and how that nature ought to be shaped and educated. The 
problems of today mirror ancient philosophical conflicts about the nature of universality, about 
the Platonic intellectual and moral ascent from opinions and illusions to true beliefs, and the 
metaphysical arguments, mostly emanating from post-modernism, that critique and reject the 
kind of universality assumed by both liberal education and scientific inquiry. The whole 
argument, historically, hinges on accepting the realist claim to a reality outside perception that is 
universal in scope and that can be expressed in rational, objective, scientific terms (Chapter 
Three will confront the issue of relativism, in particular as it is related to the claims of modern 
science to an objective basis for reality and knowledge). The whole ambiguity surrounding this 
problem is further complicated, as Rothblatt (1993) notes, by the economic reform imperatives 
of modern day American liberalism (discussed further in Chapter Four) and by the tense status of 
liberal education in mainstream academic politics. 
The idea of liberal education is what spans the chasm between the free and democratic societies 
of today - with our modern scientific and pragmatic orientations - and the thought of classical 
Greece and Rome, Renaissance Humanism, and the Enlightenment. Several distortions and 
dogmas have taken shape upon the tradition of thought and ideas of liberal education. Today, it is 
perhaps best defined in terms of the constellation of conflicts around which it revolves: between 
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the sciences and humanities, between liberal and professional education, utilitarian and 
pragmatic concerns over usefulness and labor market responsiveness, and the many theoretical 
challenges posed by post-modernism and philosophical relativism. The challenges of post-
modernism and relativism are perhaps the most serious for the universalist and idealist 
understanding, and post-modernist and relativist critiques lay at the source of most of the 
disagreements between the sciences and humanities, with professional education, and with 
utility, usefulness, and employment and labor market relevance. 
The conflict between a "liberal" and a "useful," "practical," or "science-based" education has 
characterized the history of liberal education in North America for centuries. The relationship of 
liberal education to the rise of professionalism is now an area of general dispute but the 
principles of professional education are often explained with reference to at least some of the 
values implicit in the historical transmission of the idea of liberal education. 
We call our times the new millennium. One of the failings of North American colleges and 
universities is that they are unable to produce ideals and values of lasting importance to guide 
young people into the wider horizons of the world, into the cosmopolitan politics of global 
culture, multi-culturalism, and citizenship, with all of its confusions and ambiguities. The same 
fundamental problems of all knowledge and values, and all the quest for knowledge, under 
universality and idealism, is necessarily the quest for self-knowledge, no matter what ontological 
or axiological conflicts  may arise.  
The purpose of the university is liberal education, to map out the whole country of our 
knowledge and its boundaries, explore its regions, climb its mountains, cross its seas, and return 
home to safe shores once again. Science and philosophy, in the dialectic of universality and 
idealism, are inseparably connected in the substance of both fields; they both ask fundamental 
questions about the experience of being human and of having a mind, and neither are satisfied 
with easy and emotionally gratifying answers. If liberal education is a special, unique, and 
atypical kind of education that arises out of some shared human nature it is already always bound 
up in every job, occupation, and profession. 
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2.9 CONCLUSION 
The historical conceptions of liberal education illustrate something of the historical evolution of 
the idea. Any narrative of liberal education, however, remains partial, incomplete, and 
fragmentary, and requires selectivity in the issues being explained and related. The origins of 
liberal education are in ancient Greece and Rome and in particular in the example of Socrates 
and the writings of Plato and Aristotle. Further major developments include the humanism of the 
15th century Italian Renaissance and the 17th century Enlightenment. The Enlightenment was 
driven by a conception of universality and the pursuit of universal values, two of which are 
rationality and objectivity (which will be further discussed in Chapter Three). Rationality has a 
universal character because it is implied in all communication, knowledge, and understanding. 
The world that objectivity seeks to explain is the same for all and outside the accidents of place, 
time, and context. In terms of the universality of liberal education, rationality and objectivity 
need to be framed in terms of the idealist reflection on the whole of knowledge. Universality is a 
meta-principle and an ideal rather than any specific content or set of educational practices. 
Idealism, and the pursuit of values with a universal significance (i.e., rationality and objectivity) 
is written into the whole historical edifice of liberal education.  
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CHAPTER THREE: PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS 
The university's ultimate purpose is to reunite us at a higher level of our humanity - as 
reasoning and moral beings. (Emberley, 1996., p. 254) 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Chapter Three presents the attempts of the British philosophers of education R.S. Peters and Paul 
H. Hirst to give liberal education a new justification and philosophical basis in rationality. Peters 
attempts to ground liberal education in conceptual and analytical philosophy while Hirst seeks to 
justify it in terms of academic-rationalism. Both these thinkers, however, are widely regarded to 
have failed to give liberal education a new justification, mostly because of movements in 
philosophy associated with relativism and post-modernism and the rejection of universal 
Enlightenment values such as rationality and objectivity. I discuss this relativist challenge to 
universality and reference Alan Sokal as a challenge to the post-modernist turn. Sokal serves as 
an advocate for science and a scientific worldview. In a sense, he is defending the universalist 
justification because in defending science he is implicitly defending the universal principles of 
objectivity and rationality that characterize the sciences. Finally, I discuss the science-based 
justification for the historical claims of liberal education.  
3.2 THE PETERS-HIRST LIBERAL EDUCATION PARADIGM 
Any new theory of liberal education has to deal with the thought and influence of  the British 
philosophers of education R.S. Peters and Paul H. Hirst. To ask “What is liberal education?” is a 
special kind of question according to Hirst because it assumes a commitment to principles of 
rationality and to a system of publicly, socially shared and agreed upon meanings; meanings 
consented to in language. To ask for a justification for liberal education, therefore, means to ask 
for a justification for the development of rational knowledge at all.  
Peters was mainly concerned with the nature of education, the moral and social principles 
underlying education in a democracy, and the moral education of the individual and society 
(MacIntyre et al., 1981). Hirst (1973) sought to give liberal education a broader conceptual 
definition as “an education based fairly and squarely in the nature of knowledge itself, a concept 
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central to the discussion of education at any level” (p. 87). In "Liberal Education and the Nature 
of Knowledge," Hirst provides what has come to be called an academic-rationalist framework for 
education. Peters and Hirst argued that the concept of liberal education is itself already logically 
implied by the idea of "education” - as an inherently civic, intellectual, and moral form of 
education aimed at the knowledge and abilities necessary for living in a modern, industrialized 
society with all its complex cognitive and social demands. 
The foundation of the Hirst and Peters educational paradigm are principles retrieved from 
Socrates:  
(i) that there is a universal human good; (ii) that the good for man is immanent in, not 
transcendent of, human life; (iii) that it is immanent in the individual life; and (iv) that 
there is no separation between education and life, of which education is a part: in the 
process of obtaining the educational good the learner is already living the good life. 
(Elliott, 1986, p. 17) 
PETERS AND ANALYTICAL CRITERIA 
The establishing and mapping out of the whole domain of the philosophy of education can 
largely be attributed to R.S. Peters, although he was also influential in philosophy generally 
(MacIntyre, 1987). He is widely regarded as an analytical philosopher but he followed no 
particular model and he dealt mainly with the conceptual structures and values upon which the 
whole idea of education is based. One of the main tasks in philosophy is making explicit the 
conceptual schemes and presuppositions that underlie any idea (Peters, 1968). Any idea of liberal 
education must be clear about what the term "education" means.  
"Education" is too general a term to refer to any specific activity. In its generality, it rather points 
to rational and definitive criteria to which a process must conform. The term covers a massive 
range of activities and tasks that have an ethical and moral component built into their nature. 
Education, it is argued, is taken to mean a family of processes explained with reference to the 
effect they have on a person, effects that are primarily cognitive and aimed at the development of 
mental states. Peters (1968) argues in Ethics and Education that education is differentiated from 
other families of similar processes such as indoctrination, coercion, or training by intrinsic 
rational and definitive criteria. Since in his conceptual approach the criteria that distinguish 
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education from processes such as training or rearing are closely related to "freeing," some people 
have argued that what R.S. Peters means by "education" and "liberal education" is essentially 
identical (Peters, 1968). 
Education implies that something worthwhile is being or has been intentionally transmitted in a 
morally acceptable manner. It would be a logical contradiction to say that a person has been 
educated but has in no way changed for the better or that in educating a student a person was 
attempting something that was not worthwhile. This is a purely conceptual and analytical point. 
Such a connection between "education" and what is valuable does not imply any particular 
commitment to content (Peters, 1968). It is generally agreed that education should aim at 
something valuable. Even if the aim is not intrinsic to the concept, that the ends are of value is 
pre-supposed by the term “education.” It is implied that the person being educated will come into 
possession of something valuable (Peters, 1973). 
Peters and Hirst held that the aims of education are inherent in the concepts of “education” and 
"knowledge" themselves; that education has a set of built-in rational criteria inseparable from 
notions of value; and that education does not signify any particular process but rather rational 
criteria to which a process must conform. Several criteria can contribute to making a process 
“educational,” but foremost among them is that activities be “worthwhile” and generally agreed 
upon to be of value. “Liberal education,” then, is initiation into systems of thought and 
awareness predicated on certain value distinctions, including “worthwhileness” and 
“desirability” (Peters, 1966). 
Education implies a “desirability” criterion because it is incoherent to use the term to describe a 
process that makes people worse, “although ‘education’ picks out no specific processes it does 
imply criteria which processes involved must satisfy in addition to the demand that something 
valuable must be passed on” (Peters, 1965, p. 18). Analyzing the desirability of some aims and 
processes over others brings into focus the immanence of value judgments and normative, moral 
considerations. Considerations of value and morality as a hallmark of mind apply both to what is 
taught and the manner of its transmission. 
In "Education as Initiation" Peters (1965) argues that the values embedded in the concept of 
education include developing desirable states of mind in the transmission of what is worthwhile; 
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acquiring a body of knowledge intended to frame in a cognitive perspective and achieving an 
understanding of what is being learned and of what is required in the learning. Worthwhile 
educational activities must be justified by sets of rationally generated criteria. Peters makes the 
distinction between things valuable instrumentally and things valuable intrinsically. The 
justification for intrinsic values is transcendental, “the activities being the pursuits of knowledge 
and understanding necessarily presupposed in the question ‘why do this rather than that?’ (Hirst, 
1986, p. 21). The problem of intrinsic value intersects with almost any conception of liberal 
education. 
Peters (1966) lays out his conceptual and analytical position on liberal education in his book 
Ethics and Education (p. 18-20). Peters's (1966) approach is similar to Socratic inquiry into 
concepts such as justice and virtue. However, Peters notes that the general terms that philosophy 
aims at, such as "education," do not have the clear and distinct kinds of definitions found in 
domains such as mathematics and geometry (i.e., such as the definitions of triangle or circle). 
Rather, the meaning of the term exists in families of related processes. It is by formulating 
criteria that a term is given a definitive, lexical meaning. General terms such as "education" pick 
out no particular activity, it is argued, but rather point to criteria to which activities and processes 
must conform (p. 3). 
For Peters, the intrinsic criteria that define any idea of education already point toward liberal 
education because the criteria to which education must conform in order to be something more 
than merely training, reforming, or indoctrinating are liberal. For Peters (1966), the concept of 
education is one committed to certain criteria: 
(i) that "education" implies the transmission of what is worth-while to those who become 
committed to it; 
(ii) that "education" must involve knowledge and understanding and some kind of 
cognitive perspective which are not inert; 
(iii) that "education" at least rules out some procedures of transmission, on the grounds 
that they lack willingness and voluntariness on the part of the learner. (p. 20) 
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In Ethics and Education (1968) Peters differentiates his notion of “liberal education” from the 
concept of “education." Peters writes that what he means by “education” as differentiated from 
processes such as indoctrination, brainwashing, or coercion, is essentially the same as what is 
often meant by “liberal education.” Such education, he says, is closely associated with the notion 
of “freeing” (i.e., freeing the mind from error).  
Peters lays out three senses of the way the cognate “liberal” is used in its relation to “education.” 
First, he lays out the negative sense of the term “liberal,” which means essentially removing 
restrictions and impediments. In its negative sense, being "free" means not being restricted by 
barriers. Traditionally, “liberal education” is a differentiated from, as opposed to being harnessed 
to, instrumental goals, “it has been a plea for education rather than vocational training, or 
training of hand and brain for utilitarian purposes” (Peters, 1968, p. 43). “Liberal,” in the 
negative sense, means essentially uncoupling educational processes from extrinsic or utilitarian 
aims and defining it in terms of intrinsic criteria. In the second sense, Peters argues that “liberal” 
seems to imply a certain depth of understanding aimed at standards and values intrinsic to a 
subject or activity. In the second sense, “liberal” takes on the meaning of not confining thought 
to a single field or domain of knowledge. With reference to the ideal of “the educated person,” 
being “liberally educated” means having a variety, or a plurality, of different ways of looking at 
the world. In the third sense of the term “liberal,” Peters suggests that liberal education means 
emphasizing principles of individual liberty in the context of educationally related processes and 
contents. In this sense, “liberal education” is a component of almost any education-related 
process or means. In processes such as vocational training it can mean teaching in a way that 
emphasizes standards intrinsic to the field or activity; it can mean that grasping a deeper 
understanding is encouraged; and it can mean encouraging a critical attitude towards what is 
taught. All three “liberal” approaches add educational value to relevant processes (Peters, 1968). 
One interpretation of the term “liberal” here is that education should not be purely technical, 
vocational, or manual. It takes into account a plurality on the epistemological level of modes of 
awareness. It also means that the criteria that separate true from false in the different domains 
come from the rational structure of the concepts knowledge, truth, and mind. “Liberal” 
emphasizes a plurality of ways of thinking and knowing into which education is intended to 
initiate people (Peters, 1973). While the aims and goals themselves are not implicit in the 
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concept of education, that those aims are of value or worthwhile is. The value of the aims is 
determined by rational criteria implicit in the concept. However, there is a great deal of 
confusion regarding the range and scope of “liberal,” “vocational,” and “technical” education 
(Peters, 1977). 
Liberal education is remarkably difficult because of its commitment to the unimpeded 
development of mind. In this sense the term “liberal” essentially means “to free” in the sense of 
freedom of the mind in all domains of intellectual inquiry. The view adheres to the premise that 
“liberal” means a kind of development towards knowledge uninhibited by instrumental (i.e., 
utilitarian, vocational, or technical) aims. Knowledge in this case is, once again, “for its own 
sake,” as apart from instrumental forms of justification (Peters, 1977). 
Liberal education framed in terms of “knowledge for its own sake,” as having its method and 
ends contained within the idea itself, is underwritten by the premise that the essential nature of 
the mind is rational and its highest development is pure theory (Peters, 1977). The value of 
studying is treated as immanent in the nature of knowledge itself and is contrasted against 
manual, technical, and vocational training where the psyche is mixed with the base material 
components of nature. Peters’ position, in terms of its modern historical developments, is in a 
sense a more developed and differentiated form of this view. However, liberal education as 
“knowledge for its own sake” is too vague a notion to support a concrete program of liberal 
studies. Peters's work is an attempt to ameliorate the conceptual confusion and ambiguity that 
plagues discussions of liberal education and is committed to an ideal of freedom and liberty. It is 
clear that being a free person, for Peters and Hirst, means more than narrow specialist training 
(Peters, 1977). 
According to Peters, liberal education is also woven into the nature of democratic life. 
Democratic life is committed to: i. respect for persons and others, ii. truth as self-evidently 
valuable, and iii. a plurality of views of what constitutes the good life (Peters, 1981). However, 
to be educated seems to mean more than a commitment to democratic ideals. It implies 
acquaintanceship with a plurality of principles and worldviews characterized mainly by a 
cognitive perspective and a habit, frame, or bent of mind. 
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The value of what is transmitted in the name of education is often in dispute in democratic 
societies owing to differences concerning the aims and ends of education. Peters tried to 
demonstrate that education of any kind is intrinsically rational and that it is "liberal" to the extent 
it tries to recognize analytical criteria in its process of teaching and learning. Any conceptual 
analysis in this area necessarily intersects with ethical and moral issues. The content and method 
of education as well as why some kinds of knowledge are more valuable than others is a moral 
question that needs some kind of philosophical justification (Peters, 1968). 
HIRST AND THE FORMS OF KNOWLEDGE 
The original notion of liberal education comes from the Greeks, a notion involving doctrines of 
metaphysical realism about the significance of knowledge for the mind and the relationship 
between knowledge and reality. The first doctrine holds that it is the nature of the mind to pursue 
knowledge: “The pursuit of knowledge is thus the pursuit of the good of the mind and, therefore, 
an essential element in the good life” (Hirst, 1973, p. 87). The second doctrine upon which the 
realist version of liberal education is founded is that the mind develops in accordance with an 
external reality. The mind can come to know what is true and ultimately real through critical and 
dialectical reasoning activity. Knowledge, understanding, and reality are (arbitrarily, it seems) 
hierarchically structured into various levels: 
From the knowledge of mere particulars to that of pure being, all knowledge has its place 
in a comprehensive and harmonious scheme, the pattern of which is formed as 
knowledge is developed in apprehending reality in its many different manifestations. 
(Hirst, 1973, p. 88) 
In "Liberal Education and the Nature of Knowledge" Hirst (1973) argues that, in his time, liberal 
education had become little more than a slogan that takes on whatever meaning suits the 
immediate context. The meaning is almost always totally defined negatively as not a vocational, 
scientific, or specialist education. In working out his notion of liberal education, Hirst comments 
on the “Harvard Committee Report: General Education in a Free Society” (1946, also known as 
the Redbook) in which a liberal education is more or less equated with a “general education” and 
is defined and justified in terms of “traits of mind” and “areas of knowledge.” Areas of 
knowledge are first identified as the natural sciences, social studies, and the humanities which 
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are differentiated and defined in terms of “methods of knowledge” (p. 59). The “traits of mind” 
advanced in the 1946 Redbook comprise the abilities “to think effectively, to communicate 
thought, to make relevant judgments, and to discriminate among values” (Harvard Report, 1946, 
p. 65). 
 Effective Thinking: Defined as logical thinking directed at practical ends, it is "the ability 
to extract universal truths from particular cases and to infer particulars from general laws; 
it is the ability to analyze a problem and to recombine the elements by the use of 
imagination" (p. 91). Under the label of "effective thinking" go all the cognitive 
operations involved in common sense  and of the poet and the inventor. 
 Communication: Defined as the ability to speak, listen, read, and write well, it includes 
the social and moral dimensions of speaking, discussion, debate, and conversation. 
 Making Relevant Judgments: Defined in terms of the relationship between theory and 
practice, judgment has to do with the relationship between ideas and experience and 
between thoughts and actions. 
 Discriminating Among Values: Defined as assigning importance to different values and 
kinds of values, discrimination of value has to do with conscious awareness of values of 
character, such as self-control and moderation, and intellectual values, such as integrity 
and commitment to truth. Discriminating among values also involves aesthetic qualities 
such as the appreciation of beauty, harmony, and for the ethical and moral conduct of life 
(Hirst, 1973). 
Hirst argues, however, that the kinds of mental activities underlying the Report’s notion of “areas 
of knowledge” and “traits of mind” leave ambiguous an underlying commitment to metaphysical 
realism and that the broad, general terms in which liberal education is couched are misleading 
(i.e., that the areas of knowledge are marked out along either socially agreed upon, or arbitrary, 
lines). How the forms of knowledge are distinguished and how they are related are too broadly 
defined and too loosely connected to an assumed metaphysical realism to be defensible.  
The Redbook says little about how the qualities of mind it develops correspond to its 
differentiation of knowledge into the three areas (natural science, social studies, and humanities). 
The relationship between the qualities of mind and the areas of knowledge is left ambiguous. In 
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order for liberal education to be defined in terms of mental qualities, how these qualities are 
related to the three domains needs to be clarified. The Redbook simply assumes that liberal 
education cultivates general mental abilities and does not provide a sufficient framework for 
specifying the relations. Also, in its use of broad and general terms, it misleadingly conflates 
what are distinct intellectual and mental processes, abilities, and powers, and assumes that skills 
have commonalities where none may be apparent. The Redbook also implies that liberal 
education is somehow emotional and moral but it gives no explanation as to how or why (Hirst, 
1973). 
Hirst's (1973) project is, then, to provide a new justification for liberal education in terms of 
what he calls the "forms of knowledge," which are "the complex ways of understanding 
experience . . . , which are publicly specifiable and which are gained through learning" (p. 96). 
“The forms of knowledge are the basic articulations whereby the whole of experience has 
become intelligible to man; they are the fundamental achievements of the mind” (Hirst, 1973, p. 
98). Each is characterized by central organizing concepts, a distinctive logical structure, 
propositions testable against experience, and distinctive techniques for exploring experience. 
Hirst identifies seven forms - mathematics, physical science, human science, history, religion, 
literature and the fine arts, and philosophy - each organized around a network of core over-
arching principles such as “number” in mathematics or “God” in religion. Each has a distinctive, 
inherent logical structure of relationships and distinct truth criteria.  
The different forms and networks are frameworks within which experiences become intelligible 
to consciousness. For Hirst, the forms of knowledge are the particular ways in which mind itself 
develops. Through the forms of knowledge he seeks to reassert and reinterpret the concept of a 
liberal education with the ambiguous claims of metaphysical realism and the loose connection to 
areas of knowledge and traits of mind explained and solved. The concept of liberal education is 
to be explained in terms of the plurality of ways through which reality is interpreted in socially 
shared terms, terms that are made legitimate through public consent, consensus, and tradition. 
Liberal education in the forms of knowledge sense is initiation into public traditions of thought 
that have been achieved by the mind through agreed upon, debated, contested, and consented to 
historical developments of public traditions: 
 57 
 
Hirst’s (1973) framework assumes that knowledge is rational and developed along the lines of a 
publicly identifiable conceptual scheme. Knowledge is only intelligible in terms of a rational and 
public conceptual apparatus. Articulation is a process of translating individual intellectual 
achievements into a publicly shared conceptual scheme – a cognitive framework with public 
criteria. Through this process individuals become aware of private states of mind in terms of a 
shared, external world in part through objectification of ideas in language. Language gives public 
expression to a private internal world. 
Hirst’s  epistemological framework supposes that to ask for a justification for liberal education is 
to ask for a justification for the pursuit of rational knowledge and the development of a rational 
mind at all. To ask for a reason presupposes a commitment to rationality. Justification is only 
possible in and through a shared scheme of rational public symbols that make up language and 
that are publicly consented to in discussion and agreement.  
Hirst’s conception of liberal education, like the Peters’ framework, is rooted in the nature of 
knowledge itself but is no longer tied to a hierarchical epistemological organization and 
abandons its philosophical commitments to classical realism. Instead, the forms of knowledge 
are delimited by conceptual, methodological, and logical features that are the product of public 
traditions and that acknowledge a plurality of worldviews based on the fundamental division 
between theoretical and practical knowledge. The forms of knowledge framework is mainly 
rational and cognitive in nature and not concerned with utilitarian modes of justification and no 
longer committed to a vague, obscure, ambiguous basis in metaphysical realism. The realist 
justification for liberal education has been to develop the mind in accordance with an external 
reality, but the way in which this process takes place and how liberal education is linked with the 
cultivation of powers of mind has historically been left obscure. Hirst’s position is no longer 
committed to metaphysical realism but on the necessary conditions intrinsic to the nature of 
rationality and rational knowledge itself. The forms of knowledge are modes of awareness the 
species has developed through traditions objectified in public form that are communicated 
through publicly accepted systems embodied in language. 
Whatever private inner world of consciousness might exist such states are only objective in terms 
of public symbols such as language and communication. The objective external world and 
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subjective private states of mind are related through a shared public scheme that exists in the use 
of signs and symbols in discussion and communication. It is a shared, rational, objective system 
where the validity of expressions and the separation of true and false are judged according to 
public criteria in discussion and consensus-seeking. The aim of Hirst’s formulation of liberal 
education as initiation into public forms of thought and awareness is a rejection of metaphysical 
realism and a re-assertion of the concept of liberal education according to the publicly agreed on 
forms of knowledge. The aim is to acquire enough breadth of knowledge along with sufficient 
depth to acquire "critical appreciation" (Hirst, 1973, p. 106). The forms make up the basis for the 
whole apparatus of what we call "mind" and how experience is made intelligible through rational 
schemata. The different "forms" of knowledge are various historically accredited and 
differentiated kinds of rationality.  
Hirst's formulation serves to underscore that to ask for a justification for liberal education is a 
special kind of question. To ask for a justification in any sense seems to be committed to asking 
for an intelligible or rational answer, so that rationality is treated as a necessary universal value. 
To ask for a justification for liberal education, then, is to ask for a justification for the 
development of rational knowledge at all: “Justification is only possible if what is being justified 
is both intelligible under publicly rooted concepts and is assessable according to accepted 
criteria” (Hirst, 1973, p. 47). 
If the achievement of knowledge is necessarily the development of mind in its most basic 
sense, then it can be readily seen that to ask for a justification for the pursuit of 
knowledge is not at all the same thing as to ask for the justification for, say, teaching all 
children a foreign language or making them orderly and punctual in their behavior. It is 
in fact a peculiar question asking for justification for any development of the rational 
mind at all. To ask for the justification for any form of activity is significant only if one is 
in fact committed already to seeking rational knowledge. To ask for a justification for the 
pursuit of rational knowledge itself therefore presupposes some form of commitment to 
what one is seeking to justify. Justification is possible only if what is being justified is 
both intelligible under publicly rooted concepts and is assessable according to accepted 
criteria. It assumes a commitment to these two principles. But these very principles are in 
fact fundamental to the pursuit of knowledge in all its forms, be it, for instance, empirical 
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knowledge or understanding in the arts. The forms of knowledge are in a sense simply 
the working out of these general principles in particular ways. To give justification of any 
kind of knowledge therefore involves using the principles in one specific form to assess 
their use in another. Any particular activity can be examined for its rational character, for 
its adherence to these principles, and thus justified on the assumption of them. Indeed, 
insofar as activities are rational this will be possible. It is commitment to them that 
characterizes any rational activity as such. But the principles themselves have no such 
assessable status, for justification outside the use of the principles is not logically 
possible. This does not mean that rational pursuits in the end lack justification, for they 
could equally well be said to have their justification written into them. Nor is any form of 
viciously circular justification involved by assuming in the procedure what is being 
looked for. The situation is that we have here reached the ultimate point where the 
question of justification ceases to be significantly applicable. The apparent circularity is 
the result of the interrelation between the concept of rational justification and the pursuit 
of knowledge. (Hirst, 1973, p. 100) 
Liberal education in this sense is conceived without any reference to technical or “useful” aims. 
It is defined totally in terms of rational, publicly agreed upon knowledge as the greatest good. 
This conception of liberal education has been influential in the philosophy of education for 
decades (Hirst, 1973). The Hirst conception of liberal education clearly intersects with questions 
of value. What is the basis for the values that animate liberal education? Hirst (1973) says they 
are found in the “forms of knowledge” that have been achieved. Liberal education is initiation 
into a plurality of historically accredited forms of knowledge according to the universal value of 
rationality. However, Hirst's claims are themselves inadequate. The conception does not provide 
a sufficient framework to justify liberal education and he never foresaw the necessary nature of 
philosophy to combat modern sophistries. While Hirst's framework does include both science 
and philosophy the whole of liberal education is not reducible to either philosophy or science.  
Liberal education is, according to Hirst, aimed at a particular bent or frame of mind, of coming to 
see judgments of taste or empirical assertions for what they are. It aims at "critical appreciation" 
(p. 166) (See Appendix A), which means essentially a breadth of knowledge and understanding 
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along with sufficient depth to become critical. Coming to know a form of knowledge, Hirst 
(1973) tells us, is "more like coming to know a country than climbing a ladder" (p. 108-9). 
Two key questions arise out of Hirst's (1973) justification of liberal education: What subjects are 
to be included in a program of liberal education? How much depth is required to acquire critical 
appreciation? Notions of breadth and depth plague any notion of liberal education. However, any 
questions of breadth and depth in liberal education are now largely irrelevant as both Peters and 
Hirst are widely regarded to have failed in giving liberal education a new justification. 
Furthermore, neither Peters nor Hirst could have predicted the influence of relativism in 
philosophy, which is one of the main developments, mostly in philosophy, eroding and 
displacing any attempt to advocate for liberal education in the North American college and 
university missions of today. 
3.3 RELATIVITY AND UNIVERSALITY 
The influence of relativist epistemology and ontology since the era of the 1960's and 1970's in 
America (during and after the period of Peters and Hirst) in post-modernism, post-structuralism, 
and social constructionism is now deeply felt in the American academic humanities. Relativism 
represents a new scholasticism and a new sophistry that regards itself as a higher form of 
wisdom. It is against any idea of a universal basis to humanity and against any language that is 
totalizing in nature and so annihilates attempts to advocate for liberal education. Radical attacks 
on Enlightenment values, such as rationality and objectivity, have gained wide acceptance in the 
academic humanities. Relativist frameworks deny any idea of universal a priori human values.  
In "Relativism, Rationalism, and the Sociology of Knowledge," Barry Barnes and David Bloor 
(1982) define relativism as "(i) the observation that beliefs on a certain topic vary, and (ii) the 
conviction that which of these beliefs is found in a given context depends on, or is relative to, the 
circumstances of users" (p. 22). Barnes and Bloor (1982) support a relativistic view about how 
contradictory beliefs can exist about the same thing. Under the relativism of Barnes and Bloor, 
knowledge is defined as "any collectively accepted system of beliefs" (Barnes & Bloor in 
Koertge, 1998, p. 14).  
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Under relativism, contradictory beliefs are the product of the varying, changing, and evolving 
rules of logic and interpretation and the criteria that separate good reasons from bad ones are 
regarded as context dependant. In other words, there are no universal a priori values or 
standards. In anthropology, relativism is the view that the world of the Other must be interpreted 
according to subjectivism that finds the key to understanding local knowledge from local causes 
(Barnes, & Bloor, 1998). All knowledge is treated locally and contextually. This runs against the 
Enlightenment premise that belief has a basis in an objective and universally shared reality that 
can be explained rationally in terms of abstract formalism and impartial criteria. In the wholesale 
rejection of essentialism, in the rejection of claims to a universal basis for experience, relativism 
is itself an essentialism and is making implicit universalist claims about the nature of the world 
(Sokal & Bricmont, 1998). 
Relativist claims about the nature of the world often conflate, in different ways, according to 
Alan D. Sokal (1998): 
1. Ontology. What objects exist in the world? What statements about these objects are 
true? 
2. Epistemology. How can human beings obtain knowledge of truths about the world? 
How can they assess the reliability of knowledge? 
3. Sociology of Knowledge. To what extent are the truths known (or knowable) by humans 
in any given society influenced (or determined) by social, economic, political, cultural, 
and ideological factors? Same question for the false statements erroneously believed to be 
true. 
4. Individual ethics. What types of research ought a scientist (or technologist) to 
undertake (or refuse to undertake)? 
5. Social ethics. What types of research ought we to encourage, subsidize, or publicly 
fund (or alternatively, to discourage, tax, or forbid)? (p. 14-5) 
Relativist frames for the truth place various modes of interpretation in different worlds and deny 
the idea of a universality behind the mere names of phenomena. All truth is subjective - the 
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product of linguistic, social, and cultural conventions - and attempts to get at the truth have 
produced equally valid and sometimes incommensurable interpretations.  
Bruno Latour is often associated with "strong relativism" (Huth, 1998, p. 181). His strong form 
seeks to redefine science strictly as a social phenomenon. At least part of Latour's program is due 
to what Sokal and Bricmont8 (1998) in Fashionable Nonsense consider to be a bad interpretation 
of Einstein's (1916) populist essay Relativity: The Special and General Theory. Relativity in 
physics is highly abstract and very different from the way the term is used in an everyday sense. 
In physics it has a lexical, formal, specialized definition. The everyday sense of the term 
"relative" has a bizarre relationship with how it is used in professional science, physics, and 
mathematics. Mis-interpretation of concepts used in the discourse of professional science has a 
debilitating effect on the aims and ideals of liberal education. It is common at many colleges and 
universities that are committed to liberal education for students to be asked to analyze scientific 
treatise about global warming or nuclear energy but in social and political, rather than 
intellectual, philosophical, or scientific terms. Even purely theoretical mathematics is framed as 
relative to cultural positionality (Sokal & Bricmont, 1998). 
Relativism has a special significance for interpreting the Other. Truth, and giving reasons for 
beliefs, hinge on the meanings of terms that are determined by what Ian Hacking (1999) calls 
"thought styles." A paradigm or a "conceptual scheme" is in a sense a thought style. A 
conceptual scheme is based on "a set of sentences held to be true" (Hacking, 1982, p. 58). The 
problem brings into focus the issue of disparate and incommensurable thought styles and 
contradictory beliefs about the same phenomena. The Western thought style behind the historical 
development of liberal education (see Chapter Two) with its special atypical tradition and 
language of universality and transcendence has generated objective scientific knowledge based 
on evidence out of the dialectical development of reason and science. Paradigm shifts bring 
tectonic changes in the rules that guide thinking, "Thales opening a continent, that of 
                                                          
8 Sokal, Alan. D. & Bricmont, Jean (1998) Fashionable Nonsense. New York: Picador USA, (p. 
124-133). 
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mathematics, Galileo opening up the continent of dynamics and Marx that of history" (Hacking, 
1982, p. 51). 
Cultural constructivist doctrine9 with its relativist epistemology regards situated cultural factors 
as giving rise to the diversity of beliefs and the naming of things. Often, constructivist doctrine 
only serves as a front to advance radical political ideas. Cultural factors and affections clearly do 
play a role in the things we believe and the reasons we give for them. The cultural constructivist 
view distances itself from the idea that there is a universal reality separate from the contingencies 
of perception (Fishman, 1996). Universality is aimed at articulating rules that exist separately in 
nature outside the mere accidents of time and place, and universality is the special feature and 
requirement of liberal education. However, such rules are mysterious and the subject of huge 
debate: 
There may well be a psychological mechanism (or mechanisms) that provide us with 
cognitive rules and generalizations from experience of which we are not consciously 
aware, and which we find impossible to articulate or formalize. (Fishman, 1996, p. 94) 
Scientific realism (Kitcher, 1998), an inheritor of the metaphysical realism underlying the 
historical justification for liberal education, is the attempt to discover and explain such an elusive 
mechanism in the reflexive basis of nature if there is one. There are different varieties of realists, 
but generally they accept "the knower can attain (some) knowledge of an independent reality - 
that is, reality that is objective in the sense it does not originate in the knower, or knowing 
subject" (Held, 1998, p. 199).  
Realism, ontologically and epistemologically, pursues a reality in-itself that the mind can acquire 
knowledge of. According to the relativity of cultural constructivism, reality is mainly the product 
of language, the linguistic mediation of communication and the partial nature of interpretation. 
Every problem in philosophy and science is reduced to the language games of communication. 
                                                          
9 Gross, Paul R. & Levitt, Norman (1994/8) Higher Superstition. Baltimore & London: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, (p. 42-70) 
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All things are constructs, and in extreme forms, all theories are equally valid. Under the anti-
realist posture (which is often political rather than philosophical):  
The knower cannot under any circumstances attain knowledge of a reality that is 
objectively independent of the knower, or how the world really is. Instead, knowers 
make, invent, constitute, create, construct, or narrate, in language, their own subjective 
realities, or, in the usual terminology, antirealities and nonrealities. (Held, 1998, p. 199) 
Relativistic attacks on the method and content (i.e., rational progress and objective knowledge) 
of natural science are also attacks on liberal education, they attack objectivity, rationality, and 
science implicitly, and so represent an attack on universality and the idealist justification for 
liberal education. Attacks that emanate from constructivist and post-modernist doctrine maintain 
that everything is relative to subjective interpretation. The relativist claim rejects the entire 
Enlightenment development of rationality and objectivity which is sometimes criticized as a 
"Western" and "patriarchal" abstraction (Nanda, 1998). 
Defending any concept of universality or universalizabiltiy is exceedingly difficult and without 
it, justifications for liberal education have no basis. The issue is deeply problematic because 
rationality is the capacity that can liberate the oppressed and help people break free from the 
margins and experience a wider humanity. Rationality has an intrinsically political and liberating 
power that promotes self-determination, autonomy, equality, and emancipation. Meera Nanda 
(1998) is correct, that rationality transcends the accidents of race, class, and gender, and that the 
knowledge it seeks - something outside the arbitrariness of cultural traditions and accidents of 
birth - has a way of being critical of, and improving upon, tradition. 
In Ernst Gellner's (1982) "Relativism and Universals," the problem of relativity is framed 
anthropologically. Anthropology as an academic field can be framed as the general study of 
humanity. Relativity is framed by cultural anthropology in terms of the diversity of humanity and 
the enormous variety of all possible worlds, "Is there but one kind of man, or are there many? Is 
there but one world, or are there many?" (Gellner, 1982, p. 181). The problem of relativism and 
universality ought to be treated first as a philosophical issue, it is foremost a philosophical 
problem and it needs to be dealt with in terms of philosophy and science. Epistemologically, it 
has to do with the relativity of cognition and subjectivity. Ontologically, it has to do with the 
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reality of the world. Sociologically, it represents the problem of the differences of social forms, 
systems, and organizations. 
Relativism is also commonly understood as an epistemological doctrine, "Relativism is basically 
a doctrine in the theory of knowledge: it asserts that there is no unique truth, no objective reality" 
(Gellner, 1982, p. 183). The relativity of worlds and the relativity of subjectivities is, however, 
not the same question:  
The issues of relativism, and that of the existence of human universals, are not one and 
the same issue. The problem of relativism is whether there is one and only one world, in 
the end; whether all the divergent visions of reality can be shown (leaving out cases when 
they are simply mistaken) to be diverse aspects of one and the same objective world, 
whose diversity can itself be explained in terms of the properties or laws of that world. 
(Gellner, 1982, p. 186) 
Relativity as an epistemological, ontological, and sociological doctrine does not defeat the claim 
that there may be a universal component to being human, even while the huge variety of possible 
interpretations of the world seems to deny this. The diversity of subjective perception and the 
variety of interpretations of the world seems to resist attempts to prove and explain human 
universality. The world is subjectively interpreted and how it is understood is often the product 
of cultural traditions or a particular thought-style (Hacking, 1982). 
Relativism as an anthropological problem claims all cognition is purely subjective and that it has 
no a priori, rational, universal basis. In cultural relativity, the subjective units (i.e., the individual 
person) identify things in terms of traditions that may include cosmological, mystical, and 
religious world views, that are all treated as equally valid. Each individual represents a 
cosmological and subjective unit with human diversity and the variety of seemingly 
incommensurable worldviews and thought-styles explained with reference to local, contextual 
factors. Clearly, the issue of relativism makes any claim for a universal basis for human 
experience dubious. Different thought styles are often the product of local cultural traditions and 
languages and incommensurable thought styles do exist in the enormous variation of cultural, 
social, and cognitive traits.  
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Epistemologically, the claim of the Western thought style embodied in the historical narrative of 
liberal education (see Chapter Two), of the intellectual and historical development of the 
rationality and objectivity used in the natural sciences, is that in order for something to count as 
knowledge it must meet certain criteria (according to  Gellner (1982), explanation must be 
symmetrical, orderly, and rational). Sociologically, under universality, cultures are seen to 
inhabit the same world, and this world has an a priori necessary structure. Objectivity, based in 
the intellectual development of rationality in the West, assumes an absolute basis in the world 
that generates rational criteria for good and bad reasons and standards of truth.  
As an epistemological claim, objectivity assumes an absolute basis in a single, universally 
shared, unified world that all humans encounter. In order for something to be knowledge 
according to the claims of universality it must be so under rational criteria of interpretation and 
intelligibility. Rationality generates the dualism and the bimodal differentiation between true and 
false propositions that can be empirically tested against experience. However, the Western 
thought style that generated the problem of relativity and universality is just one among many 
others, "for the particular thought style which alone generated this unique, converging, 
cumulative world, as the object of human cognition, was not universally dispersed among men. 
On the contrary, it was but one tradition amongst many, and a very untypical one" (Gellner, 
1982, p. 191). 
Gellner (1982) summarizes the argument of "Relativism and Universals": 
The problems of relativism and that of the existence of human universals is not identical. 
The doctrine of 'human universals' is often tacitly conjoined with that of the uniqueness 
of man: the claim is not only that the essentially human is present in all of us, but also 
that it is not present in anything else. 
Universality at the phenomenological level is highly questionable or trivial. At the 
explanatory level, the notion is complex and obscure. 
The solution of the problem of relativism does not hinge on the establishment of human 
universals. If it has a solution, it is elsewhere. 
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Relativism is about the existence of One World: and the conceptual unification of the 
world is, precisely, the work of one particular style of thought, which is not universal 
amongst men, but is culturally specific. 
But this in turn does not actually subvert the Universality Thesis: for although the 
conceptual unification of the world does have specific socio-historic roots, it is evidently 
accessible to all men, and is in fact now being diffused generally. 
Science needs one world. It does not need one kind of man within it. But one kind of man 
did make the single world. His historical situation may have been unique, his basic 
constitution was not. The single world seems to be gradually adopted by all of them, and 
appears manifestly accessible to all men. (Gellner, 1982, p. 199-200) 
Universality claims that there is an a priori unity to humanity. Universals are those features that 
are shared by humanity generally or the general characteristics of being human. Universals are 
the constants of general humanity that operate for all societies and characterize human beings as 
a species. As an epistemological claim it assumes humans have certain a priori cognitive 
structures (e.g., memory and imagination). As an ontological claim it assumes that the world 
humans encounter is the same for all, regardless of tradition, situatedness, and context. 
Sociologically, it regards all social organizations and systems of governance to be based in 
principles and the various expressions of a single, harmonious unity. The rationality that the 
West has developed seeks a universally valid basis for beliefs, and such universality is the only 
legitimate ground of liberal education.  
3.4 THE POST-MODERN CHALLENGE 
Postmodernism is often characterized with reference to Jacques Derrida and Jean-Francois 
Lyotard as the rejection of any claim to a universal basis for experience; a problematization of 
the nature of meaning as changing from one situation and discussion to another, one context to 
another, one person to another. All knowledge is treated as localized, situated, and relative to the 
subjective reality of the observer and objectivity is rejected as the illusion of bias and prejudice. 
The subjectivism and relativism of post-modernism criticizes any claim to a reality outside 
perception or to any theory of universal or transcendent phenomena. Deconstructive literary 
theory is intended to be liberatory and to reveal hierarchies and expose the marginalization of the 
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weak and powerless. Liberal education has in particular come under attack from post-modernists, 
post-structuralists, social constructionists, and desconstuctionists, for its monolithic character, 
that was argued to have excluded the experiences of women and minorities (Hanson & Heath, 
1998). The whole theoretical enterprise of post-modernism has a special antagonism with claims 
to objectivity and universality. 
In the foreword to the eighth printing of The Postmodern Condition (1991) Frederic Jameson 
tells us the term "post-modernism" refers to "the condition of knowledge in the most highly 
developed societies" (Jameson in Lyotard, 1991, p. xxiii). He frames the state of philosophy and 
science today as "the crisis of metanarratives" (Jameson in Lyotard, 1991, p. xxiii). The crisis of 
metanarratives is the crisis of metaphysical philosophy and of our social and civil institutions 
whose justifications have historically been based in its arguments and reasons. Transformations 
in technology, it is argued, have led to transformations in the nature of knowledge and reality. 
Lyotard's vein in The Postmodern Condition (1991) is aligned with the work of Gilles Deleuze 
and Felix Guattari and is intended as a polemic against Jurgen Habermas (Jameson, 1991). While 
Habermas concerned himself with the philosophical status of authority and consensus, Lyotard 
aims mainly at the "game of dialogue," or how language influences the scope of, and determines, 
the possibility and structure of social bonds. It is important to remember, underlying the debate, 
that the whole constellation revolves around the problem of justice. Defining justice is consonant 
with the problem of defining liberal education; it is a hugely complex task and resists easy 
explanation. 
Post-modernism presents itself as a kind of narrative analysis where even science and its 
principles and arguments are treated as fables and myths with the intention of calling the 
epistemological and ontological basis of any notion of universality, rationality, or objectivity into 
radical question. It is tied up with the relationship between science, capitalism, and our accepted 
and acceptable ways of getting at and communicating the truth.  Science and "narrative," for 
Lyotard (1991), are distinct and often contradictory forms of knowing. Where the objectivist and 
universalist discourse of science is monolithic, narrative is heterogeneous, contradictory, and 
contested. Lyotard (1991) is incredulous towards grand metanarratives (e.g., Hegel and Marx) 
and the ideals of the Enlightenment that once served as the basis of civil and social institutions 
such as the university. It is a change in metaphysical philosophy arising from a transformed idea 
 69 
 
of science where the justification for beliefs are treated as merely various myths and fables. It is 
a turn to heterogeneity in the language games that form and justify beliefs (Lyotard, 1991). 
Post-modern, then, refers primarily to the status of knowledge in the post-industrial, 
computerized, mechanized age. It is concerned with heterogeneity in the language games of 
everyday life and in science (e.g., computer languages, information storage, linguistics, and 
communications). Post-modernism and narrative analysis is an attempt to explain metaphysical 
transformations in knowledge in general. Lyotard's frame differs in its fundamental ontology 
from scientific realism in a number of ways and is antagonistic against, and in opposition to, any 
idea of universality (Lyotard, 1991).  
Under post-modernism the discursive, linguistic component of decision making is emphasized. 
Post-modernism, as a transformation in the processes of knowledge through computer 
technology, has influenced almost every aspect of life, including our interpersonal relationships 
and the foundation of the legitimacy of our civil institutions. Economic growth and social control 
are both involved in the extension of computer technology into everyday life. The 
transformations of the modern nation-state has had a profound influence on the nature of science 
and scientific inquiry (Lyotard, 1991). 
Narrative analysis has an overarching concern for, and a special antagonism with, the processes 
and status of science. Narrative analysis is aimed at understanding utterances such as evaluations 
or opinions. It is intended as an emancipatory and liberatory framework that problematizes any 
claim based on authority in any domain. Narration, as a form of knowledge, is involved in every 
aspect of our existence and influences science in the language games of legitimation, consensus, 
and consent and the use of language to make arguments and explanations. Language is a goal 
already implied in our everyday awareness of the world and our place in it. It is concerned with 
the pragmatics of communication, competing stories, the articulation of theories and ideas with a 
special concern for heterogeneity that is a primarily philosophical problem: 
What is most striking in Lyotard's differentiation between story-telling and 'scientific' 
abstraction is its unexpected modulation towards a Nietzschean thematics of history. In 
effect, indeed, for Lyotard the fundamental distinction between these two forms of 
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knowledge lies in their relationship to temporality, and in particular to their relationship 
to the retention of the past (Jameson in Lyotard, 1991, p. xiii). 
In the Appendix to the eighth printing of Lyotard's (1991) The Post-modern Condition, Regis 
Durand answers the question "What is postmodernism?" In Durand's estimation, post-modernism 
is essentially a movement that is against the idea that history is a unity guided by an inherent 
end. It is a radical break with the grand narrative of the Enlightenment. Post-modernism, in this 
sense, is mainly a movement in aesthetics and art that seeks to transform traditional standards  of 
beauty and judgments of taste. It is against canonical, established, lexical standards of aesthetic 
judgment. The purpose is to reject conformity and to embrace heterogeneity:  
The postmodern would be that which, in the modern puts forward the unpresentable in 
presentation itself; that which denied itself the solace of good forms, the consensus of a 
taste which would make it possible to share collectively the nostalgia for the unattainable; 
that which searches for new presentation, not in order to enjoy them but in order to 
impart a stronger sense of the unpresentable. A postmodern artist or writer is in the 
position of a philosopher: the text he writes, the work he produces are not in principle 
governed by preestablished rules, and they cannot be judged according to a determining 
judgment, by applying familiar categories to the text or to the work. Those rules and 
categories are what the work of art itself is looking for. The artist and the writer, then, are 
working without rules in order to formulate the rules of what will have been done. Hence 
the fact that work and text have the characters of an event; hence also, they always come 
too late for their author, or, what amounts to the same thing, their being put into work, 
their realization (mise en oeuvre) always begin too soon. Postmodern would have to be 
understood according to the paradox of the future (post) anterior (modo) (Durand in 
Lytoard, 1991, p. 81). 
Postmodernism offers itself as an intellectual framework for interpreting the world arising out of 
the dynamic development of information technology and transformed modes of accessing and 
distributing knowledge, at least in the West.  Post-modernism, as an aesthetic movement, seeks 
to dissolve traditional notions of beauty and justice. However, even purely in terms of a 
movement in aesthetics, post-modernism often conflates ontology and epistemology and is 
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antagonistic towards universality, rationality and objectivity. In its conflation of ontology and 
epistemology - even while it states as its purpose the generation of "new" and "fresh" theories -  
postmodernism often blurs the distinct between the world and our knowledge of it (Lyotard, 
1991). 
Post-modernism assumes that "reality," or "the real," can never truly be represented. All 
representation remains only partial and contextual. Post-modernism is a radical break with the 
mainstream, especially in terms of aesthetics, "Let us wage a war on totality; let us be witnesses 
to the unpresentable; lets us activate the differences and save the honor of the name" (Durand in 
Lyotard, 1991, p. 82). 
As Regis Durand's "war on totality," post-modernism seeks to end all metanarratives and to 
eradicate totalizing concepts such as universality and objectivity. The turn here has had a 
profound influence in shaping the culture and ethos of the  North American university and has 
been extraordinarily influential in the academic humanities. Post-modernism is antagonistic to 
the narratives that legitimate the structures and processes of the university, between the unity of 
knowledge and the heterogeneity of fields and faculties. The principal of the harmony and unity 
of knowledge - which is universality - is problematized and framed as "a language game that 
links the sciences together as moments in the becoming of spirit, in other words, which links 
them in rational narration, or rather metanarration" (Lyotard, 1991, p. 33).  
By dissolving the universalist idea of the unity and harmony of knowledge, postmodernism 
dissolves the intellectual basis of the university (and also our moral and intellectual core as a 
people), and fragments even the notion of a coherent identity, or concept of truth and justice, and 
also liberal education. It dissolves the "grand narrative of legitimation." The role of the 
university has changed drastically and our collective future, or the whole world, is now largely 
volatile and unpredictable. The rise of machines has indeed changed the way knowledge is 
produced, stored, and transmitted, and teaching and learning at the university is now framed in 
terms of performativity and measured by the efficiency criteria of input-output ratios "Who 
transmits learning? What is transmitted? To whom? Through what medium? In what form? With 
what effect? A university policy is formed by a coherent set of answers to these questions" 
(Lyotard, 1991, p. 48). Technological transformations have changed the nature of knowledge, 
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and how it is produced, processed, and distributed. The problem of transformed relationships is 
perhaps most evident in the processes of teaching and learning at the university. The relationship 
between knowledge producers and the consumers of knowledge has clearly changed drastically, 
contributing to the decline of liberal education. 
3.5 RELATIVISM AND SCIENCE 
Alan Sokal (2008) caused an uproar when he published a parody of post-modern literary 
criticism for a trendy leftists American journal. He submitted "Transgressing the Boundaries: 
Towards a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity" to a cultural studies journal called 
Social Text (1996, p. 217-252). It was accepted under the auspices of a special issue for the 
Science Wars, which was intended as an attack on Paul R. Gross & Norman Levitt's (1998) book 
Higher Superstition. Sokal then revealed his hoax in Lingua Franca. The story made it to the 
front page of the New York Times, and in the International Herald Tribune, the London 
Observer, and the French Le Monde. 
Sokal's first impression of the Gross and Levitt (1994) book Higher Superstition was that the 
authors were on the political right and were grossly exaggerating the intellectual confusion and 
ambiguity of some social constructionist and post-modernist thinking. However, after some 
further research and reading, Sokal concludes that Gross and Levitt (1994) are correct, and the 
concerns they raise are important and legitimate. Sokal has now written two books critiquing the 
confusing and unjustifiable doctrines of social constructionism and post-modernism. 
The event of Sokal's hoax demonstrates for us the profound influence that social constructionist 
and post-modernist intellectual frameworks have played in our politics and in shaping the North 
American university, particularly the academic humanities. Sokal's intention in writing the Social 
Text piece is mainly political and it serves to show the role epistemological conflicts play in 
informing our practice and shaping disagreements over how we view reality. Social 
constructionism and post-modernism have been extraordinarily influential in American academic 
humanities departments and in science studies and the cultural study of science.  
In Sokal's (2008) book Beyond the Hoax, a text written in response to the ripples the hoax 
controversy caused, Sokal points out for us the huge political and intellectual implications that 
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relativist epistemology poses to any conception of universality, rationality, or objectivity, and so 
to any kind of liberal education. The purpose of the hoax, in Sokal's (2008) terms, is to "combat a 
currently fashionable postmodernist/poststructuralist/social-constructivist discourse - and more 
generally a penchant for subjectivism - which is, I believe, inimical to the values and the future 
of the Left" (p. 95). The hoax demonstrates that the conflict between universality and relativism 
is an intrinsically political problem. Post-modernism, post-structuralism, and social 
constructivism regard all human relations to be masked systems of arbitrary power. 
Sokal positions himself, along with Gross & Levitt (1994), with the Left, understood as "the 
political current that denounces the injustices and inequalities of capitalist society and that seeks 
more egalitarian and democratic social and economic arrangements" (p. 107). Sokal and Levitt 
are socialists while Paul Gross is a centrist (social constructionists and post-modernists make up 
the radical left, while religious fundamentalists make up the radical right, in the North American 
college and university today). 
The hoax demonstrates the need for a progressive social critique grounded in a worldview that 
can get past partisanship and provide a realistic analysis that American citizens can understand. 
The project of defending universality, a necessary feature of developing an acceptable and 
plausible kind of liberal education, is also a component of formulating a coherent account of 
ourselves as ethical and moral beings and of the identity of ourselves as a nation. A focus on 
universality might be our best tool in the struggle for a more just and fair society. For Sokal 
(1998) and Gross and Levittt (1994), universality, objectivity, and rationality are regarded as the 
best tools for liberation and for improving the world around us. Rationality offers a powerful tool 
for liberating the oppressed. 
Political critiques that emanate from what Gross & Levitt (1998) and Sokal (2008) refer to as the 
"academic left" have portrayed science and rationality as simply one worldview among others 
that is optional to adopt. Some have attacked universality and objectivity as Western ethno-
science that only serves to obscure the power relations that define us and oppress the 
marginalized Other. The seriousness of these conflicting epistemological frameworks cannot be 
overstated and the problem is further exacerbated by a host of damning concerns facing the 
university including significant social and civil unrest and protest. 
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Like many social constructionists and post-modernists (e.g., Jacques Lacan, Julia Kristeva, Luce 
Irigaray, Bruno Latour, Gilles Deleuze, Felix Guatarri, and Paul Virilio), Jean Baudrillard 
employs ambiguous terminology drawn from the world of professional science in an often 
confused and confusing way: 
In the Euclidean space of history, the shortest path between two points is a straight line, 
the line of Progress and Democracy. But this is only true of the linear space of the 
Enlightenment. In our non-Euclidean fin de siecle space, a baleful curvature unfailingly 
deflects all trajectories. This is doubtless linked to the sphericity of time (visible on the 
horizon at the end of the day) or the subtle distortion of the gravitational field. 
(Baudrillard in Sokal, 1998, p. 148) 
It is difficult to unravel exactly what it is Jean Baudrillard is getting at here. He is combining the 
use of well-known scientific terms (e.g, Euclidean space) with a total disregard for their meaning 
in professional science and in an ambiguous, misleading way. The confusing use of language is a 
source of error rather than clarity or understanding. The point, according to Alan Sokal, is that 
the way in which Jean Baudrillard uses the terms has nothing to do with how the terms are used 
in mathematics, physics, or in any branch of professional science. 
The feminist wing of social construction (e.g., Sandra Harding, Carolyn Merchant, and Evelyn 
Fox Keller) represent a radical challenge to the Enlightenment legacy of rationality and scientific 
method and the Western canon of literature and philosophy (Sokal, 2008). The challenge extends 
to the development of scientific method in the West. Western capitalism is portrayed as 
patriarchal domination where flawed notions of objectivity and universality obscure what are 
deeply held racist and sexist prejudices. Even while aimed at egalitarian and social-democratic 
ideals, relativistic epistemological and ontological thinking of the social constructionist kind only 
obscures the distinction between the world and our knowledge of it. Feminist social 
constructionism, in its construal of Western capitalism as a patriarchal conspiracy, often 
conflates ontology, epistemology, and sociology with individual ethics. Sokal (2008) accuses the 
feminist wing of social constructionism and post-modernism of academic faddishness, careerism 
disguised as professionalism, based in an incoherent mish-mash of trendy ideas. 
 75 
 
Epistemological relativism, as both social constructionism and post-modernism, represents a 
serious intellectual challenge to any notion of universality or objectivity. Critics have attacked 
science and scientific method, as well as the substantive content of the natural sciences, as 
grounded in bourgeois, sexist, Eurocentric prejudices (Sokal, 2008).  The relativistic post-
modernist and social-constructionist frameworks are often coupled with a denial of objectivity 
and a rejection of the idea of a world separate from language and perception that can be known 
rationally. Universality and objectivity, in this view, are an illusion that only serves to obscure 
the power relations that define us and that contribute to their reproduction. Social 
constructionism and post-modernism both rely on relativistic theories of knowledge and truth 
that are predicated on a rejection of human universality. 
There are different kinds of relativism underlying post-modernism and social-constructionism: 
 Cognitive relativism: Truth, knowledge, and matters-of-fact 
 Ethical and moral relativism: Goodness, justice, and value judgments 
 Aesthetic relativism: Beauty, harmony, and artistic judgments (Sokal & Bricmont, 1998) 
While the political stance of social constructionism and post modernism is to liberate the 
oppressed it has yet to do so in any demonstrable way. Post modernism and social 
constructionism are a backlash against the grand narrative of the Enlightenment and the 
leadership of society by science and philosophy. In response to the controversy the Sokal hoax 
caused, Sokal advocates for liberatory post-modernism and offers several rules to guide the 
development of post-modern theory: 
 Stress on non-linearity and discontinuity, 
 Deconstruction that seeks to transcend the subject-object dichotomy,  
 The overthrow of static identity categories and hierarchies, 
 A stress on symbolism and representation, and 
 Refutation of authoritarianism and elitism (Sokal, 1998). 
Liberatory post-modernism can aid in demystifying and democratizing professional science and 
help to deconstruct the barrier between "scientist" and "public" by incorporating feminist, queer, 
multicultural, and ecological perspectives and critique. Philosophy and science can indeed be 
more welcoming of women, the marginalized and the oppressed. A liberatory post-modernism 
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will aid us in advancing universality and also aid in revising the entire Western canon, which 
will be a pre-requisite of generating a consensus about the substantive content of any program of 
liberal education (Sokal, 1998). 
Values with a universal significance, such as rationality and objectivity, have a liberatory power. 
The intellectual powers underlying scientific method promote self-determination, autonomy, 
equality, and emancipation. Science has a tense relationship with tradition and has a way of 
overturning and changing it. The knowledge and skills cultivated in science and scientific 
education are regarded as beyond cultural traditions and the knowledge it pursues knows no 
bounds of birth, or the contingencies and accidents of class and family background (Nanda, 
1998). Science sees itself as driven by reality rather than culture or politics (Gross & Levitt, 
1994). A scientific worldview is characterized by Sokal (2008) as clear and cool headedness 
combined with respect for evidence and open debate. He also regards, as do I, such a worldview 
to be vital for the survival of humanity.  
Relativism is hegemonic in many American academic humanities departments today and 
relativistic concepts of "mind" and "reality" influence the way people think in the wider society 
and culture. Modern relativist sophistries often conflate epistemology, ontology, and sociology, 
treat science, rationality and objectivity as an inherently exploitative, culturally constructed 
illusion and conflate facts with values and the world with our understanding of it. This is a 
problem for the philosophy of science as much as it is a problem of intellectual integrity (Gross 
& Levitt, 1998).  
Sokal's (2008) counter to relativism is what he calls a "scientific worldview" which he defines as 
"a respect for evidence and logic, and for the incessant confrontation of theories with the real 
world; in short, for reasoned argument over wishful thinking, superstition, and demagoguery" (p. 
106). A scientific worldview is a rational worldview based in clear headedness, a respect for 
evidence, and open debate. Discovering the truth, for scientists and philosophers, remains one of 
the most perplexing questions of all. The problems of science and philosophy are intrinsically 
political, and are universal in scope at least to the extent that they transcend mere left-right 
politics (e.g., What is knowledge? What is justice? What things in the world are real?). 
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Universality seeks to categorize what are disparate epistemological and ontological frameworks 
under a universal system of ethical and moral rules that represent a trans-cultural value, a value 
that offers the best means for navigating what is an increasingly complex, danger, and terror 
filled world. The process of open and fair argument is essential for our spirit as a people and for 
the survival of our species on this planet. Defending liberal education will mean defending 
rationality from attacks on science, scientific method, and especially on the Western canon of 
philosophy and literature. 
3.6 FROM SPECULATION TO SCIENCE 
In David G. Winters, David C. McClelland, and Abigail J. Stewarts (1981) book A New Case for 
the Liberal Arts, the authors set out the traditional issue of liberal education claiming to produce 
cognitive, mental, and moral  effects such as critical thinking (see Appendix A), independence of 
thought, empathy, and self-control, and to test whether colleges and universities actually produce 
these effects using evidence-based, scientific, objective, psychometric analysis10. The authors 
test the impact of liberal education by measuring the effects colleges and universities have on 
students in the long run - longitudinally - both in single institutions and generalized across many 
institutions that are committed to some kind of liberal education. There is a wide array of effects, 
and many colleges do indeed seem to produce substantial intellectual and moral gains. How can 
we tell that liberal education is causing character development, and that the development is not 
caused by extraneous variables and factors such as social class, geographical context, family 
status, etc...? The work of Winter et al. (1981) is the only attempt I have seen to give traditional 
and classical claims of liberal education an evidence-based footing.  
The different statements concerning the kind of products and results of a liberal education vary 
and overlap widely: 
1. Thinking critically or possessing broad analytical skill: Hutchins, Harvard Committee, 
Dressel and Mayhew, and Barton. 
                                                          
10 The table that lays out the structure and format of the method used in the psychometric 
analysis used by Winters et al., (1981) is found on p. 50. 
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a. Differentiation and discrimination within a broad range of particular 
phenomena (especially within the history of Western culture): Plato, Harvard 
Committee, Dressel and Mayhew, Barton, and Bok. 
b. Formation of abstract concepts: Whitehead 
c. Integration of abstract concepts with particular phenomena or concrete 
instances; making relevant judgments: Plato, Whitehead, Harvard Committee, and 
Dressel and Mayhew. 
d. Evaluation of evidence and revision of abstract concepts and hypotheses as: 
Dressel and Mayhew, and Bok. 
e. Articulation and communication of abstract concepts: Harvard Committee, 
Dressel and Mayhew, and Bok. 
f. Differentiation and discrimination of abstractions, identification of abstract 
concepts: Plato, Harvard Committee, Faust, Dressel and Mayhew, and Bok. 
g. Comprehension of the logics governing the relationships among abstract 
concepts: Plato, Whitehead, and Bok. 
2. Learning how to think: Bok. 
3. Thinking independently: Faust, Barton, and Becker. 
4. Empathizing, recognizing one's own assumptions, and seeing all sides of an issue: 
Dressel and Mayhew, Barton, and Bok. 
5. Showing of self-assurance in leadership ability: Plato, Rhodes, Wilkinson, and Becker. 
6. Demonstrating mature social and emotional judgment; personal integration: Plato, 
Harvard Committee, Dressel and Mayhew, Perry, and Bok. 
7. Holding equalitarian, liberal, pro-science, and anti-authoritarian values and beliefs: 
Dressel and Mayhew, and Barton. 
8. Participating in and enjoying cultural experience: Dressel and Mayhew, and Bok 
(Winter et al., 1981, p. 12-3). 
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Because there is so much ambiguity concerning how liberal education induces powers and 
capacities of mind the claim seems, historically, to have rested on a quasi-religious faith rather 
than on scientific evidence and the liberal arts with their special language of universality and 
transcendence constitute phenomena with a quasi-religious significance (Winter et al., 1981).  
It is very common for liberal education to be vaguely associated with cognitive and intellectual 
processes such as "critical thinking." Critical thinking represents a general term associated with 
the liberally educated person that implies some kind of thought process, concept formation, or 
concept attainment. Critical thinking implies being able to select, arrange, organize, and interpret 
facts with flexible, logical, analytical thinking. Ultimately, the psychometric argument does 
provide evidence-based proof that a liberal education does produce cognitive, motivational, and 
emotional effects through producing "self-knowledge" and "the ability to think" (Winters et al., 
1981, p. 80-5): "We could say it strives towards Plato's goal of the philosopher-king: adept at 
conceptual articulation and imbued with mature and instrumental motives for leadership" (p. 81). 
However, even with the evidence and science-based approach of Winter et al. (1981), the means 
by which liberal education produces psychological and social effects is still unclear. What 
precisely causes the effects? Family background or social class? For example, intersecting 
factors that influence the learning at North American colleges and universities might include: i. 
academic involvement, ii. extracurricular activities, iii. dormitory life, iv. culture, v. sports 
involvement, vi. volunteering, and vii. science (Winter et al., 1981).  
In Chapter Seven11 of A New Case for the Liberal Arts (1981), the authors generalize their 
findings from a single elite institution across several other similar institutions (i.e., colleges and 
universities committed to some version of liberal education in their missions and mandates) and 
find the effects of attending such an institution are shown to be similar and generalizable (i.e., 
that liberal education leads to an enhanced capacity for thought, mature adaption, critical 
thinking and conceptual skills, independence of thought, self-knowledge, and motivation for 
leadership, regardless of context). Many of the anxieties concerning liberal education across 
                                                          
11 Winter, David. G., McClelland, David. C., & Stewart, Abigail, J. (1981) A New Case for the 
Liberal Arts. San  Francisco, Washington, London: Jossey-Bass Publishers (p. 151-180). 
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North America may be resolvable by turning to evidence-based psychometric research, but 
evidence-based research is not necessary for accepting the universalist thesis or universalist 
justification of liberal education12. 
Winter et al. (1981) conclude that the growth in cognitive skills (e.g., critical thinking or 
intellectual flexibility) can be demonstrated psychometrically to be effects of liberal education 
regardless of context (i.e., liberal education produces these effects independent of geographical 
location, and independently of factors such as social class and historical context). The 
application of systematic, disciplined, organized cognitive effort in complex situations produces, 
among other things, independence of thought (i.e., liberal education "liberates" students 
intellectually), leadership abilities, and personal maturation (i.e., through the exposure to new 
and often difficult ideas and experiences in formalized, organized activities). Responding to 
confusion through disciplined and concentrated effort enhances overall substantive gains in 
critical thinking capacities, that transcends the context of any single institution and is widely 
generalizable across the phenomenon of liberal education as a whole. Winter et al. (1981) 
conclude by pointing out that their analysis is just a first step toward providing an evidence-
based justification for the kinds of effects people such as John Henry Newman (see Chapter 
Two) attributed to liberal education. However, it provides progress towards refining a 
justification for liberal education with carefully defined relations between content and method 
and the production of educational effects.  
                                                          
12 In the conclusions of their work, the authors write: "If liberal arts education confers benefits to 
society through better leadership and management skills and more vigorous voluntary 
organizational activity of liberal arts graduates, but if it does not confer financial benefits to these 
graduates that are commensurate with its costs, society, as a major, if not the principal financial 
beneficiary of liberal education, should assume a large share of increased college costs. Our 
results, therefore, can be read as making a case specifically for increased public support of liberal 
arts education, either by direct grants to private, high-quality liberal arts institutions or by 
changing public institutions so that they have these qualities" (Winter et al., 1981, p. 183-4). 
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3.7 CONCLUSION 
Chapter Three begins with a discussion of the attempts of the philosophers of education, Peters 
and Hirst, to provide a new philosophical basis for liberal education. These two thinkers made 
similar, but different, attempts to justify liberal education. However, they are widely regarded to 
have failed in their attempt, mainly because of movements in philosophy towards post-
modernism and relativism. The issues raised by relativism and post-modernism, and particularly 
how they are related to the claim for universality, is discussed. Sokal represents a challenge to 
the post-modernist turn as an advocate for the objectivity of the natural sciences and a scientific 
worldview. A scientific worldview is commensurable with the idealist claim to universality (i.e., 
objectivity and rationality as universal values). Finally, the evidence-based justification for the 
historical claims of liberal education made by figures such as John Henry Newman is given. 
However, more needs to do be done to establish liberal education as based on objective, neutral, 
scientific evidence. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: POLITICAL ANALYSIS 
We must dissent from the indifference. We must dissent from the apathy. We must 
dissent from the fear, the hatred, and the mistrust. We must dissent from a government 
that has left its young people without jobs, education, or hope. We must dissent from the 
poverty of vision and the absence of moral leadership. We must dissent because America 
can do better, because America has no choice but to do better. (Justice Marshall in 
Freedman, 1996, p. 143) 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Chapter Four examines the intrinsically political nature of liberal education and situates the idea 
in the context of policy problems in North American colleges and universities. It is impossible to 
ignore the political and economic climate in which arguments about liberal education take place 
today. Liberal education is intrinsically political at a number of intersections: with academic 
research and work, with the university as an institution, and with the generational struggle for 
democracy. The political problems that influence any notion of liberal education today are 
discussed. Today, in the sense of Cicero's civic ideal, the problem of liberal education is 
approached civically and as a kind of democratic education. The issues here include political 
attempts to harness the university to the labor requirements of national industry and movements 
in philosophy situated in the American academic humanities. Finally, Chapter Four advocates for 
a synthesis of professional and liberal learning as at least a partial solution to the intractable 
problems of educational planning in colleges and universities in North America.    
4.2 THE POLITICS AND ECONOMICS OF LIBERAL EDUCATION 
The university itself is a radically political phenomenon. It represents a mingling and mixing of 
many diverse elements - including the elements that make up the academic and scientific 
community. Our times mark the beginning of a new age for the colleges and universities of 
North America. The politics of liberal education are written into the whole edifice of the 
university and it is one of the fronts of our contemporary culture wars. It remains, as it has been 
for over 2500 years, an area of general disagreement and dispute. 
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Fareed Zakaria (2015), noted as amongst the most influential foreign policy advisers of his 
generation by Esquire (Zakaria, 2015), points out in his recent defense of liberal education, In 
Defense of a Liberal Education: 
The governors of Texas, Florida, North Carolina, and Wisconsin have announced that 
they do not intend to keep subsidizing the liberal arts at state-funded universities. "Is it a 
vital interest of the state to have more anthropologists?" Florida's Rich Scott asked. "I 
don't think so." Wisconsin is planning to cut money from subjects that don't train students 
for a specific job right out of college. "How many PhD's in philosophy do I need to 
subsidize? (p. 18-9) 
Florida Governor Rick Scott proposed in 2013 to make funding for degrees according to their 
relevance to regional and national industrial imperatives that are perceived to be of economic 
importance to the vitality of the United of States of America and the state of Florida (TBO, 
2013). Students in humanities disciplines would therefore be paying higher tuition than their 
colleagues in Science, Technology, Engineering and Math (STEM). The harnessing of education 
to the immediate demands of labor force development is misguided inasmuch as the strong 
literacy and numeracy component of liberal education is already assumed by most advanced 
scientific and technological research. The intellectual, civic, and moral ideals of liberal education 
are intended to provide the basis for wider life success through phenomena such as a broad and 
deep understanding of concepts, such as duty and justice. 
Recently, Victor E. Farral Jr. pointed out in The Fiscal Times (2013) that one of the forces 
leading the decline of the liberal arts is a context of high unemployment and rising student debt. 
The pressures arising from market forces are tending to direct students into a focus on technical 
fields that are immediately connected to labor market success. As with the proposals of Governor 
Rick Scott to make funding dependent on the knowledge requirements of local and national 
industry the general direction is away from any notion of liberal education. No mention is made 
of how decline in liberal educational ideals is associated with declining civic and democratic 
participation. The decline of the liberal arts is tied directly to the decline of civic engagement in 
America and the boom-bust economic cycle of modern, industrialized, computerized nation-
states. Without liberal education the creative thinking and higher order intellectual capacities that 
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governments and companies depend upon to animate their bureaucratic infrastructure will 
decline and will mean less creative adaption to the pull of market forces for national industry.  
Also in The Fiscal Times, Sharyl N. Nash (2012) reports that a study by the Georgetown 
University Center on Education and Workforce and Civic Enterprises affirms the market 
viability of bachelor's and graduate degrees in liberal fields. In times of economic instability and 
soaring student debt (Blaire Briody in 2012 presents the shocking figure that student debt is 
astronomically high in the United States of America at $956 billion, and tuition fees have 
increased 72% since 2000), and at a time when the average wage for a high school graduate is 
below the poverty line, the kind of flexibility and intellectual versatility that liberal education 
strives for is perhaps more important than ever. 
The Association of American Colleges and Universities (AAC&U) since its founding in 1915 
has maintained a commitment to liberal education. The idea is defined by the AAC&U as a kind 
of education involved in cultivating transferable skills, values, ethics, civic engagement, and as 
more of a way of studying than any particular subject. The AAC&U emphasizes the civic ideal, 
the aim of responsible citizenship and producing the intellectual, moral, and social requirements 
for democracy.  
In the January-February (2013) edition of Change Magazine, Martha Kanter and Carol G. 
Schneider point out that the Obama administration in the United States of America is aiming to 
revive the civic commitment of American colleges and universities. Civics education transcends 
the boundaries of educational purpose and extends from the early years of schooling to college 
and university and beyond. Two reports point to the veracity of this commitment and the 
importance of civic education, A Crucible Moment: College Learning and Democracies Future 
(2012) and Advancing Civic Learning and Engagement in Democracy: A Roadmap and Call to 
Action (2012). The first report emphasizes taking civic engagement to a higher level and making 
it of central importance to policy and planning at public colleges and universities. Even job 
preparation requires initiation into civic virtues. Civic education is a component of all training, 
including vocational and professional training. The second report is the response of the U.S. 
educational administration. The roadmap lays out substantive objectives and criteria to guide the 
future of educational policy and planning: 
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Each generation must work to preserve the fundamental values and principles of its 
heritage. . . to narrow the gap between the ideals of this nation and the reality of the daily 
lives of its people; and to more fully realize the potential of our constitutional, democratic 
republic. We can emerge from this civic recession, but to do so will require a full-scale 
national investment from every level of government and every sector of society. 
(Quigley, 2012, p. xiii) 
Owing to being intrinsically political and for being naturally embedded in virtually all of the 
most forceful components of public life in North America today, liberal education has been 
attacked for many reasons, especially since the turn to post-modernism, social constructionism, 
and relativism in the academic humanities (see Chapter Three). It has also been attacked 
politically along partisan lines as irrelevant, exclusionary, elitist and disconnected from the 
practical realities of life and work (Hanson, & Heath, 1998). Liberal education today is both 
highly politicized and highly criticized by almost everybody. It has become an outcast living on 
the margins of intellectual culture or the gadfly in the marketplace that Socrates once claimed to 
be.  
As Paul Axelrod (2002) points out in Values in Conflict, the phrase "liberal education" now 
means whatever is in service to the dominant political and economic agendas of the day. 
Globalization and the marketplace are pressuring colleges and universities towards illiberal 
policies focused on economic competitiveness and efficiency. Professional, business, and 
technology programs are privileged at many North American colleges and universities. 
Professional and business programs are committed to bureaucratic criteria and instrumental aims 
that have no place for the universalist and idealist commitments of a liberal education. 
Professional, business, and technology programs simply do not mention fostering the Socratic 
spirit of critical inquiry into the general nature of the world and human experience. These 
programs often implicitly and unreflectively accept certain values and principles over others, and 
how these assumptions shape the cognitive and moral dimension of professionalism is still 
largely unresolved. Often, the bureaucratic and technical rationality of professional programs is 
directly antagonistic to the notion of a universal humanity, where instrumental reasoning seeks to 
determine the life possibilities of the student without taking into consideration the universal, 
historical, intellectual, and cultural significance of the university as an institution. 
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Clearly, our times involve massive doubt and skepticism over the value of liberal education, and 
this comes at a time when higher education can no longer assume easy justification, when North 
American colleges and universities are being called upon for accountability, and where financial 
crises threaten the existence of many institutions. The demand for instrumental training in skills 
that are directly related to labour market needs, the industrial labor requirements of the modern 
nation-state, and market forces all exert a profound gravity on the development of college and 
university infrastructure. The tradition of thought and ideas upon which the whole North 
American educational experiment were based are inseparable from the kind of intellectual, 
moral, civic, and social values that the universalist and idealist conception of liberal education 
advocates for. Writing liberal education into the missions and mandates of colleges and 
universities in North America is an attempt to direct the whole orchestra of the long range 
development of higher learning both locally and around the world. 
4.3 LIBERAL EDUCATION AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
Peter C. Emberley's (1996) Zero Tolerance is among the best critiques of university politics in 
Canada. The author pins the main problem of liberal education in the tense political relationship 
between what he calls the cultural left (p. 200-228) and the corporate right (p. 153-174). Zero 
Tolerance (1996) demonstrates that no program of liberal education is likely to be accepted or to 
gain wide support and mainstream acceptance. Politically motivated attempts to transform the 
mission and mandate of the university represent a tangential attack on liberal education and its 
universalist basis. 
Emberley (1996) instructs us that the corporate right sees the university as a set of financial 
resources similar to any other to be efficiently and effectively managed and distributed. The 
university is to be made market-responsive and ruled by the "invisible hand;" cost-effectiveness 
is to be the only criterion capable of validly measuring program utility. The invisible hand of the 
market is treated by some as the only valid form of accountability and universities are seen as 
expensive and poorly managed in terms of the utilitarian ethics of bureaucracy. Some have 
proposed cost-effective means such as distance education, raising tuition fees and charging 
foreign students double fees, and strategically targeting research to areas of provincial and 
national economic concern. However, it should not be ignored that the problem of university 
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finance today is an intrinsically historical problem. The problems of today "result directly from 
the indiscriminate expansion of the 1960's, and the blame should fall on those who governed in 
the period from the 60's to the 80's" (Emberley, 1996, p. 160). 
The bad advice during the era of the 60's to the 80's was that spending in education would fuel 
economic growth and wealth creation and that with more money flowing in more could be spent 
in the future to maintain colleges and universities. The university, as a result, has become a 
massive, bloated industry, suffering from the overblown education budgets of an earlier era 
(Emberley, 1996). In the reform movements of the 90's universities were increasingly framed for 
the public as a means for preparing knowledge workers for the labor market where all knowledge 
and skills are justified directly by reference to employment. The economic reforms of Canada's 
colleges and universities during the 90's saw the passing off of rising costs to students in the 
manner of increased tuition fees. The financial engineering of the senior administration has led to 
many deeply concerning student protests. In one example, Lord Axworthy, one of the main 
architects behind the transformation and change in Ontario's universities in the 1990's, was 
pelted with macaroni by a group of student protesters (Emberley, 1996, p. 165). 
What the corporate right does not recognize is the huge gap between our inner selves and 
the technological civilization it is building around us. It cannot see that behind the social 
disorder and widespread anomie is something more than just another technical problem 
that can be solved. Essential human experiences are being blunted and diverted into 
surrogate, but potentially lethal, satisfactions by unconditional faith in technological 
progress. (Emberley, 1996, p. 198) 
We are all aware that massive shifts in education, college, and university government and 
administration are underway. Under the thin veil of normalcy a dark struggle for power and 
prestige is going on. The significant changes going on in North American colleges and 
universities today include new governing models and economic metrics such as "Model C": 
Model C works on the assumption that the university is a private corporation, free to 
develop according to its own mission. Like a corporation, it would maximize profits and 
be accountable to its shareholders. Funding would be provided on a contract-by-contract 
basis. Governments would identify the level of service they wished to purchase from the 
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university in the form of teaching, research, and community service (Emberley, 1996, p. 
169). 
Model C has been criticized for creating a situation where competition rewards those who are 
already at the top of the decision making and authority structure and those in positions of 
privilege at the expense of the McStudents it exploits (Emberley, 1996). Engineering the 
university according to market logic, again, relies on the idea of the invisible hand rather than on 
a set of rules to guide educational development. In the whole nebulous ideology of market driven 
reform there is virtually no mention of liberal education, scholarly and intellectual culture, or the 
civic role of colleges and universities. The invisible hand points to a base materialistic egoism, 
where all choices and decisions about the world, and of the world, are driven by selfish, 
financial, fiduciary calculations. Selfishness cheapens the university mission and produces 
competing factions and rampant base personal ambition. A liberal educational culture is 
grounded in wholly different values. The role of the university is to provide a home to the best 
impulses of human imagination, creativity, culture, and ingenuity, and it is not to be framed as 
driven by supply and demand or input and output ratios (Emberley, 1996). 
Exacerbating the issues of contemporary North American college and university reform and 
renewal are generational clashes between those who entered academic culture during the bloated 
budgets of the 60's and 80's and today's young generation. The present scheme involves shifting 
the burden of debt accumulated by what are now the senior administration and management to 
the generation of McStudents entering the higher learning today (Emberley, 1996). It is not 
moral, professional, ethical, or acceptable in any way to force the young generation to continue 
paying for the privilege and security of the senior leadership. The issue here represents a threat to 
national unity and identity, with the emerging class stratification leading to huge civic and social 
unrest and protest. If the issue of intergenerational clash is not met directly and confronted head 
on it may have the effect of crippling today's young people, not only economically and 
financially, but intellectually, culturally, socially, and morally. The loss of liberal education, I 
argue, will be a profound threat to our future and to the life chances of today's young people. 
Market logic has a special antagonism with liberal education at the level of a priori values and 
pre-understood assumptions. Market logic, with its focus on immediate gratification, efficiency, 
 89 
 
and economic responsiveness, represents a disguised attack on, and negation of, any idea of 
liberal education. All kinds of political agendas represent a negation of liberal education, which 
is essentially non-partisan, particularly in its universalist and idealist kind. Conflicting with the 
reforms of the corporate right and Governors such as Rick Scott are movements in the academic 
humanities, in philosophy, and the turn to relativism and post-modernism.  
Stephen H. Balch (2005) points out in "Liberal Education and Civic Education for Our Time" 
that increasing emphasis on research specialization represents an abandonment of liberal 
education. The intersection of liberal education and research specialization, like the intersection 
with professional education, is a complex analytical and conceptual mess. Professional programs 
and research specialization are predicated on the fragmentation and the devolution of the 
university into disparate, fragmented, antagonistic faculties. As a result of the turn to a narrow 
focus on research specialization and the massive increase in business, technology, and 
professionally based programs, liberal education has declined, degrading the baccalaureate to the 
level of a marker of potential upward social class mobility. 
4.4 ATTACKS ON UNIVERSALITY 
Peter C. Emberley's (1996) cultural left is conflicting with the corporate right and its McStudent 
products. The left generally seeks to aim the university towards social welfare and egalitarian 
reform. Post-modernism (see Chapter Three), typically associated with the political left, 
represents a serious challenge to mainstream politics and it is tied together with wider social and 
political tensions between the parties and the organization of the estates and the people of North 
America. Post-modernism is written into the causes of our modern battles over academic and 
social status, it has been influential in America for decades, and while it has declined, it has left 
in its wake irresolvable problems and fundamental disagreements. Behind post-modernism is a 
political agenda driven by a relativistic philosophy that sees all sociability as a product of 
conflict and tensions and a struggle for power that pits all against all. Behind all the antagonism 
is the quest for continuous revolution. The struggle of all against all of liberal individualism is 
written into our national political life (Emberley, 1996).  
Liberal education is theoretically and intellectually committed to universality, objectivity, 
rationality. Therefore, attacks on science are defacto attacks on liberal education, insofar as the 
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objectivity and rationality of the sciences is attacked. Paul R. Gross and Norman Levitt's (1994) 
Higher Superstition demonstrates that many of the attacks on science come from critics who 
have little actual knowledge of science and its means and ends. The authors of Higher 
Superstition (1994) critique the attacks that emanate from what they call the "academic left" (p. 
2) - mostly humanists and social scientists - and their dislike of science. The academic left is 
hostile against the social structures that produce science as well as scientists themselves. Many 
of the attacks are directed towards the substantive knowledge of various fields of scientific 
inquiry and  many reject the legacy of the Enlightenment, including Marxists, feminists, 
multiculturalists, and environmentalists: 
The traditional Marxist view that what we think of as science is really 'bourgeois' science, 
a superstructural manifestation of the capitalist order, recurs with predictable regularity, 
in its own right or refurbished as the doctrine of 'cultural constructivism.' The radical 
feminist view that science, like every other intellectual structure of modern society, is 
poisoned and corrupted by an ineradicable gender bias, is another vitally important 
element. An analogous accusation comes from multiculturalists, who view 'Western' 
science as inherently inaccurate and incomplete by virtue of its failure to incorporate the 
full range of cultural perspectives. A certain strain of radical environmentalism condemns 
science as embodying the instrumentalism and alienation from direct experience of nature 
which are the twin sources of an eventual (or imminent) ecological doomsday. (p. 5) 
Ultimately, these attacks represent a threat to liberal education as well as the intellectual health 
and vibrancy of North American colleges and universities. There really is no central core from 
which the attacks emanate - the manner in which critiques of universality are approached are 
disparate and heterogeneous, for the most part. The attacks on objectivity, rationality, and 
universality are routinely a part of nearly all classroom instruction in North American colleges 
and universities (Gross & Levitt, 1994). 
In Chapter Three (p. 43-55) of Higher Superstition (1998), Gross and Levitt distinguish between 
weak and strong forms of the doctrine known as cultural constructivism. In the weak form, it is 
acknowledged that all science is, in a sense, influenced by the social and cultural milieu in 
which it is pursued. In the strong form of cultural constructivism (what is also sometimes called 
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"social constructionism" (p. 45)), science and its commitment to objectivity and rational 
progress are regarded as a mere discourse and as a practice that is contextually relative and 
mostly arbitrary. In the strong form, any claim to universality is regarded as meaningless outside 
of the particular community in which it is bestowed with meaning. From here we descend to the 
position of absolute relativism where all worldviews are regarded as equally valid. The strong 
form criticized by Gross and Levitt (1998) is also among the mainstays of feminist doctrine. 
Often, social constructionism is a front for indoctrination into various ideological and political 
positions. The post-modernist, social constructionist, relativist vulgate dissolves any justification 
for liberal education. 
Martin Anderson (1996) points out in Imposters in the Temple that the last generation of 
educators, particularly on the left, criticized the liberal education tradition as difficult, 
inappropriate, irrelevant, brutal, immoral, racist, and sexist.  Politics, intellectual decay, the 
decline of academic freedom (and freedom of any kind), and political correctness all serve to 
damage and obscure the nature and purposes of liberal education and all play a role in the 
degradation of the university as an institution. At this time, formulating and defending a 
justification for liberal education is exceedingly difficult and requires a radical break with 
mainstream academic politics. Liberal education is one of the last bastions of resistance against 
attempts to harness the university to partisan aims.  
Victor D. Hanson and John Heath (1998) argue in Who Killed Homer? that the higher 
educational institutions of today in the abandonment of the liberal education tradition have 
perhaps lost the reflexive basis of the intellectual, moral, and civic goods of a free and 
democratic society. The last generation of educators abandoned liberal education and fled to 
relativism, social constructionism, and post-modernism. Civic virtue and citizenship are implied 
in this problem. The attempt to unite us across our differences is civic and democratic in the 
highest sense. A focus on difference can only divide us through arbitrary, contextual distinctions. 
Those who attack liberal education as Eurocentric and phallocentric (Gross & Levitt, 1998) do 
not understand its values, its means, or its processes, or the knowledge and understanding at 
which it aims. 
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4.5 LIBERAL EDUCATION AS CIVIC EDUCATION 
Liberal education was recently defined by Carol G. Schneider (2013) in "Practicing Liberal 
Education: Formative Themes in the Re-Invention of Liberal Learning" as 
A philosophy of education that empowers individuals, liberates the mind from ignorance, 
and cultivates social responsibility. Characterized by challenging encounters with 
important issues, and more a way of studying than specific content, liberal education can 
occur at all types of colleges and universities. (p. 4) 
Liberal education in its civic sense, in the sense of Cicero's artes liberales in modern times, has 
often been used as a slogan and conflated with the liberal arts and general education. Again, the 
liberal arts are a specific set of disciplines in the humanities, the social sciences, and the 
sciences, that have their roots in the medieval trivium and quadrivium (see Chapter Two). 
General education is a broad foundation of knowledge spread across all disciplines that is shared 
among all college and university students. While liberal education in its civic sense certainly is 
related to both the liberal arts and general education, it is conceptually and analytically distinct 
from both (Schnieder, 2013). 
Liberal education in its civic sense is closely aligned with Amy Gutman's (1999) notion of 
democratic education and is concerned mainly with the utilitarian social concern of producing 
responsible citizens. Any debate concerning education at all is intrinsically political and 
therefore intrinsically civic. Hirst's (1973) framework (see Chapter Three) calls into question two 
key points that are also relevant for the civic kind of liberal education: i. What subjects are 
included in the civic and democratic version of liberal education? and, ii. How much depth of 
knowledge and understanding is necessary for liberal education suited to democracy? To bring 
the problem into focus: Is patriotism necessary for responsible citizenship? What is the role of 
multiculturalism in educating responsible citizens? What constitutes a liberal education in a 
constitutional democracy? (Gutman, 1999). 
While in the historical sense of the humanitatis, liberal education today might include subjects 
such as history, languages, philosophy, and religious studies, in its civic sense it might be 
characterized more by the philosophy of law, sociology, political science, and a thorough 
introduction to the nature, purposes, and structures of democratic institutions. Pronouncements 
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that these subjects and the ideals of justice and democracy that underlie them are obsolete and 
outmoded are damning for the civic kind liberal education (Schneider, 2013). 
Civic and democratic education are made up of cognitive, social, and moral commitments. What 
kind of college or university curriculum does democratic citizenship entail? Colleges and 
universities certainly do play a role in training workers but being a worker means more than 
merely earning wages. It means participating in a system of concepts and meanings that imbue 
freedom, justice, and democracy with meaning, power, and vitality. Every generation must 
renew this commitment and come to accept certain civic, intellectual, and moral ideals if 
democracy is to survive and proliferate. The civic mode of liberal education is the intellectual 
and moral substance that animates democracy. Civic education is required to animate democracy 
and perpetuate North American democratic institutions (Schneider, 2011). 
Young people today are bombarded with the message that education in any form is only relevant 
for the purposes of potential labor market gains. Anxiety over jobs and economic gains are 
definitive of the young generation. No emphasis is placed on the ideals of freedom, justice, or 
democracy that liberal society depends on. The best and freest society in the world is being 
intellectually and morally eroded at a time when exactly the opposite should be happening. In the 
wider picture the most vital component of a free and democratic society is the shared system of 
concepts and meanings that live in our colleges and universities and fuel the intellectual life of 
the nation. The community of inquirers of academic culture is the moral and intellectual core of 
liberal education that underlies almost all of its forms in terms of both the philosophical and 
oratorical ideals (see Chapter Two) (Schneider, 2012). 
Living in a democratic society is like a habit or skill that requires initiation into concepts and 
meanings that form the horizon for the possibility of weighing evidence and making real political 
choices. Our shared world is one built around fundamental questions that are totally human - all 
too human. The process of initiation into citizenship defines the terms around which the whole 
struggle rages, of the good and the good life, and the natural human desire for wholeness and 
oneness. Each one of us confronts these question in a uniquely personal way, but these perennial 
questions have a universal significance and application. The civic kind of liberal education, with 
its basis in scientific, literary, and creative thought, provides initiation into a tradition of 
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erudition on these questions and the opportunity to deliberate them in the context of the liberal 
university in a shared community of free and equal people and in a situation of full and open 
communication (Schneider, 2013). 
Liberal education in its civic sense, perhaps owing to the often confused, vague, and ambiguous 
terms in which the phrase is used, is experiencing tenuous and difficult times. There are growing 
concerns over quality, accountability, and the expectation of a university education at all 
(Schneider, 2009). Liberal education is often characterized pejoratively by those who think that 
the demands of market logic have no place for a civically and democratically minded education 
that emphasizes the intellectual and moral demands of citizenship over the training of workers. 
The harshest critics today argue that the civic or democratic kind of liberal education is not only 
irrelevant but actually counterproductive to an educated and efficient "workforce of tomorrow." 
The ideals of intellectual, moral, and political growth that characterize liberal education are seen 
as irrelevant to the production of a compliant, productive, and efficient workforce. Universities 
and colleges today are embracing a utilitarian and economically minded framework modelled 
after management practices borrowed from the world of business. Many policy leaders seek to 
eviscerate liberal education for the sake of workforce development (Schneider, 2013). 
Attacks on liberal education are felt deeply in our American academic humanities departments. 
The disciplines of the humanities and social sciences are now seen as largely irrelevant by the 
majority of citizens. Universities and colleges are being instrumentalized to the demands of 
market logic and to meet the labor and manpower demands of industry. The loss of 
consciousness of history, philosophy, and values associated with the decline of liberal education 
has contributed to the moral and intellectual bankruptcy of the North American campus and of 
American society generally. Without the consciousness necessary to carry on and renew the 
ideals of a free and democratic society the knowledge and skills that made the liberal university a 
genuine possibility will surly decline (Schneider, 2013). 
It should be obvious that a democratic society requires generational renewal to survive. The 
intellectual, political, and moral ideals of the civic kind of liberal education are rooted in a shared 
framework of concepts and meanings that live in our colleges and universities. The "workforce 
of tomorrow" will require more than a narrow education defined along market lines and 
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economic imperatives. Workers also require initiation into the knowledge and ideas required for 
full participation in life and society. Democracy rests on a commitment to the development of 
rationality through argument and debate as a society where people use reason in a high degree 
and argument to weigh evidence and solve problems. A nation is built on more than economic 
competitiveness and market gains (Schneider, 2011). 
Science has a tense relationship with the civic framework for liberal education and the extent to 
which science is implied in citizenship is ambiguous. Scientific specialization and democratic 
education are at odds. They are often grounded in opposed and contradictory ways of seeing the 
world. Liberal education does include science but would be characterized by something such as 
the philosophy of science rather than narrow specialization in a particular branch of science, such 
as theoretical physics. The purpose of science education in a civic education framework is to 
acquire the methodological acumen to benefit from tradition while developing ways to question 
and improve upon existing views (Koertge, 1998). In its civic sense it is unclear how science 
would be structured and included and how it would be taught and assessed. 
Canada and the U.S. today face a host of insurmountable challenges. Cultures are getting more 
diverse, the economy is painfully difficult, society includes special interest groups competing for 
influence, social unrest and protest continues to arise here and there, and our democratic politics 
garner less confidence and respect, particularly from the younger generation. The world still 
suffers from poverty, war, terrorism, fear and anxiety at our collective and uncertain future. A 
civic kind of liberal education can give young people the real possibility to seriously deliberate 
life choices and political ideas, and it can act as a catalyst for aiding young people in the struggle 
out of the existential despair and the moral and intellectual ennui and malaise of North American 
society today (Schneider, 2013). 
4.6 LIBERAL EDUCATION AS DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 
In the North American context, liberal education is most commonly associated with democratic 
education, which is itself a modification of the civic ideal of the artes liberales tradition. For 
those who sought to include democratic education in the college and university mission a 
democratically organized university is centered around certain definitive criteria: i. the first 
investigation of a democratic university ought to be itself, its own practices and processes of 
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doing research and generating theory - its own commitment to research, teaching, and service, ii. 
a deep commitment to serving humanity, and iii. of accessibility for all (Wegener, 1978). A 
democratic institution is inherently aimed at the processes that expand and enrich the individual 
human life in its civic, democratic, and political dimensions: 
Democratically meant two things: first, the opportunity to participate in the enterprise of 
creating and enlarging an intellectual culture was to be open to all who could contribute 
to it by the standards of the enterprise itself, not by irrelevant criteria of birth, race, creed, 
or 'alien' tradition; second, the fruits that the enterprise would yield, in every sense for 
every activity, would be available to the society as a whole, rather than to some members 
of it only. In other words, universities and the intellectual community were to be the 
servants of the community at large (Wegener, 1978, p. 107). 
As Meira Levinson (1999) points out for us in The Demands of Liberal Education the aims of 
education are often determined by extrinsic political forces rather than the logic intrinsic to the 
concept of "education" itself and in a liberal state the aims of education are liberal. To know that 
the aim of "education" is "to educate" is not enough to claim that the goals of education are 
intrinsic to the concept itself; "contrary to the assertions made by the philosopher of education 
R.S. Peters, the aims of education are not internal to or given by the concept of 'education' itself" 
(Levinson, 1999, p. 3). 
The ends of education are determined by political structures extrinsic to the concept. In a liberal 
state, liberal principles (e.g., individual liberty, private property, free trade, respect for persons, 
and peace) set the tone of education. Liberal principles guide both the ends and processes of the 
civic kind of liberal education in a democratic society. Liberal education is both intrinsically 
moral and intrinsically political; "the politics of education provision in a liberal state should be 
guided by liberal principles" (Levinson, 1999, p. 4). 
The civic justification for liberal education is that it feeds a vibrant and democratic society. 
Living in a democratic society is a skill or capacity acquired through initiation. Democratically 
minded education seems necessary to consciously (Gutman, 1999) reproduce the conditions of a 
democratic society, although the political regime of democracy is not implicated in the intrinsic, 
formal logic of the concept "education" either. Democracy is the legacy of a Western philosophic 
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tradition that has been transmitted generationally and forms the basis of both a cognitive 
perspective and a way of life. However, democracy does not produce itself. It needs to be 
produced and re-produced through liberal and civic education (Schneider, 2013). 
Liberal education has historically intended to cultivate knowledge, skills, imagination, and 
creativity. These qualities are developed through initiation into a shared stock of cultural 
knowledge and into the intellectual and moral criteria of citizenship, exemplified by the civic and 
political dimensions of liberal education. The ability to act ethically, to justify reasons for action, 
and to recognize values are all key to the continuation of a vibrant democracy. With the decline 
of liberal education and its intellectual, moral, and political ideals, the very intellectual and moral 
substance of humanity so vital to a vibrant democracy will also decline. Democracy may not be 
able to survive the decline of liberal educational ideals (Schneider, 2013). 
The civic, intellectual, and moral benefits of liberal education seem eminently self-evident. To 
think clearly, to examine thoroughly, and to judge carefully are all intrinsically valuable 
cognitive qualities to cultivate. Underlying the civic basis of liberal education is the premise of a 
social contract between free and equal people grounded in universalizable values and precepts 
(i.e., the general qualities of rationality required by all citizens to seriously deliberate about 
political choices). The liberal values associated with democratic education are the ground that 
mark out the possibilities of what subjects can be included and the depth and rigor with which 
these subjects should be pursued. 
The ideal of individual liberty is a moral endeavour that exerts significant influence on education 
in Canada and the U.S. Citizens in a liberal state are necessarily committed to individual liberty 
as a foundational value. In terms of liberalism, liberty brings the individual into dialectical 
conflict with the state. Education is the vital space where the dialectical relationship of the 
individual with the social plays out. The dialectic between the individual and the state is most 
pronounced in the educational structure where the political ideal of autonomy is practiced and 
cultivated. For Levinson (1999), the structures and aims of the civic version of liberal education 
depend upon the value of autonomy and individual liberty: 
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I simply argue that liberal principles depend for their justification on an appeal to the 
value of individual autonomy, and that this justification must also therefore guide the 
development of a liberal theory of education (Levinson, 1999, p. 6). 
If the extrinsic political demand on liberal education is autonomy for the sake of responsible 
citizenship, and for the sake of democracy, then this, like all educational aims and processes, is 
intrinsically moral and aimed at universality. Democratic life has moral demands and universities 
are specially well suited to facilitating the cognitive and moral requirements of a democratic 
state. As institutions that produce and facilitate democratic virtues, universities tend to be 
sanctuaries against attempts to impose controls on the creation and proliferation of ideas that 
might be unpopular (Gutman, 1999). 
Democracy hinges on rationality and on using discussion and debate to weigh evidence and 
make judgments, and these are cognitive and social requirements that take intellectual training 
and socialization. The special home where this skill is cultivated and practiced is the university. 
The cognitive and social process of debate and discussion produce the powers of autonomy, 
responsibility, and accountability. They are the virtues made up of the knowledge and skills 
practiced by the responsible citizen. Liberal education in its civic kind involves a pluralistic 
conception of the university where young people are introduced to the widest array of possible 
conceptions of the good, and the good life, and where the process of teaching and learning for 
the sake of autonomy is practiced. Democratic citizenship has cognitive, social, and moral 
demands. The civic kind of liberal education is aimed at post-secondary institutions such as 
colleges and universities, not primary and secondary schools, and the development in colleges 
and universities implies a broad range of content and a deep level of mastery (Gutman, 1999). 
Each of the subjects covered by the civic kind of liberal education is subdivisible. The 
philosophy of law, for instance, as an example of something that might be included in a civics 
curriculum, asks the basic universalist question "What is law?" The study of law can be 
differentiated into the study of things such as natural law, legal positivism, legal realism, legal 
interpretivism, utilitarianism, deontology, and would be motivated by philosophical approaches 
to legal problem solving. As a purely pragmatic point it is worth noting that citizenship education 
is subdivisible like any subject, and it requires philosophy as a necessary condition to justify its 
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scope and make arguments concerning its validity as a field and for why some ends are more 
desirable than others.  
4.7 CIVIC EDUCATION AND IDEALISM 
James O. Freedman's (1996) in Idealism and Liberal Education, (a book that reflects his 
experience as president of the University of Iowa from 1982 to 1987, and as president of 
Dartmouth College since 1987, and that consists mainly of his many speeches delivered at 
commencements and convocation exercises), writes that liberal education with its special 
commitment to the most enduring achievements of Western and Eastern civilization prepares 
students for our unforeseeable future through acquainting them with the cultural achievements of 
the past. Liberal education represents the attempt to shape the long term future of human destiny 
and our life on this earth and to question and impose order upon the experience of being human: 
A liberal education invites students to explore the ideal of being human - the drama of 
discovering the darker side of the self; the responsibility of imposing meaning on one's 
life and one's society; the challenge of transcending the ambiguity-entangled counsel of 
arrogance and modesty, egotism and altruism, emotion and reason, opportunism and 
loyalty, individualism and conformity. (Freedman, 1996, p. 2) 
In our times, where the political, social, and moral spaces that divide us on issues of equality, 
science, faith, tradition, and progress are far greater than what little common ground we can find, 
Freedman's (1996) idealistic conception of liberal education is more important than ever. The 
task of preparing young people for the future is an intrinsically political and civic, and also 
intrinsically idealistic, enterprise. Such an education transforms the whole realm of the merely 
human and should transform students in every segment of their being by infusing them with 
ideas that have a magnificent, resplendent, transcendent power. 
Liberal education with its universalist basis remains unconventional and left out of mainstream 
academic administration and policy planning. It is unfashionable in its emphasis on values that 
get past the mere moment and in its uneasiness with emotionally gratifying answers. The 
ambiguities lead to intractable problems with a universal significance, and, at its basis, the 
 100 
 
human condition has intrinsic principles that underlie the lives of individuals and communities 
(Freedom, 1981).  
Political analysis has a special significance for science and has the value-added criterion, or the 
utility, of explaining science to the citizens of free and democratic societies around the globe. 
Advancing science is a self-evident good and a positive end because it serves the a priori 
conditions of human nature. The tension between the intellectual activity of literary intellectuals 
and scientists is longstanding13. Liberal education is a bridge between the massive range of 
human endeavors and the basic principles of knowledge, basic principles that are required to 
organize reality into intelligible structures, and that generate the criteria for the cognitive, 
intellectual, and moral activity that binds us as a species, and with the entwinement of the 
university with the civic soul of the nation: 
Just as a poet seeks to express and understand the world by imposing an order on words, 
just as a painter seeks to convey a vision of reality by imposing an order on light and 
color and form, just as an historian seeks to record and explain the past by imposing an 
order on developments and events, so a scientist seeks to explain the riddles of the natural 
world invoking intellect and imagination to impose an order on the disparate facts and 
phenomena that he or she observes. (Freedman, 1996, p. 79) 
The problem of the kind of critical consciousness pointed to by James O. Freedman originates in 
Socrates and in the Delphic precept to "know thyself."  In the introduction to the book Civic 
Education and Culture, Bradley C. S. Watson (2005) claims that in liberal education the passions 
are tamed and the self is made social. Its essence, civically, is a process of socialization into what 
it means to be human and the desire to go beyond oneself in the widest possible sense. The civic 
kind of liberal education represents the desire to "ask the questions that cut across time and 
place" (London, 2010, p. 325). 
                                                          
13 C.P. Snow (1959) Rede Lecture The Two Cultures. Science represents one of the greatest and 
most magnificent achievements of human culture. It is an achievement of the mind of the highest 
activity, rigor, complexity, and beauty. 
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Ultimately, the problem of civic virtue is a philosophical problem. Becoming liberally educated 
means becoming civically engaged but it also means a habit or comportment of thought, a 
cognitive trait of remaining on the outside of history, of questioning the very nature of history, 
historicity, and time itself, of the ultimate mysteries of human life and consciousness, the 
unanswerable and intractable questions and perplexities of human nature and the human 
condition that underlie both poetry and mathematics, both philosophy and science. There are no 
universal rules to govern life and society in modernity, progressivism and technological advance 
have dissolved tradition, in dissolving tradition we have dissolved the justification  of liberal 
education and left our colleges and universities to flounder in confusion, error, disarray, and 
decay. 
Inquiring into the nature of universal humanity is not purely scientific and is not purely 
philosophical. Perhaps the distinguishing characteristic of liberal education is that it represents 
an unsolvable problem and in being unsolvable is the universal basis of all problems. The most 
serious challenges to universality have come from post-modernism, social-constructionism, and 
relativism (see Chapter Three) which are the product of mainly political imperatives. Relativism 
dissolves the civic justification that all students require initiation into general skills such as 
literacy and numeracy because it annihilates even the claim of generalizable capacities at all or 
of traits and characteristics that are generalizable past the uniqueness of the individual subject. 
The trend towards post-modernism and relativism pose a serious challenge to the aims of liberal 
educators. The perspective of universality regards human existence as a rational whole whose 
various forces intersect and reciprocate, becoming attuned, in the processes of teaching and 
learning, to the nature of external reality (Emberley, 1994). 
Liberal education remains a unique and atypical attempt to direct the long range life and 
development of both education and civilization. Politically, the practice of liberal education is 
aimed at certain universal patterns of thought and action required for full and active participation 
in civic life, and sets of values and ideas that are held to be of universal and transcendent 
significance. Liberal education grounded in the universalist thesis represents the ongoing and 
never-ending attempt to found a political community based in phenomena that are more 
profound than mere administrative rank and salaries. Liberal education is intrinsically political 
precisely at the intersection where it coincides with the social and civic significance of the North 
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American college and university mission. What is often missed in political and civic debates 
over liberal education is that the argument and controversy is over the nature of human life as 
such.  
North American colleges and universities today are facing challenges that are not going to go 
away; neither are our civic and economic shortfalls. The idealist claim for universality is a 
pedagogical ideal to guide teaching and research. It is the only thing I know of that can mediate 
all competing concerns while producing a rational, democratic, liberal culture. Arguments over 
the missions and mandates of North American colleges and universities are toxic and poisonous, 
they have corrupted the halls of ivy, and are engineering the intellectual, cultural, and moral 
course of the nation. New ways forward need to be found for advocates of liberal education, and 
perhaps our best option is, as I will suggest in the next section, supported by Lee Shulman 
(2004), to make liberal education into a profession that adheres to the criteria and general 
structure of professionalism. 
4.8 LIBERAL AND PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION 
Any idea of liberal education is at odds with the demand for professional training with 
immediate labor market relevance. The universalist conception of liberal education in particular, 
committed to reflecting on the whole breadth of human culture, is not for the sake of a 
profession, although it is part of all professions. What we are discussing here is the intellectual 
and moral soul of the  North American college and university and of humanity generally, and 
how that humanity ought to be educated, trained, and so forth. Purely professional training and 
an emphasis on immediate financial gain is too narrow a mandate for educational development. 
The tension between any idea of liberal education and business-professional education, some 
have argued, has produced a "bimodal culture14" (Lewis & Liegler, 1998, p. 48). Professors and 
teachers in the academic humanities often have a negative attitude toward professional schools: 
                                                          
14 To clarify what is meant by "bimodal culture," see C.P. Snow's famous 1959 Rede Lecture, 
The Two Cultures. 
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Liberal arts is said to comprise knowledge for the sake of knowledge. It is an education 
that prepares students to live. Its quality of life deals with ideas, not monetary gain. On 
the other hand, professional studies is said to involve knowledge for the sake of 
occupation. It is a vocational education that prepares students to make a living. Its quality 
of life deals with monetary gain, not ideas. (Lewis & Liegler, 1998, p. 49) 
The utilitarian and pragmatic criteria of developing North American colleges and universities 
according to a mandate that arises out of market needs and immediate fiduciary demands is 
producing a gulf and a separation between the two cultures of liberal and professional learning. 
While there are no easy answers or simple solutions, our task is to demonstrate where and how 
liberal and professional education are commensurable, where they are not, and what intersections 
bind the two frameworks theoretically, conceptually, and analytically together. For example, 
scientific specialization in a single branch of knowledge is already involved in liberal education. 
It is freeing in that it gives the individual command over a speciality, but it is imprisoning, by 
imposing limits on the capacity for reflection on the whole of knowledge (Lewis & Liegler, 
1998). 
Professional and liberal education are both intended to cultivate certain intellectual, cognitive, 
and civic virtues. With its justification in seeking a shared basis for experience and as general 
inquiry into the universalist phenomena of being human, liberal education shares many of the 
outcomes of professional training, such as critical appreciation, critical thinking, and critical 
awareness (see Appendix A). The features attributed to liberal education and to professional 
education, assuming professionalism involves some higher order thinking and cognitive abilities 
or civic, social, and moral virtues, are not mutually exclusive: 
An educated professional requires four aspects of knowledge specific to their chosen 
field: (1) conceptual understanding of theoretical foundations; (2) technical skills; (3) the 
ability to integrate theory with practice; and (4) career marketability. (Lewis & Liegler, 
1998, p. 54) 
Lee S. Shulman (2004) in "Professing the Liberal Arts" argues that one of the great challenges 
facing liberal education in our modern climate is that it is not professional enough. People who 
espouse some notion of liberal education are often suspicious of professional and vocational 
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education. Liberal learning is defined precisely as education for its own sake and not for the sake 
of a profession. The whole purpose of Shulman's discussion in "Professing the Liberal Arts" is to 
show that the tension between liberal and professional education is flawed and that liberal 
education needs to become more professional, and vice versa. Drawing on Steven Brint, 
Shulman (2004) lays out the six characteristics of professional learning 
1. Service: Serving others using bodies of knowledge according to a moral ideal 
2. Understanding: That theory changes according to transformations in the knowledge 
domain 
3. Practice: The enacting of a knowledge base of the field. 
4. Judgment: The middle term between theory and practice, between knowledge and 
application. 
5. Learning: Acquiring knowledge through experience, both for the individual 
practitioner and for the entire community of practice. 
6. Community: Professions are public and communal groups of experts who possess the 
knowledge to critically evaluate their own field. (p. 549-551) 
The term "profession" implies criteria and logical requirements that include, but are not limited 
to, skilled application of a broad and deep understanding of a particular area of knowledge 
guided by a moral ideal of service and in a community of fellow inquirers. In reference to the 
second point in particular, understanding includes both a broad acquaintanceship with the area of 
knowledge of any field and a grasp of both the theoretical and practical reality of the profession. 
Liberal education and professional education are at odds and they need to be bridged for the 
greater beauty and harmony of all. In the confusing and often contradictory relations of theory 
and practice, and mind and reality, Shulman (2004) shows us liberal education faces three 
challenges: 
i. the loss of learning (amnesia):  Students often forget the theory and knowledge 
acquired at a college or university, a problem more pronounced in liberal education. 
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ii. the illusion of learning (illusory understanding):  Ostensibly deep knowledge may be 
based on glib verbal understanding and superficial acquaintance, with no substantive 
comprehension or a misconception of theories. 
iii. the uselessness of learning (inert ideas):  Ideas may be received by the mind without 
being used or tested and without being combined with other knowledge or theory. 
Shulman (2004) argues that to defeat the chimeras and hobgoblins of liberal learning requires 
that we make it more like a profession. He offers a few principles to make liberal education more 
like a profession, namely activity, reflection, collaboration, passion, and community (p. 558). 
Generalizing across these principles, the substance of professionalizing liberal education consists 
in the demanding exercise of participating in an energetic community of inquirers, through 
working in discussion, argument, and debate, in social interaction and the company of others. 
Through a pedagogy of active discussion, debate, and dialogue, a caste of mind is produced that 
is critical of itself and the professional community to which it belongs. Shulman ultimately 
advocates for the use and examination of case study (p. 561-565), however, the issue here merely 
reflects the longstanding liberal educational commitment to the integrity of teaching and learning 
that has characterized the transmission of liberal education since Socrates. One of the challenges 
facing liberal education today is the gulf between liberal and professional learning, and the gulf 
between the two domains needs to be bridged. 
4.9  CONCLUSION 
Chapter Four situates liberal education in the contemporary political and economic climate. 
Several political forces are serving to obscure liberal education and its special idealist and 
universalist justification. The issues include both the attempts to politically engineer the college 
and university according to criteria drawn from the world of professional business and 
management, and movements in philosophy in the American academic humanities. Today, 
liberal education is gravitating towards the civic ideal, towards preparation for responsible 
citizenship and full participation in democracy and the intellectual life of the nation. Finally, as a 
curative to the political problems facing liberal education, Chapter Four offers a synthesis of 
liberal and professional learning. The cultures of liberal education and professional education are 
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at odds and need to be bridged in the academic humanities. Doing so represents an attempt to 
include some facet of liberal education in the college and university mission. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: A THEORY OF LIBERAL EDUCATION 
Facts can be relayed, feeling-states can be conveyed, and skills can be demonstrated by 
computers and video, but nothing can replicate the contact of human beings.  (Emberley, 
1996, p. 188) 
The preceding chapters have stated the goal of including liberal education in the missions and 
mandates of North American colleges and universities. The problem of liberal education is 
approached in three ways: historically, philosophically, and politically. The intention of 
advancing liberal education along these fronts is to generate the ideas and theories that can fuel 
policy thinking. Theory influences policy at the level of college and university work by affecting 
the considerations and debates of decision makers. The argument is part of an ongoing 
conversation over the future of college and university education in North America and around 
the world. Universality is a pedagogical ideal and a way of framing the processes of teaching and 
learning; it is a way of making a special commitment to reflecting on the whole of knowledge. 
The ends of universality, it is argued, are already implied in all teaching and in all research. 
The historical analysis in Chapter Two shows that any narrative of liberal education remains 
partial and incomplete. With its basis in Greek and Roman classics, and in terms of its medieval 
historical developments, there is simply too much scope for simple generalizations. Debates 
about liberal education begin with Homer's Iliad and Odyssey (Hanson & Heath, 1998) and 
continue to today, calling into question fundamental problems in all the main branches of 
philosophy - that is, in epistemology, ontology, ethics, and axiology. The influence of liberal 
education in the North American system is extraordinarily complex and the problem is further 
complicated by recent political, economic, and social developments; more needs to be done to 
understand liberal education in the North American context. The historical narrative ends with 
recent developments in philosophy, in post-modernism and relativism, and the notion that the 
problem of liberal education today is inseparable from tensions caused by competing paradigms. 
Peters and Hirst (see Chapter Three) represent a major attempt to establish liberal education 
philosophically as a part of the necessary logical conditions of the concepts of education and 
knowledge themselves. Peters sought to define liberal education as part of the intrinsic, formal, 
logically necessary criteria of the concept "education." Hirst sought to separate liberal education 
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from its basis in classical realism and to establish it according to an academic rationalist 
framework. Ultimately, Peters and Hirst failed in their attempt to establish a new justification for 
liberal education and neither could have foreseen the transformations in philosophy brought on 
by the developments of post-modernism.  
Post-modernism rejects the Enlightenment values of philosophy and science, its whole purpose 
being antagonistic towards claims with a totalizing character (e.g., in mathematics, that formal 
analytical notations demonstrate universal attributes of reality). Debates here are often scholastic 
in nature and in their language and arguments. The rejection of the objectivity and rationality of 
the sciences represents the rejection of the claim to a universal basis of reality. More needs to be 
done to establish the universalist and idealist claims of liberal education according to rational 
science and objective evidence.  
Chapter Four describes the economic and political climate that debates over liberal education 
revolve around today. Recent political and economic tensions are causing people to turn away 
from liberal education and embrace a mandate of technical and professional training to serve the 
demands of national industry. Politically, universities today have taken on a corporate model of 
governance borrowed from the world of business and management. The values of the corporate 
model of governance and its utilitarian ethics of efficiency and economy negate liberal 
education; it represents a rejection of the special language of universality.  
Movements in philosophy in the American academic humanities represent another major 
challenge to liberal education in their rejection of any explanation of life and work that purports 
to be universal in scope. Perhaps owing to competing partisan concerns the turn liberal education 
is taking today is civic and towards the oratorical and rhetorical ideal (see Chapter Two) aimed at 
civic education and preparation for democratic citizenship. Civic and democratic education 
represent a turn to the oratorical ideal but liberal education must remain committed to serving a 
universal humanity. It is an intrinsically idealist enterprise. To ameliorate the theoretical and 
political tensions over liberal education Chapter Four advocates for professionalizing liberal 
learning or developing liberal arts institutions according to the values and criteria of 
professionalism. 
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As an idea to drive policy development in North American colleges and universities, liberal 
education in its idealist and universalist sense - framed in terms of the development of objectivity 
and rationality as values that are universal in scope - represents the best that has been achieved. 
Any explanation is complicated by perplexities that arise out of the historical, philosophical, and 
political analysis, but the idealist kind of liberal education is one committed to directing the long 
range course of  development for colleges and universities in North America and the whole 
future of human destiny. The bases of liberal education are the questions and values that cut 
across our differences, that unite us as a community of inquirers, as citizens that love freedom, 
justice, and virtue, and the qualities and capacities that unite human beings as a species. 
Universality and idealism are two sides to the same idea; each side informs the other, and both 
are necessary requirements for liberal education.  
Universality is best characterized by objectivity and rationality but these features are framed in 
idealist terms as the ongoing quest for wholeness and oneness. Universality serves as a 
pedagogical and ethical ideal that transcends the boundaries of philosophy and science and of 
liberal and professional learning. The universality and idealism of liberal education will be 
indispensable for the future of North American colleges and universities.  
PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION AND RESEARCH SPECIALIZATION 
There is no simple answer to easing the integration of liberal education and the pragmatic 
demands of professional training and scientific research specialization. The problem might be 
framed: What is the value of education if it does not contribute to a job and a career? What value 
is a career without the full and rich experience of an individual human life? (Wegener, 1978). 
How can liberal education be integrated into the mission and scope of North American colleges 
and universities? How can it be integrated with science and professional education? The task of 
reconfiguring the university mission along these lines is foremost a philosophical problem. 
Primarily, the aim must be unifying the fragmentary experience of colleges and universities 
according to the meta-principle of universality. While universality rings strangely in our ears it 
remains the all-important task of uniting the species through firing the transcendent bond that 
bridges each person with all others. 
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Ameliorating liberal and professional education is possible because the two cultures overlap at a 
variety of points of intersection both in terms of the knowledge they pursue and the values they 
espouse. Synthesizing the cultures of science, liberal, and professional education must begin at 
the conceptual and idealist level of pure theory because it exists nowhere in practice today. 
Collaboration in areas of overlapping knowledge and values and between different specialists 
and scholars is the substance of liberal education. The kind of intellect required must enter into 
inquiry into the nature of the universe and be committed to teaching the universe. 
Students at North American colleges and universities have a special liberal educational heritage 
that is unique to our cultural circumstances and context. One of the problems that liberal 
education  must confront is the genesis of a unique North American ideal peculiar to our special 
circumstances and in our present context and climate.  It is the essential task of liberal education 
to interpret and remake the world, to encounter the fundamental problems of human life and 
community in a radically intellectual and moral way. The university is the special site reserved 
specifically for this process. Universities are the organizing educational engines of tomorrow and 
the base upon which the future of the nation is built. 
Management science, for example, is built on utilitarianism and progressivism that assumes the 
criteria of utility, efficiency, and productivity fulfills both the economy and also acts as the 
ultimate fulfillment of human nature (Embelery, 1996). If good management is the ability to 
judge correctly in diverse circumstances then liberal education is already assumed and implied in 
it. Individual uniqueness, even for the individuality, autonomy, and creativity of the business 
manager, are part of a universal nature. Attentiveness to the uniqueness and idiosyncrasy of 
human beings alerts us to the intellectual and moral depths of our own person. The university 
mission ought to reflect the universalist understanding and awaken us to the calling of serving 
the hearts and minds of the community and a wider humanity. 
Research specialization poses a perplexing problem for liberal education. High levels of 
specialization cause researchers to drift away from the lasting, fundamental, perennial, timeless 
questions that drive the enterprise of the liberal educator. Specialization itself runs counter to 
both liberal education and democracy. It restricts the inquirer into a narrow branch of knowledge 
without making any reference to the whole (Wegener, 1978). Even science needs to be 
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committed to the intellectual and moral ideals of liberal education. A North American version of 
liberal education will need to synthesize the diverse and seemingly contradictory phenomena of 
science, democracy, and professional education. 
Liberal education according to the notion of universality represents an embracing of the 
continuity of the species with the inevitable mortality of the individual life. The work of the 
liberal educator is to speak out across the generations and to study the most pressing and 
essential problems of human nature. The substance of such an education are the books at the 
libris (Freedman, 1996) (debates about what books ought to be included, and what constitutes a 
Great Book, is longstanding, (Bloom, 1987)). The library, where the intellectual riches of the 
university resides, is the temple of liberal education. Books wake us up to the complexity and 
inherent ambiguity of human life and provoke us to ask the searching questions intrinsic to what 
it means to be human. Being in conversation with other minds through books is a transcendent 
moment in our intellectual, moral, and emotional lives. Books provide us with the resources to 
cope with the moments of our most desperate despair as well as with the moments of our highest 
nobility and dignity. The library at the college or university - the libris - with its mass of 
materials is the temple of a regime committed to liberal education. The library represents the 
intellectual soul of the university as an institution (Freedman, 1996). 
The processes of teaching and learning framed in the universalist conception of liberal education 
is intrinsically moral, aimed at uniting each member of the community with all others. No one is 
ever alone because our lives are only defined by our relationships with other people. Colleges 
and universities end up being a magnet for all of the most dire problems; they respond to, and are 
in a dialectical relationship with, the wider culture; a conversation takes place among and within 
them, ideas give universities harmony and form, the theory the institution produces fuels us and 
our intellectual and civic culture. The life of our campuses shape the civic future of the nation.  
Liberal education is, then, the slow and sober work towards examining and explaining the most 
pressing problems of human life and community, those fundamental questions that are universal 
in scope, and totally human - all too human: Who am I? Why I am here? What is just? What is 
virtuous? Even in professional education and business management these intractable questions 
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remain. The crisis of liberal education is the same crisis faced by every sector of the economy, it 
is the crisis of human nature itself and all those who seek to influence and shape it.  
UNIVERSALITY AND IDEALISM 
The intractable problem for liberal education is between relativism and idealism. Relativism is a 
denial of even the possibility of shared, general, universal, a priori values. The whole basis of 
relativism is anti-idealism and anti-universality. There is no denying that society is experiencing 
a breakdown in moral order and civic virtue and the university plays a role in this phenomenon. 
As an ideal to guide educational policy development at  colleges and universities across Canada 
and the United States of America a turn is needed to a special kind of liberal education 
committed to idealism and universality. The implications of the universality ideal are complex: 
How can educational institutions be guided by such an ideal? How can the university teach the 
whole universe? As  Wegener (1978) pointed to in his historical revision of liberal education, 
"The true University is the centre of thought on every problem connected with human life and 
work, and the first obligation resting upon the individual members which compose it is that of 
research and investigation" (p. 37). The college or university guided by the notion of universality 
is a special and atypical kind of community committed to an intellectual and moral ideal of 
service to humanity.  
The ontology underlying the claim to universality is that there is the world - we all formulate our 
problems and goals, and experience pleasures and pains, in the same world. Liberal education is, 
then, the kind of education involved in becoming reflectively aware of the shared world of 
language, communication, and thought we all inhabit, in the context of the universal significance 
of all phenomena. It is to come to see the universal or transcendent significance of the individual 
human life, or to perceive the universal person through the particular individual, that liberal 
education aims at. Implied in the problem of universality is an ethical paradox of the first 
magnitude: How does the individual mind and individual world take shape and evolve according 
to the general nature of human life and a general humanity?  
A radical transformation is implied in the question of transcendence. The common conditions of 
all human activity (e.g., the underlying conceptual, intellectual, and theoretical basis of diverse 
activities and phenomena) is the conceptual ground of our search for universality. The criteria 
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that distinguishes liberal education are structured and systematic, rational, objective, reflective, 
and committed to the wider goal of the improvement of the human condition. Through the 
connection of the individual human life with the totality of all human lives a state of harmony 
and caste of mind is produced and the transcendent nature of human life is disclosed. For 
example, if we perceive our moment right here and now not as any particular moment but as the 
perpetual and universal moment of all moments, we approach something like the disclosure of 
universality. 
The university represents the organization of universal knowledge and the conduit of intellectual 
culture and liberal education is its animating force. The essential task of the university is the 
teaching of the universe. As an institution the university has a special relationship to the world. 
However, it seems ridiculous to demand that the university reflect the entire scope of human 
experience and work. What would be required is a new kind of institution that reconfigures and 
supersedes the present North American context, one that exists in a huge, complex mass of 
activity and that is immense in its intellectual energy and collaboration. Perhaps the best 
approach to such an institution is to reduce all subjects to the teaching of philosophy - to a 
universal discipline or faculty that accommodates all data, subsumes all inquiry, and functions as 
the fulcrum of intellectual life. 
The claim to universality is a way of putting into words the ineffable human longing for 
wholeness, the same natural longing we all have for a fair society and a just political order. The 
new justification for liberal education - universality - is to serve as the basis for inclusion of the 
idea of liberal education in the construction of college and university missions and mandates in 
North America. The interests embodied here were once called the trivium and quadrivium and 
they represented values intended to be universal in scope that arose out of the general nature of 
life and work itself. The whole project revolves around the articulation of human nature and its 
special concern with justice and dignity.  
The place where essential values are created and renewed, the temple of liberal, intellectual, 
moral, and professional culture - the university - is besieged by change, by the winds of different 
competing visions and orthodoxies, and the factionalism and fragmentation brought on by the 
demand for myopic research specialization. The idealist conception of liberal education is rarely, 
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if ever, mentioned. What is the philosophical purpose of education if it is not to unite us across 
our differences, to unite human beings with their world and with each other, with the community, 
the city, the whole cosmopolitan society of citizenship in, and fraternity with, humanity? 
(Emberley, 1996).  
The idea of liberal education reaches out to us across the centuries, across nations and languages, 
through the whole dramatic and tragic tale of life on this planet. It speaks to us about ourselves, 
our nature, and the values that bind us as a people, as a community of inquirers, and as a nation 
of citizens who love freedom, liberty and justice. The substantive question is essentially what 
curriculum, what course of studies, what suite of data and assessment procedures, what testing 
mechanisms can do justice to liberal education? Any attempt to formulate a substantive context 
to the formal reality of liberal education is going to be simply another version or configuration of 
the arts, of the liberal arts, of the same fundamental organization of knowledge embodied in the 
basic study of language, music, mathematics, and poetry.  
The liberal arts themselves represent the attempt to unite mathematics and poetry with the human 
longing for wholeness and holism. A North American version of liberal education must be 
committed to uniting poetry and mathematics in rebellion against both modernity and post-
modernity. However, it is more than merely retrieving classical authors such as Plato or Cicero 
(as in renaissance humanism); it is more than merely studying Goethe's Faust (1808). 
Pedagogically, it represents an ideal of a shared humanity embedded in the a priori nature of 
human community itself. Any justification for liberal education arises out of the ambiguous 
nature of human life and serves the nature of human life as a harmonious and unified whole. 
Some who have defended liberal education, such as Peter C. Emberley (1994,1996), sought to do 
so by reviving the noblest heritage of the Hegelian philosophy, something that influenced the 
founders of Canada's educational establishment. He means, like Kimball (1986), that liberal 
education represents a perpetual historical process, an ongoing dialectical conversation of 
participation in pure theory and pure being. The universalist justification claims objectivity and 
rationality as its basis as the accretion of a special and atypical tradition of thought and erudition.  
Universality is a special commitment to harmonizing groups across diverse identities and 
differences. The phenomena we are aiming at is elusive because it is based in the underlying 
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structure of all our dissonance and contradictions. The reason why no course of liberal education 
can be agreed on is that written into the idea itself is perpetual debate and endless argument, the 
endless arguments in philosophy and science, around which the future of our educational 
institutions and our whole civilization revolve. As Emberley (1996) writes in Bankrupt 
Education, "The debate over liberal education goes on sub species aeternitatis" (p. 62). 
SELF-KNOWLEDGE 
The moment of self-knowledge - the kind of self-knowledge pointed to by Socrates when he 
exhorts us to "know thyself" - is the distinguishing feature of a liberal education15. Thinking at 
the level of universal human nature is the formal logical requirement that distinguishes liberal 
education from other forms of education but this is an idealist and universalist argument that is 
not widely accepted and is outside mainstream educational thinking. The bond that Socrates 
seeks is universal in scope and beyond the political and economic realities of the day. As a 
special concern for the necessary underlying features of tradition it represents an ongoing quest 
for the meaning of all tradition and of a life beyond the self. The ground of liberal education is a 
special concern for the soul of humanity and for the harmonious relationship of the individual 
self with the cosmos. Liberal education is the special education of the self and a journey of the 
mind and soul into wider horizons where the personal, social, and spiritual coincide in the 
relationship between teacher and student (Emberley, 1996). 
How is liberal education logically and ethically distinct from other kinds of education? The 
idealistic reflection on innate powers is a form of cognitive, ethical, and moral activity. As a 
process of awareness it entails the incremental progress towards knowledge of a transcendent 
and universal human world. While the process of discovery is unique to each individual person 
the capacity for self-discovery is itself a feature of human nature with universal significance. 
Through the universal reflection on intellectual powers intrinsic to human consciousness - of 
capacities, features, and requirements that transcend the contingencies and accidents of place and 
                                                          
15 Wegener, Charles (1978) Liberal Education and the Modern University. Chicago & London: 
The University of Chicago Press, (p. 94-5). 
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time - liberal education is distinct precisely because of its basis in the irresolvable problems and 
ambiguities of the human condition.  
The powers liberal education advances are based in the logically necessary a priori structures of 
thinking, knowing, teaching, and learning in the most general and widely used senses of the 
those terms. The act of becoming liberally educated is distinguished by a unique and atypical 
moment of transcendence in the special relationship of the moment with the universal reality of 
all moments and of the individual life with the entire range and scope of human experience. 
Exercising and expanding the critical faculties of mind, its languages and processes, the way it 
learns and adapts by coming to know its environment and testing its ideas against empirical 
reality, using rationality and rational method as the only guide, making choices about good and 
evil, right and wrong, asking all the most fundamental ethical questions of human existence: 
What is real? What things exist in this world? What am I? What is just? What is truth?  
OUR UNCERTAIN FUTURE 
Liberal education is going to have a curious episode in North American colleges and universities. 
Today it is little more than an amorphous liberality of thought and feeling taking place in the 
conflict between the sciences and the academic humanities (Wegener, 1978). The university is 
no mere cultural adornment or preserver of the status quo and middle class. It is an instrument 
for the enhancement and preservation of both the individual life and the life of a community of 
citizens committed to intellectual and moral ideals and the values upon which the goods of a free 
and democratic society depend. Democracy has a special significance for our North American 
context.  
Plato's image of the cave from Republic VII (514a-521b) is the best description of what liberal 
education is supposed to do for us. Young people today are still drawn in by the gravity of the 
journey represented there, they still fall in love with the stars and the sky and with ideas such as 
freedom, virtue, and justice (Emberley, 1996). The purpose of my research has been to further 
the cause of liberal education by providing it with a new justification, arising from the historical, 
philosophical, and political analysis according to the significance of the concept of universality 
for life and work. With its special commitment to a universal basis for being human, liberal 
education represents the best preparation there is for all the chances and exigencies of human 
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destiny and our life in this world. The argument made here is as unconventional as it is outside 
mainstream academic politics, administration, and planning. It is not in fashion to advocate for a 
focus on the enduring and intractable problems of the human condition. Intractable problems of a 
first-order character operate as the principles that underlie the organization of the individual life 
as well as the organization of the political life of the nation. No scheme of studies can be 
prescriptively laid down and any set of substantive content remains only partial, tentative, and 
provisional, representing only a moment in what is a long and complex, perpetual process. 
Any discussion or plan for a program based on liberal education runs into the issues of 
curriculum, issues of breadth and depth, and institutional procedures. The basic unit of liberal 
education, however, is the student, and it is to the student that its transformative powers are 
aimed. The student is the purpose, object, vehicle, and content of liberal education (Wegener, 
1978, p. 103). The university, like the liberal arts, is the historical product of the cosmic link 
between the individual human life and the nature of the species. The commitment to universality 
is a complex one: it is the problem of the relationship of the individual human life with the 
totality of all human lives. Liberal education in the universalist (and idealist) sense, then, 
represents a massive undertaking of human beings thinking about themselves - their powers, 
achievements, failures, and destiny. A liberal education is a goal oriented kind of education but 
the aim is service to humanity and to human dignity generally (Wegener, 1978). 
There is now a vast chasm separating the core of the Canadian people and the architects of the 
educational apparatus. The intent of my argument is to provide liberal education with a new 
justification, the universality thesis, intended to serve as a meta-principle for educational 
development and reform. What an education would look like that is based in rationality and 
objectivity, that is integrated with professional education and research specialization, and that is 
committed to seeking a shared basis for human experience, is still unclear. Challenges are posed 
by both the need for scientific research specialization and professional education. The system of 
North American colleges and universities must develop strategies for dealing with issues of 
curriculum and assessment that can integrate and synthesize scientific and professional education 
with liberal and democratic education. The way forward is interdisciplinarity and a commitment 
to intellectual, moral, and ethical values that bridge the many chasms that separate us. We have 
to ask ourselves, whose interests are being served by ignoring the problem of liberal education? 
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A THEORY OF LIBERAL EDUCATION 
From the synthesis of conceptual approaches (i.e., the historical, philosophical, and political 
analysis) arises the understanding that liberal education is an ongoing controversy, discussion, 
and debate over certain fundamental, intractable problems with a universal significance. 
However, clearly, perpetual argument and debate cannot serve as the basis for a program of 
liberal education. The second definition of liberal education developed out of the conceptual 
synthesis, then, is that liberal education arises out of the general nature of human life and, 
through the search for values with a universal significance, serves the nature of human life as a 
whole. What are the universal values upon which liberal education depends? 
The task, then, to establish liberal education is establishing the idea of universality (see Chapter 
Three, p. 51-8). Universals are the constants of a general humanity that operate in all contexts 
and for all societies. The idealist commitment is to values that transcend time, place, and context 
and to principles that characterize the entire scope of human activity and experience. Liberal 
education, by definition, arises out of reflection on the whole of knowledge and experience and 
serves the nature of human life as a harmonious unity. 
Universality is a meta-principle. The rationality and the objectivity that arises out of the 17th 
century Enlightenment are, I argue, the best example of values with universal implications. 
Universality is an ideal; something we strive for and more of a frame of mind and a way of 
studying than any particular content or subject matter. Universality implies a commitment to 
reflecting on the whole of knowledge and the nature of human life as a whole in the context of 
values that are outside the accidents of place, time, and context. The two universalist components 
of liberal education - rationality and objectivity - must be thought of in the context of idealism, in 
terms of fundamental, universal, widely generalizable values. From the idealist position the 
conception arises that liberal education is a way of studying or a habit of thought. It is a 
pedagogical principle rather than any particular subject matter or content. 
Many books have now been written defending rationality and objectivity from various 
intellectual critiques (see Gross, Levitt & Lewis (eds) (1996) The Flight from Science and 
Reason; Sokal & Bricmont, (1998) Fashionable Nonsense, Gross & Levitt (1994) Higher 
Superstition, and Koertge (ed) A House Built on Sand). The rationality and objectivity of liberal 
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education is framed in terms of idealism in the context of values that are universal in scope. 
Universal values are pursued in the recognition of a wider humanity and in a commitment to 
reflecting on the whole of knowledge. The understanding of universals is best explained with 
reference to rationality and objectivity. Rationality and objectivity are based in linear, logical 
progress, grounded in facts and evidence, and aimed at a reality outside perception that is the 
same for all, regardless of place, time, or context.  
First, rationality represents a core, universal value of liberal education. As the philosopher of 
education Paul H. Hirst (see Chapter Three, p. 54-60) argued, to ask for a justification for liberal 
education is a special kind of question because it asks for a justification for the development of a 
rational mind at all. Rationality is a universal value because knowledge is only rendered 
intelligible according to rational criteria that are publicly agreed on and that are rooted in public 
traditions. Rationality is a trans-cultural value implied in all communication and in all knowledge 
and understanding.  
Second, objectivity represents a phenomenon with universal significance. Objectivity seeks to 
inquire into and explain a world that is the same for all regardless of place, time, and context. 
The world that objectivity seeks is universal in scope; it aims at discovering the world we all 
encounter, although we all approach it in different and unique ways. Objectivity is a kind of 
understanding aimed at revealing a reality outside perception that holds in all times and all 
places. Objectivity represents a mode of thinking not bound by context, place, and time.. 
Rationality and objectivity are universal values of liberal education but not its entire scope. 
Liberal education has always been characterized as a bent, habit, or frame of mind rather than 
any specific content; a habit of mind able to relate a particular phenomenon to the universal 
significance of all phenomena. Being able to relate particular issues to the whole of knowledge 
involves a rational objective worldview.  However, for liberal education, the values of rationality 
and objectivity must maintain a commitment to reflecting on the whole of knowledge and 
serving the nature of human life as a whole. 
SUMMARY 
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The purpose of my research has been to inquire into the nature and ends of liberal education for 
the sake of advocating for the place of liberal education in the missions and mandates of colleges 
and universities in North America.  
Historically, liberal education represents an idea that originates in the ancient Greeks and 
Romans, in the person of Socrates and the writings of Plato and Aristotle. It is too vast a history 
to provide any simple historical narrative to the point where a complete historical account is 
virtually impossible. Any history of liberal education remains partial, fragmentary, and 
incomplete and requires selectivity in terms of the phenomena being explained and related. 
Liberal education is, however, mainly the special and atypical tradition of education that 
originates in Socrates. The historical analysis demonstrates what a profoundly difficult problem 
the continual retrieval and re-interpretation of the idea of liberal education has been in 
educational development in North America and around the world. 
Philosophically, R.S. Peters and Paul H. Hirst represent one of the most recent attempts to 
provide a new theoretical justification for liberal education. R.S. Peters sought to redefine liberal 
education in terms of the rational criteria to which an educational process must conform in order 
to be considered "liberal." Paul H. Hirst sought to define liberal education in terms of academic-
rationalism and to divorce liberal education from its vague, obscure basis in metaphysical 
realism. Inquiry into liberal education is a special type of project, according to Hirst, because it 
asks for a justification for the cultivation of a rational mind at all. However, both these thinkers 
are widely regarded to have failed to provide liberal education with a new justification and 
neither could have predicted the modern day attacks on universalist values, such as rationality 
and objectivity.  
Several intellectual frameworks such as post-modernism, social-constructionism, and post-
structuralism have attacked the development of universality in the West and the universalist 
values of the Enlightenment. Liberal education, in particular, came under attack for its 
monolithic character, for excluding other traditions and for being irrelevant to the production of 
the workforce in the 21st century. Philosophically, the special basis of liberal education are 
certain fundamental problems and conflicts of a first-order character that are universal in scope 
(e.g., What is knowledge? What things exist in the world? What is just? What is good?). 
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Therefore, the rejection of universal values, such as rationality and objectivity, represent a 
rejection of the basis of liberal education. Ultimately, more needs to be done to establish the 
claims of liberal education according to objective, disinterested evidence. 
Politically, liberal education is woven into the fabric of many of the challenges of North 
American society today. Many policy leaders seek to eviscerate liberal education for the sake of 
workforce development. Liberal education today is often regarded as civic in nature, as having a 
special relationship with democracy, and is seen as aimed at the production of responsible 
citizens capable of participating in democratic society. Again, the special basis of liberal 
education is a focus on certain fundamental questions with a universal character such that attacks 
on universal values such as objectivity and rationality represent attacks on liberal education. 
Many of the attacks on objectivity and rationality are political and represent the rejection of any 
idea of universality.  
Contrary to the arguments of R.S. Peters that liberal education can be defined totally in terms  of 
the concept "education" itself, liberal education is aimed at extrinsic political ends and the 
production of citizens capable of participating in democratic society. The key political task of 
liberal education is to ameliorate what are seemingly opposed phenomena, such as the opposition 
between the sciences and the humanities, between science education and democratic education, 
and between humanistic and professional learning. The amelioration of these opposed positions 
is an intrinsically idealistic enterprise as is the preparation of young people for the future and for 
participation in civic life. Perhaps the best approach to supporting liberal education today is to 
synthesize it with professional learning and to make liberal education more professional and 
more like a profession. 
Finally, liberal education represents a continuous, ongoing controversy, discussion, and debate. It 
is a link between the educational institutions of today and the ancient past. All the problems of 
modern society, the conflict between the sciences and the humanities, scientific and democratic 
education, all the arguments of post-modernism and multiculturalism, are all part of the debate 
over liberal education. The idea of liberal education is best defined in terms of the clusters of 
arguments, disagreements, and intractable problems within which the debate takes place. The 
debate over liberal education and its place, purposes, and aims goes on sub species aeternitatis.  
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The purpose of my research has been to generate the theory required to fuel policy thinking and 
the policy process. Liberal education, with its special basis in an ongoing argument, discussion, 
and debate that is universal in scope represents the highest purposes of the university as an 
institution. Its aim is nothing other than to unite us at a higher level of our humanity, as thinking, 
reasoning, and moral beings (Emberley, 1996). What is the philosophical purpose of education if 
it is not to unite us across our differences and to unite people with their community? The way 
forward for liberal education is interdisciplinary through an education that is based in universal 
values, such as rationality and objectivity, that is integrated with professional education and 
research specialization, and that is committed to seeking a shared basis for experience and 
uniting us as a people and a community of inquirers. 
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APPENDIX A 
LINGERING CONFUSIONS AROUND CRITICAL THINKING 
Chapter Three made reference to Hirst's (1973) justification for liberal education in social-
rationalism. For Hirst, liberal education is aimed at "critical appreciation" (p. 106) of the forms 
of knowledge. However, what does Hirst mean by the term "critical"? While the term critical is 
often treated as if the meaning goes without saying there are serious conceptual issues regarding 
the meaning of this phrase. Conflicts over the aims and means of education has made defining 
critical thinking an increasingly important task. Critical thinking is often seen as a panacea and 
treated as a politically indifferent phenomena that is assumed as a general aim of many colleges 
and universities. Critical thinking, however, has several definitions and it is still a contested 
domain mired in  ambiguity and complexity. Ralph Johnson (1996) in "The Problem of Defining 
Critical Thinking" notes five attempts to define "critical thinking": 
 Ennis: "reasonable, reflective thinking that is focused on deciding what to believe or do" 
(Ennis in Johnson, 1996, p. 266). 
 Paul: "critical thinking is disciplined, self-directed thinking which exemplifies the 
perfections of thinking appropriate to a particular mode or domain of thinking" (Paul in 
Johnson, 1996, p. 267). 
 McPeck: "the skill and propensity to engage in an activity with reflective skepticism" 
(McPeck in Johnson, 1996, p. 267). 
 Siegel: "an individual who is appropriately moved by reasons" (Siegel in Johnson, 1996, 
p. 267). 
 Lipman: "skillful, responsible thinking that facilitates good judgment because it (1) relies 
upon criteria, (2) is self-correcting and, (3) is sensitive to context" (Lipman in Johnson, 
1996, p. 267). 
Johnson shows that all these attempts are inadequate in different ways. To formulate a new 
widely acceptable definition, Johnson frames the problem of critical thinking in terms of: i. the 
network problem (of other closely related phrases), and ii. the scope problem (of the degree to 
which it extends into different cognitive, social, and practical domains). 
 124 
 
i. the network problem: "critical thinking" is conceptually related to cognitive processes such as 
"problem solving, decision making, metacognition, rationality, rational thinking, reasoning, 
knowledge, intelligence" (Johnson, 1996, p. 218). As such, the phrase "critical thinking" is often 
left ambiguously related to a wide array of cognitive processes. Clarifying the differences 
between these closely related concepts is a foremost task of conceptually analyzing the term 
"critical thinking." 
ii. the scope problem: What is the scope of critical thinking? Does it extend to the realm of action 
no less than thought? "Reflection on what one is to do" sounds like a description of problem 
solving, decision making, or of moral thinking, "Does critical thinking contain moral thinking 
and morality as a proper subset?" (Johnson, 1996, p. 218). 
Both Ennis (i) and Siegel (iv) conflate critical thinking and rationality and serve to show that 
they are closely related terms. "Critical thinking" and "rational thinking" are clearly distinct 
processes.(as are creative thinking, problem solving, decision making, metacognition, reasoning, 
and knowing). In Paul's (ii) definition "critical thinking" hinges on becoming aware of different 
forms of egocentric and ethnocentric thinking. Under Paul's (ii) conception, critical thinking 
involves moral awareness, and rationality is treated as an intrinsically moral phenomena. Like 
liberal education, rationality is regarded by Paul (ii) as an inherently normative and moral 
enterprise.  However, Paul (ii) leaves vague how exactly critical thinking is related to morality. 
Johnson (1996) further criticizes this by arguing it emphasizes individuality at the expense of the 
inter-subjective component of critical thought, judgment, and awareness. 
In McPeck's (iii) account, from the perspective of the philosophy of education, "critical thinking" 
is a matter of disciplinary knowledge and a broad view of understanding. Johnson (1996) 
criticizes McPeck's view for being too general and for subsuming many capacities and features 
which have a tenuous connection to how critical thinking is commonly thought of (i.e., McPeck's 
definition would include connoisseurship). For McPeck, critical thinking is a subset of 
rationality. 
Seigel's (iv) definition is more developed because it is built on a critical commentary on Ennis, 
Paul, and McPeck. The core of Seigel's more developed view extends critical thinking into the 
domain of practical life. Seigel's conception is more like an attitude, as one who is moved by 
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good reasons. Johnson (1996, p. 221) claims that for Seigel, critical thinking is co-extensive with 
rationality. It is based on articulating judgments in a way that is underwritten by an appreciation 
that acknowledges the reasons for beliefs and actions. It is predicated on a depth and complexity 
of understanding aimed at certain forms of judgment. Johnson (1996) points to Seigel's (iv) 
conflation of critical thinking with rationality. The ambiguity between critical thinking and 
rationality is not easily resolved. They have a "tight" conceptual connection (as R.S. Peters might 
say), and are certainly closely related, but remain distinct depending on context. The extent to 
which rationality is implied by critical thinking remains unclear. 
Lipman's (v) account emphasizes recognizing criteria intrinsic to different forms of knowledge as 
the meaning of "critical." However, a person may perceive that activities have intrinsic standards 
and still fail to fall under the form of critical thinking as it is commonly understood. Johnson 
(1996) further criticized this view for, again, emphasizing the individual over the inter-subjective 
negotiation of meanings and concepts. Being critical seems to mean being judged to be so based 
on the consensus of a community of people or of professionals that criticize their own 
community. Lipman's account of critical thinking, however, is mainly scientific and logical 
thought, and as such, Lipman's account "is much too restrictive" (Johnson, 1996, p. 223). 
No one is critical of everything, all the time, everyday. "Being critical" remains an ambiguous 
state of affairs and framing it narrowly in terms of cognitive capacities underscores the neglect of 
a wider domain of the inter-subjective negotiation of community standards. While critical 
thinking surly is related to logical and scientific kinds of thinking, insofar as "critical" means 
recognizing intrinsic standards in kinds of knowledge and various principles that organize bodies 
of facts, those standards are not separate from the social and community-based processes that 
influence how they are judged. Critical thinking certainly does seem to mean recognising 
normative dimensions intrinsic to values and judgments concerning standards that separate good 
thinking from bad thinking.  
Begin with etymology: The word krinein - from which we get out word 'critic' and 
'critical' - means to estimate the value of something. A critic is a person who judges, 
appreciates, estimates the value of something. Similarly, I propose a critical thinker is a 
 126 
 
critic of thought in much the way that a film critic is a critic of film. (Johnson, 1996, p. 
225). 
The scope of critical thinking influences how we frame discussions of the scope of liberal 
education. Liberal education is associated with cognitive development but also with moral 
development and a commitment to intellectual ideals such as self-critical reflection and political 
ideals such as autonomy. The basis of liberal education is rationality and the cognitive, social, 
and moral processes involved in weighing evidence and making judgments. Formulating a 
coherent, lexical, authoritative account of critical thinking and differentiating it from rationality 
will aid us in formulating a scheme of liberal education and defending it from its detractors.  
The term 'critical' has historically a number of connotations. Suggested synonyms are 
indicative of the first and more popular understanding of the word - faultfinding, 
captious, caviling, carping, and censorious. The Oxford English Dictionary traces the 
changing nuances from the first use - notably by Shakespeare's Othello: 'I am nothing if 
not critical,' meaning 'giving to judging in an especially adverse or unfavorable way'; to 
Sir Thomas Browne's use in the 17th century, meaning 'involving or exercising careful 
judgment or observation on the basis of which right decisions might be made'; to the use 
by Thomas Jefferson as 'a turning point of decisive importance in relation to an issue.' I 
assume that the Group of Five would identify Browne's use as the appropriate one. 
(Johnson, 1996, p. 225) 
The lines that distinguish rationality from critical thinking are blurry and undefined. Both rely on 
formal, analytical, cognitive processes for weighing evidence and arguments and making 
judgments, including moral judgments. While rationality is often framed as "reason generally," it 
may be that rationality is the cognitive process involved in generating criteria for judging, while 
critical thinking is the process of application of the criteria to different domains of knowledge.  
Critical thinking is a special kind of cognitive process and does not seem to be a regular feature 
of everyday practice, like bare rationality. Even a thought at all is in some sense a product of 
rationality. Critical thinking might be framed as a more developed kind of rationality subsuming 
a set of technical cognitive processes. Is critical thinking a highly developed form of reason and 
practical rationality? Critical thinking surly is involved with reason, as having a logical, coherent 
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framework for weighing evidence and making judgments, and giving reasons is a necessary 
feature. Rationality and critical thinking are clearly tightly related.  
In formulating a coherent scheme of rationality we must make clear to what extent it is 
intrinsically social and moral. Rationality is clearly an antecedent of moral judgment and of 
giving reasons for actions. As Johnson (1996) points out for us a critic is one who produces a 
commentary or a theory and has a respect for objectivity, reason, and gives evidence to back up 
theories. Giving theories to justify a critique is intrinsically social and hinges on the criteria of 
separating good from bad based on community standards. To what extent is formulating a 
conception of rationality a purely social and linguistic problem?  
The word rationality means more than merely formal, analytical, logical reasoning. It is not 
merely logical consistency, even while logical inconsistency is sometimes what is meant by 
irrational (Johnson, 1996). In its intrinsically moral sense our conception of rationality seems to 
lead itself towards the idea of self-knowledge. Self-knowledge is the dialectical basis for the 
interplay between actions and beliefs that influences the extent to which an action or decision is 
rational and moral. Generating a defense of liberal education will have rationality, particularly in 
terms of self-knowledge, as a key distinguishing feature. The issue here means differentiating the 
intellectual from the rational and the rational from the irrational in theories, beliefs, norms, 
standards, and judgments of value.  
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APPENDIX B 
LIBERAL EDUCATION AND POLITICAL LIBERALISM 
The framework for a liberal educational theory includes: i. a deep commitment to pluralism, ii. 
government influence through a legitimation process, and iii. that a legitimated government has a 
duty to uphold individual liberty (Levinson, 1999): 
(a) Commitment to pluralism: Huge range of possible values, identities, conceptions of the good 
life. Consensus of values is unlikely. 
(b) Government legitimation: Principles of justice through which the state operates. The 
legitimation process takes place in an acknowledgement of agreed upon principles and equal 
respect.  
Meira Levinson’s (1999) criteria for a liberal legitimation process are: 
 public process 
 all citizens participate 
 equality (equally) 
 freedom (freely) 
 consensus 
(c) Government duty: To uphold individual liberty through substantive liberal institutions. 
I. Pluralism: Pluralism is the ground of the liberal legitimation process. Different values gain 
support in a process of discussion and agreement. A process of legitimation serves as the ground 
of the state. Laws are only justifiable through the mode of deliberative equality and freedom. 
II. Government legitimation: Grounded in John Locke’s notion of “non-coercive, equal 
participation leading to unanimous agreement” (Levinson, 1999, p. 11). Any lawful government 
needs to be rooted in this liberal approach and the criteria for a fair legitimation process. John 
Locke’s framework satisfies all five of the legitimation criteria. 
III. Government duty: Contingent on satisfying criteria I and II, includes legitimated liberties and 
duties. It is a positive, substantive requirement of a legitimate state. 
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The idea that the state has a duty to uphold fundamental rights is what distinguishes liberalism 
from anarchism and utilitarianism. Liberalism is complicated by the idea of pluralism and by the 
negotiation of meanings and terms. Some think this may render widespread agreement 
impossible and that liberals and libertarians need to acknowledge implicit partisanship in their 
claims. The processes of weighing evidence and making  judgments implicit in the cognitive 
functions of liberal education are similar in nature to the processes of democratic election. It 
involves being able to look at things from a variety of perspectives and incorporate new ways of 
seeing problems and finding solutions amidst a wide array of critical problems. 
Table 2 CONDITIONS OF A LIBERAL STATE 
COMMITMENT TO 
PLURALISM 
Range of possible values, 
identities, conceptions of the 
good; Process of reasonable 
deliberation leading to consensus 
Ground of legitimation process; 
plurality of beliefs/values;  
PROCESS OF 
GOVERNMENT 
LEGITIMATION 
Criteria for legitimation process: i. 
public process, ii. all citizens 
participate, iii. equality (equally), 
iv. freedom (freely), and v. 
consensus 
“non-coercive, equal 
participation leading to 
unanimous agreement” 
(Levinson, M., 1999, p. 11) 
DUTIES OF 
LEGITIMATE 
GOVERNMENT 
Uphold liberty through substantive 
institutions 
Contingent on criteria I and II. 
Consensus among values leading 
to liberties and duties; Positive 
requirement of the state 
 
Levinson (1999) unites the commitment to pluralism, the legitimation process, and substantive 
liberties and duties under the form of autonomy. Autonomy is defined as the capacity to form a 
conception of the good and to evaluate ends with the genuine possibility of revising them. 
Autonomy is regarded as a value that justifies substantive freedoms. Autonomy has at least two 
dimensions: i. social and political, and ii. cognitive and moral. In its social and political 
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dimensions it involves processes of practical judgements based on opinion and evidence. In the 
cognitive and moral sense it involves the mental process of envisioning a just society and 
calculating an acceptable path to achieving the good for the individual and for the state. 
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APPENDIX C 
 STATEMENT OF PHILOSOPHY 
The Academic Approach 
A philosophy of education reflects the basic understanding, values, and knowledge of a person's 
worldview. Such a position is a kind of meta-orientation (Ornstein & Hunkins, 2009, p. 2). A 
philosophy of education provides statements concerning educational development, design, and 
planning, and the perceived roles of teachers and students. A person can be strongly attached to a 
single approach or represent an overlapping of approaches catered to different situations. 
Broadly speaking, I situate myself in an academic approach (Ornstein & Hunkins, 2009, p. 7-8) 
which is also sometimes referred to as the traditional, encyclopedic, intellectual, or knowledge-
based orientation. The academic orientation is aimed at analyzing and synthesizing major 
positions, trends, and concepts. Academic analysis is concerned with many broad issues that are 
approached in a scholarly, intellectual, and theoretical rather than a scientific, technical, social, 
or practical way. Academic approaches are often concerned with the nature and structure of 
knowledge and the basis of processes like teaching and learning. Often, ideas and theories are 
approached historically, philosophically, and politically, aimed at a broad theoretical overview 
and synthesis. Academic approaches are primarily concerned with ideas, theories, concepts, and 
words. 
Idealism and Epistemology 
An orientation towards knowledge is central to the philosophy of education; it influences all the 
organization of our lives and the goals towards which we strive. Usually, an individual reflects 
several philosophies and approaches to knowledge. Beliefs about the nature, structure, and scope 
of knowledge influences the life of the individual and the life of the wider society. The way we 
frame knowledge determines our decisions, choices, and understandings of the world; acting on a 
philosophical orientation influences what values we attach ourselves to and how we enact those 
values. Epistemological considerations are a beginning point in educational decision making and 
in selecting criteria to determine means, aims, and ends. An epistemological orientation reflects 
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our background and our experiences, our attitudes, beliefs, and worldview and provides a guide 
for our actions. 
Epistemology provides a framework for thinking about our values and goals and determines our 
aims and methods for achieving them. Epistemologically, I position myself as an idealist, in the 
vein that stretches back to Socrates and Plato and whose other major figures include Kant and 
Hegel (Ornstein & Hunkins, 2009, p. 34-5). Plato believed that ideas could be brought into unity 
and harmony through universal concepts or Platonic "forms." Hegel tried to establish a 
comprehensive philosophical worldview grounded in idealism and thought ideas could be 
synthesized through the bringing together of thesis and anti-thesis to arrive at higher levels of 
understanding. Kant believed such a process as pointed to by Plato could achieve some moral 
clarification and insight but that no such universal or absolute truths could be known. 
Idealists generally hold that the highest aim of education is the search for truth. and for enduring, 
timeless, universal values. To an idealist, learning involves remembrance or anamnesis (see 
Plato's Meno), which is the recollection and analysis of ideas. Education, as well as knowledge, 
is mainly concerned with ideas and concepts (e.g., liberal education). The idealist seeks to 
synthesize knowledge together as a harmonious unity by relating ideas and concepts together. 
The seven liberal arts of the trivium and quadrivium represent the best curricular organization for 
the idealist. Philosophy and theology are at the top of the hierarchy for their highly abstract 
character, mathematics is required to cultivate rational thinking, history and literature provide 
training in moral and cultural thinking, and language provides the means for articulating and 
communicating ideas, theories, and concepts. 
Idealists typically emphasize classics like Plato and Aristotle over science because the purpose of 
the classics (like the Great Books of Alan Bloom's (1987) The Closing of the American Mind), is 
the training of the intellect according to its own inherent nature, a nature that has a universal 
significance. Training in ancient philosophy and languages trains the mind whereas science 
merely interrogates certain cause and effect relationships between natural objects. 
As a philosophy of education idealism aims at moral principles that are universal in scope such 
as the constant features of a general humanity. Knowledge consists in recollection, 
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remembrance, or anamnesis of latent, innate ideas that arise from the potential for experience of 
the world. Knowledge is only the reflection on innate ideas or values intrinsic to the formal 
structures of experience, knowledge, understanding, teaching, and learning. The only real values 
are those that are unchanging, constant, and general in character. The teacher, according to 
idealism, must aid students in becoming aware of innate potential and intrinsic human powers, 
and to the moral criteria that are intrinsic to all life and work. Framing knowledge as recollection 
or the power of memory in general represents thinking in its most abstract sense. The basis of 
idealist educators is the liberal arts, that are crowned with philosophy; a master discipline that is 
universal in scope. 
Idealism and Perennialism 
Alongside the idealist commitment to values that transcend the accidents of place, time, and 
context, perennialists (Ornstein & Hunkins, 2009, p. 38-9) regard human nature as a constant. 
People have the capacity to reason and to raise to an understanding of the universal truths of 
nature. The goal of education is to develop reason, rationality, and the rational person. According 
to perennials, similar to idealism, the liberal arts represent our best intellectual heritage. 
Becoming acquainted with the ideas of the past aids the student in coping with the demands of 
the present and the exigencies of the unforeseeable future. Both idealism and perennialism focus 
on the past and regard the liberal arts as a special intellectual heritage, and both orientations 
value classics and classical subjects. Perennialists typically advocate for Great Books, a core 
curriculum, and for returning to the liberal arts. 
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